

SOVIETISM

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING



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SOVIETISM

"How explain the outspoken sympathy for the Bolshevik régime among so many well-meaning democratic Americans?"

"Our credulity, our impatience in sifting evidence will explain much. We will take a hazardous trip to Russia, talk to Lenine and his *commissars* through an interpreter, return with a phonographic reproduction of their utterances. But we will not study the utterances of the Bolsheviki when they are not talking propaganda for America. We will not bring critical analysis to bear on their claims. We will not try to ascertain whether in the nature of things their statements are possible."

—MANYA GORDIN STRUNSKY in *The Century*.

SOVIETISM

THE A B C OF RUSSIAN BOLSHEVISM—
ACCORDING TO THE BOLSHEVISTS

BY

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

AUTHOR OF "RUSSIA'S MESSAGE," "THE SOCIALISTS
AND THE WAR," ETC.



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FOREWORD

What everybody wants to know is not what the Bolsheviks *claim* to stand for, nor even what they honestly *think* they stand for, but what they actually do stand for—according to a fair summary of their own acknowledged words and deeds.

In the following summary first weight is given to the Soviet constitution and decrees—as issued by the Soviet or sympathetic publications—the speeches of Lenin and the other Bolshevik leaders, the Bolshevik press. Only occasionally is other evidence referred to. The opinions of the greatest Bolshevik writer, Maxim Gorky, are quoted as giving a suitable background to hold the material together.

The volume is prepared for the use of the general public, which has shown a full appreciation of the fact that this type of evidence is conclusive. To the fair-minded reader a fraction of the material here brought together would be sufficient. He must be warned, however, that the Soviet sympathizers will endeavor to impugn even Soviet testimony, whenever it is damaging.

Let the facts speak!

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CONTENTS

I. SOVIETISM AND THE BOLSHEVIKI

	PAGE
I. WHO ARE THE BOLSHEVIKI?	3
The Bolsheviks a Sect.—Do the Soviets Represent the Majority?—The International Origin of Bolshevism.	
II. WHAT DO THEY WANT, FUNDAMENTALLY?	8
The Class-Struggle "Doctrine"—The Absence of a "Seriously Undertaken" Program.—The Present "a Period of Destruction."—The Bolshevik New Testament.	
III. WHAT DO THE SOVIETS STAND FOR IN ACTUAL PRACTICE?	18
A Method of Obtaining Power.—Not Unselfish Idealists.	
IV. WHAT ARE THEY FIGHTING AGAINST?	23
Soviet "Democracy."—Repudiation of Proletarian Democracy by the Communist International.—How Lenin Launched Civil War.—The Character of the Civil War.	
V. WHAT IS THE CHIEF SOVIET WEAPON?	30
The Reign of Terror.—"Abandonment" of Reign of Terror.—Starvation as a Means of Government.—Psychological Ruthlessness.	
VI. TO WHAT IS THEIR POWER DUE?	46
The Economic Disorganization.—Russia Starved by the Entente.—Soviet Finance.—The Bolshevik Labor Policy.—The Repression of the Labor Unions.—Soviet Russia Establishes Compulsory Labor.—Militaristic State Socialism the Final Outcome.—Compulsion for Industrial Managers.—Special Revolutionary Tribunals for Labor.—The Secret of Red Army Success.—Sovietism and Bolshevism.—Educational Reform?—Attempt to Sovietize the Schools.—Bolshevism against Freedom of Conscience in Education.—Education and Propaganda Merged.	

VII. WHAT SUPERIORITY HAVE THE BOLSHEVIKI DEVELOPED?	86
Do the Bolsheviki Represent the Proletariat?—What is New About Bolshevism?—The Extraordinary Propaganda Efficiency of the Soviets.—The Undemocratic Origin of the Propaganda.—How Does the Propaganda Succeed?	
VIII. CAN THE SOVIETS WIN BACK THE PEOPLE?	99
Compulsory Agriculture.—Bolshevism vs. Agriculture.—Communism to be Forced on Agriculture.	
IX. ARE THE BOLSHEVIKI REFORMING?	113

II. THE PRO-BOLSHEVISTS

X. "AUTHORITIES"	120
A Summary of Amazing Claims.	
XI. THE ORIGIN OF PRO-BOLSHEVISM IN SMOLNY INSTITUTE	125
XII. VARIETIES OF PRO-BOLSHEVISM	133
i. The Near Bolsheviks.	
XIII. VARIETIES OF PRO-BOLSHEVISM	137
ii. The Pro-Sovietists.	
XIV. VARIETIES OF PRO-BOLSHEVISM	146
iii. Benevolent Neutrality.	
XV. NON-BOLSHEVIST SUPPORTERS	150
Killing Sovietism by Kindness.—Recognition the Real Object of the Economic Propaganda.—Foreign Capital to Rescue Sovietism.—Compromising with Bolshevism.	

III. SOVIETISM ABROAD

XVI. THE SOVIETS' PLANS FOR WORLD REVOLUTION	165
Road to International Dictatorship.—A Revolutionary Offensive.—Instruments of Revolution.—Platform of Third International.—Sovietizing the World.—Attitude	

CONTENTS

ix

PAGE

to United States.—Letter to American Labor.—Soviet Movements Progress.—The Black International.—Victory for 1920 Predicted.—Open War on the World.—World Disorder as a Preparation for World Revolt.—Sovietism in the Border States.—Bolshevist Revolutionism as Taught in Italy.—Russian and German Sovietism.—Bolshevist Imperialism.—The Function of the Communist International.—The Strength and Weakness of World Revolt as the Basis for Sovietism.

XVII. THE CAPTURE OF THE WORLD'S SOCIALIST PARTIES BY BOLSHEVISM

191

The American Socialist Party Joins the Communist International.—The Soviet Government and the Communist International.

APPENDICES

I. SOVIETISM AND RELIGION	209
II. THE SOVIETS AS A MILITARY MENACE	215
III. THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT	218

PART I
SOVIETISM AND THE BOLSHEVIKI

CHAPTER I

WHO ARE THE BOLSHEVIKI?

The Bolsheviks are a *Sect*, that is an organized movement which believes it has the only truth and all the truth that is necessary for the social salvation of humanity.

The Bolsheviks are *not*
a political party in the ordinary sense,
the "majority" of Russia,
the proletariat or wage earning class.

The Bolsheviks a Sect.—That this “party” is in reality a sect is shown by all its publications and by most of its acts. The preamble of the Soviet Constitution (adopted by the 5th Pan-Russian Congress) declares that the Soviets propose “to put an end to every ill that oppresses humanity!”

Do the Soviets Represent the Majority?—The constitution abandons any claim to represent the masses as a whole, declaring for “a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry.” A previous constitution had given such of the peasantry as were enfranchised a representation equal to the urban proletariat in each province. But even the largest Bolshevik estimate of the numbers of the proletariat calculates them as being only one-fifth as many as the peasants or agriculturists. The new constitution, reprinted by the sympathetic

New York *Nation*, accomplishes the same result as follows (see Section 8, Article 1) :

“The Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets consists of representatives of the urban Soviets (one delegate for each 25,000 votes) and representatives of the provincial congresses (one delegate for each 125,000 voters).”

In order to understand the extent and precise grounds of Lenine’s repudiation of majority rule, let us quote his denunciation of the rival faction of the Social Democratic or Workingmen’s Party, namely, the Mensheviks:

“In its class composition this party is not Socialistic at all. It does not represent the laboring masses. It represents fairly prosperous peasants and workingmen, petty traders, many small and some even fairly large capitalists, and a certain number of real but gullible proletarians who have been caught in the bourgeois net.”

Even a “fairly prosperous” workingman is not a “proletarian.”

Karl Radek, one of the most influential Bolsheviks, interviewed in Berlin by The New York Globe—a paper favorably regarded by the Bolsheviks, is reported as saying:

“*The claim, made by some of our people, that the majority of the Russian people favor the Soviet government is not true. The peasants are against the Soviet government.*”

The peasants are 90 per cent. of the Russian people (and even more, since the loss of the leading industrial district, Russian Poland).

Lenine himself has admitted his failure with the largest peasant group:

"We have not yet learned how to regulate our relations with the middle peasants and to win their confidence."—Lenine's Report to Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist (Bolshevist) Party, Petrograd Pravda, April 5, 1919.

One of the most sympathetic to Bolshevism of all the correspondents selected by Lenine to enter Russia in the confident assurance that he would give desirable reports, was Isaac Don Levine of The New York Evening Globe. In a speech in New York in February, 1920, Mr. Levine pointed out that there are only 300,000 real Bolsheviks (members of the Communist Party) in Russia to-day, and only 62,000 Communists in the Red Army, which numbers more than 1,200,000 men, of whom 80 per cent. are conscripts.

"The majority of the Russian people," he stated, "know practically nothing of Socialism or its principles. They are not converts to Communism, but they prefer the Soviet government to seeing the dictatorship of Denikin or Yudenitch, and they fight under the Soviet banner to preserve their independence." (For facts showing that the Russian "proletariat" are not Bolsheviks, see Chapter 7.)

Of course the people will passively submit to any despotism, temporarily—during periods like the present in Russia, or like the last decade of the Czarism, when even 90 per cent. of the nation was helpless against a highly organized army, bureaucracy, and police.

In the hearings before the Senate Commission, "Ambassador" Martens argued indirectly that the proletariat (represented by the Bolsheviks and by the Bol-

sheviki alone) were always the majority and would always use violence—unless their opponents submitted to their dictatorship.

"Do you believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat?" Mr. Ellis, the Senate counsel, inquired.

"Certainly," Martens replied. "I believe the Soviet form of government is the best, and if the great mass of the people are in favor of it they have the right to use force against minorities if they resist. *The ruling classes always resist.*"

"You don't think the proletariat has a right to use revolutionary force unless it is in the majority?" Mr. Ellis asked.

"*The proletariat is always in the majority,*" said Martens.

Quotations from Lenin in several parts of this volume show the Bolshevik claim that only Bolsheviks are self-conscious proletarians or, at least, they retain the right to say who the real or loyal proletarians are. Yet no matter how many are thus excluded—and Lenin excludes most of the world's Socialist and Labor organizations—the remnant, approved officially by the Bolsheviks, is still held to be *the* proletariat, which is the majority, and—under Bolshevik dictatorship, called the dictatorship of the proletariat—is justified in using violence, and in seizing control of government and industry.

The International Origin of Bolshevism.—Bolshevism or Sovietism is by no means a Russian or Slavic movement, it is not "a natural political expression of the Slavic genius," nor "the traditional Russian idea of democracy," as its American apologists have alleged. All Russians, Bolsheviks and non-Bolsheviks alike, hail

Sovietism (or denounce it) as something *new* and *international*. Lenin himself says the idea was taken in part from the Paris Commune, in part from the American revolutionary Socialist, Daniel De Leon. Nothing would so insult the Sovietists as to declare that their movement is *in any degree* either a national or a traditional development.

A certain group of Americans have “discovered” that the Soviets are a peasant institution, derived from the *mir* (the town meeting of the peasants). There is no resemblance, no historic connection, and no relation whatever between the Soviet and the *mir* in the Russian mind. In fact they represent the opposite poles of Russian thought and politics—the *mir* being feared and opposed by the Bolsheviks, who have done all in their power to replace it by village committees and other institutions. The *mir* on the other hand is favored by the arch enemies of the Bolsheviks, the Social Revolutionists, who elected a majority to the constitutional assembly, which was broken up by Soviet bayonets.

Three-fourths of the self-chosen leaders of the Soviets, members of a non-Slavic race (which they do not, however, truthfully represent), have a German dialect as their mother tongue, and have scarcely had contact with this peasant people (the Russians). Many of these have spent a large part of their lives in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, England, France or America and confess their ideas were taken largely from the extremists of those countries.

CHAPTER II

WHAT DO THE BOLSHEVIKI WANT, FUNDAMENTALLY?

When the profession of theories and doctrines is put to the crucial test, in the only way it can be tested, namely, by the force of circumstances—as in the civil war in Russia to-day—the Bolsheviki are found in actual practice to be aiming at one thing only, POWER for their sect. Like Mohammed and his followers they believe that they are the only trustworthy custodians and interpreters of the constantly changing practical aims of the sect. If they secure all the power they want they may, or may not, stand for certain ideas and doctrines, such as may *then* appeal to them. At present they are mainly concerned with the struggle to establish, maintain and increase their autocratic power, which they call “the dictatorship of the proletariat.”

Bolshevism is *not* primarily
a doctrine,
a program for a new society.

“Russian Bolshevism . . . No, it is not a doctrine, nor a political party. It is merely a method, a mode of action, only a means which has long ago become widely detached from the very aims that were supposed to justify it.”

These words of Alexander Kouprine, famous Russian author, were called to my attention after the present booklet was prepared. They are the very words I have

employed, and give a strong reënforcement to the view here taken because of the fact that Kouprine, a close friend of that famous Bolshevik, Maxim Gorky, lived in Russia during a large part of the Bolshevik régime and had every opportunity for observation.

The Class-Struggle "Doctrine".—The only socio-logical doctrine the Bolsheviks hold to is the Socialist theory of class-struggle. Even this they do not treat seriously and critically like Kautsky and the German Socialists. Taken as the Soviets take it, it is really no doctrine at all, but merely a call to arms. The sect can win only by fighting. The enemy is utterly wicked and must be fought to a finish. All neutrals must be forced to choose sides. The fight must be forced so as to compel this. The fighting can thus be made desperate, and every barbarity and ruthlessness can be justified. Etc. Etc. If this is a doctrine then every fighting sect has held a similar doctrine.

The Absence of a "Seriously Undertaken" Program.—The Soviets have not seriously adopted any constructive governmental program of their own. They have set down a vast number of contradictory projects on paper—but mainly for propaganda. They have disturbed themselves little about realization. They have the government and the country but they do not accept responsibility. For, though every one of these projects should fail completely no propaganda value will be lost (at least for some time), since every failure is held up to the people as being due either to the past crimes of the Russian bourgeoisie, the present crimes of the other bourgeois governments, or the danger of the return of the bourgeoisie—which necessitates the suspension of all new and far-reaching Bolshevik construction. By con-

tinuing their military and conspirative threats against neighboring countries the Bolsheviks believe they can keep these countries on the alert and make this danger to "the revolution" in Russia last indefinitely. Bismarck argued for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine because it would keep the French hostile, and thus provide a solid ground for German militarism. Lenin's reasoning—openly avowed in many of his statements—is similar.

"The task of construction depends *entirely* on how soon revolution will triumph in the more important countries of Europe. Only after such a victory shall we be able *seriously to undertake* the work of construction."—Speech of Lenin to Petrograd Soviet, Severnaya Kommuna, March 4, 1919.

The Bolsheviks are "seriously undertaking" one thing only "for the present period"—the capturing of governments by the international Bolshevik sect. Why should we take seriously a work of construction which is not yet seriously undertaken? Under these conditions many projects for construction are as a matter of fact pure propaganda (see Chapter V). At best they represent a political theory and not a political program.

But even these theories are not to be taken very seriously; they do not hold together consistently or persistently as a system or doctrine.

The Bolsheviks teach nothing consistently except Bolshevik rule through "Soviets," which may mean any social system—or mere opportunism and chaos.

Maxim Gorky, referring in *Novaya Zhizn* to "the chaotic, topsy-turvy activities of the Soviets," declared:

"The decrees of the 'Government of People's Commissioners' are no more than newspaper feuille-

tons, no more, no less. It is that sort of literature which is written on water, and even though a real idea is now and then given expression to, the present circumstances forbid the realization of any idea."

"Die Freiheit," the Berlin organ of the Independent Social-Democrats, a revolutionary newspaper, which has been most friendly to the Bolsheviks, says:

"Purity of principles is for Russia only an article for exportation. Always seeking to introduce anarchy and disorder in the world, Lenin to-day finds his road to Damascus, for he is making a fresh appeal to capitalist forms in order to reestablish the general economy of the country. The dictatorship of the proletariat is reducing itself to the dictatorship of a few Communist leaders. The Councils' system is broken up, for the workers have no longer any influence in the factories. The agrarian program of the Communists is a complete fiasco."

Why all this effort to provide an export propaganda—which has absorbed a large part of the Soviets' time and means? Because the Bolsheviks, like the Mohammedans, know their sect can thrive only while spreading by arms and propaganda. Lenin has declared to Raymond Robins and others that Sovietism cannot hope to live if confined to Russia alone. The reason is that in modern society neither arms nor propaganda—as the main props of a social system—have ever been able to accomplish anything much at home. By their very nature they require a constant supply of new territories and peoples to act upon.

(It is worth while, in passing, to point out the probable motive of this semi-Communist organ of the German Independents. They do not see how Lenin can help

the world revolution in which they are interested, and at the same time enter into a sort of economic alliance with foreign capitalists!)

The Present a Period of Destruction.—The following important pronouncement, typical of many others, shows that the Bolsheviks have deliberately planned to turn their backs, for the present period, on constructive work and to give their entire energy to destruction:

“The present is the period of *destruction* and crushing of the capitalist system of the whole world.”

—Call for First International Communist Congress, Petrograd wireless, January 23, 1919.

Criticisms of Bolshevism by Captain Jacques Sadoul are almost as valuable as those of Maxim Gorky. For two years Sadoul was the most active of the foreign sympathizers with the Bolsheviks in Russia. A member of the French Military Mission he was given every opportunity by Lenin and soon became the chief French exponent of Bolshevism. After having been court-martialed by the French government he was nominated by the Socialists of Paris for the Chamber of Deputies and obtained the same large vote as did the other Socialist candidates.

Sadoul, like Gorky, is a partisan and his detailed testimony in behalf of Bolshevism cannot be accepted without further examination. This does not apply to his testimony against it. His book on the Bolshevik Revolution has an introduction by Henri Barbusse, who, an ardent and unqualified Bolshevik himself, recommends it without qualification. Sadoul says:

"The Soviet regime, resting exclusively upon the proletarians, has brilliantly demonstrated its destructive power and its insufficiency in creative work."—"Notes sur la Révolution Bolchevique" (p. 377).

The Bolshevik New Testament.—The doctrine with which the Bolsheviks came into power is carefully and deliberately elaborated by Lenin in his book called "The State and Revolution," published in the autumn of 1917. While the previous works of Lenin constitute the Old Testament, this book, published after the first Russian revolution, and immediately before the Bolshevik bayonets turned Kerensky out, is the New Testament of the Soviets.

This New Testament has brought Lenin's views into final form for propaganda purposes. His theories are lengthy and complicated so that he and his followers have no difficulty in finding texts to support any acts whatever that promise to extend their power. It is upon the type of doctrine contained in "The State and Revolution" that the Bolsheviks based their appeals to the masses in the summer of 1917—that is, these were their theoretical views, for they were enforced by the crudest promises of bread, land, peace and the political sovereignty of the mass. In other words, every conceivable promise was made entirely regardless of the facts, of possibilities of fulfillment, or of contradictions between the promises themselves.

Nor must it be supposed that all this propaganda was the main force which overturned Kerensky and established Lenin. The pressure of the German armies was constantly pushing Russia towards the gulf, while the

German propagandists were doing everything in their power to reënforce the propaganda of the Bolsheviks.

The importance of this "new testament" must therefore not be exaggerated, either in its political effects or as giving an insight into the fundamental psychology of the Bolsheviks. Their psychology is mainly characterized as a tendency not towards doctrine of any kind, but towards a struggle for power for the sect. But "*The State and Revolution*" does indicate the *sort of doctrine which Bolshevism evolves when it is occupied with theorizing*. It thus gives the drift of the Bolshevik mind, discloses the guiding motives of the Bolshevik character and shows one of the devices by which they obtained power.

The great revolutionary work of the Bolshevik Mohammed proves clearly that his favorite ideas (which, however, he doesn't allow to interfere with his struggle for power) are to be classed rather as *Communist-Anarchist* than as Socialism even of a revolutionary type.

"The State is the organ of class domination, the organ of oppression of one class by another" (page 11). Therefore it must be destroyed.

"The democratic Republic is the best possible political form for capitalism" (page 18).

"The substitution of a proletarian for the capitalist State is impossible without a violent revolution" (page 26).

In Russia (March, 1917), according to our author, on account of the weakness and corruption of the Cadets, Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, the proletariat was called upon "to concentrate all the forces of destruction against the State, and to regard the problem as one not of perfecting the machinery of the State, but of breaking up and annihilating it" (page 37).

Anarchism is the enemy, above all, of the political State. And in our time the political State is, mainly, a democracy based upon majority rule. Lenine declares open war against democracy, that is, he did so until recently, when his advisers in Western Europe and America persuaded him to assume outwardly the opposite stand. This change, however, is clearly only on the surface, since numberless quotations can be shown from his writings and speeches even recently to the contrary (see below).

He also attacks "majority rule" but in this instance wishes to claim the phrase "majority rule" for his side of the case. He does this by the trick of calling existing majority rule "majority domination"—his contention being that as long as the minority does not willingly submit to each majority decision we have no majority rule but a dictatorship, which he calls a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie! This view is expressed in the following paragraph:

"Democracy is not identical with majority rule. Democracy is a State which recognizes the subjection of the minority to the majority—that is, an organization for the use of violence . . . by one part of the population against another. . . . We set ourselves, as our final aim, the task of the destruction of the State—that is, of every form . . . of violence against man in general. . . . Striving for Socialism, we are convinced it will develop further into Communism . . . and there will vanish all need for force . . . since people will grow accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social existence without force and without subjection" (page 85).

Lenine does not deny that his new régime is based upon violence. (See below.) Indeed, this is precisely

what he means by a dictatorship of the proletariat." He is constantly referring to this accepted Bolshevik phrase in order to demonstrate to the satisfaction of his Bolshevik followers that there must be an "iron dictatorship," "the rule of one man in each industry," etc.

He covers this contradiction easily by saying that a dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary "for a considerable period in order to destroy the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie." That is, to destroy what we call democracy and majority rule!

Lenine's Communism is fully and sufficiently expressed in the following paragraph:

"To organize our whole national economy like the postal system, but in such a way that . . . all persons employed should receive no higher wages than the working man, and the whole under the management of the armed proletariat—this is our immediate aim. That is the kind of State and the economic basis we need" (page 52).

It only needs to be pointed out that Lenine has given a great many conflicting interpretations to this Communist principle and will doubtless give still others. Apparently he is able to advocate any economic methods whatever under this head from syndicalism to compulsory labor; from the Taylor system of scientific management to the payment of enormous salaries for experts!

In other words, his doctrines do not restrict him in any direction; he guides the Soviet ship of state without a chart, in the meanwhile claiming infallibility by offering himself as the only prophet, the only authorized interpreter of his doctrines. His method, as Gorky says, is experimental—a method that a rich, well organized,

and educated nation might deliberately adopt (within rational limits), but a method that no despot, and especially no leader of a sect would dare to avow, least of all in a desperately wretched and backward country.

CHAPTER III

WHAT PRINCIPLES DO THE BOLSHEVIKI STAND FOR IN ACTUAL PRACTICE?

The Bolsheviki stand for one set of principles persistently, and for these only—namely, a METHOD of obtaining and keeping power for their sect. It is the method of fanaticism. They are ready to sacrifice everything for their object—including not only themselves, but—as far as necessary for their purpose—the entire human race and everything it has created. They do not acknowledge any inviolable rights of anybody outside their sect and they deny all facts, principles, ideals, and logic that at any time or place stand in the way of their effort to obtain a monopoly of power for their sect.

The Bolsheviki are *not*

idealists, since their aim is concrete, the possession of their earth by their sect, and its use and control, not according to any predetermined principles but according to any principles they determine as they go along;

unselfish, since they are aiming at the advance (by any and all means) not of themselves alone, it is true, but of their sect, including themselves.

In Russia the Bolsheviki are fighting all other parties, that is all that do not accept their autocratic rule; in other words, they are fighting democracy (see Chapter

IV). The testimony of the English expert Lockhart is valuable on this point. His competency and information are testified to by the pro-Bolshevist Raymond Robins (though Lockhart now reaches the opposite conclusions). Lockhart says:

"The avowed ambition of Lenin is to create civil warfare throughout Europe. Every speech of Lenin's is a denunciation of constitutional methods, and a glorification of the doctrine of physical force. With that object in view he is destroying systematically both by execution and by *deliberate starvation* every form of opposition to Bolshevism. This system of 'terror' is aimed chiefly at the Liberals and non-Bolshevist Socialists, whom Lenin regards as his most dangerous opponents."

This is not unselfish idealism; it is the self-seeking of a sect.

A Bolshevik comrade wrote Gorky saying, "You should rejoice, comrade, that the proletariat is victorious." To this Gorky replied in his paper, the *Novaya Zhizn*:

"I have no reason for rejoicing. The proletariat has conquered no one and nothing. Just as the proletariat was unconquered when the former police régime held it by the throat, just so the bourgeoisie, which the proletariat has now by the throat, is not conquered. In general, ideas cannot be conquered by physical force."

"In factories and shops a vehement struggle has arisen," he says, "between the uneducated and unskilled workmen and those skilled and educated. The unskilled workers call the trained workers—locksmiths, machinists, foundry workers, etc.—'Bourgeoisie.' "

"But what alarms me most," he continues, "is

the fact that the revolution does not bring with it any sign of a spiritual regeneration among men. It does not seem to be making men more honest. It is not lifting their self-esteem nor the moral value of their labor. At least one does not notice among the masses that the revolution has lifted or quickened their social conscience. Human life is appraised just as cheaply as it was before. . . . The 'new authorities' are just as brutal as the old ones were, and in the bargain their manners are worse. The new officials permit themselves to be bribed just as easily and they send men to prison in herds the same as the old did."

"Physical force has merely been transferred," writes Gorky, "and there is no more contemptible poison than power over one's fellowmen."

The reason why there is no "spiritual regeneration" is clear. The Bolsheviks do not appeal in most cases to social instincts or social aspiration. Most victims are offered bread or work. Some are offered pay or preferment, careers of revolutionary adventure in the Bolshevik hierarchy, or even opportunities for plunder or revenge.

Gorky makes it clear that Lenin is not really endeavoring to live up to any fixed dogma, except his own divine right to rule. For he regards himself as free to experiment. That is the only dogma and it furnishes him with his excuse in his own mind, but it does not limit or determine the direction of his actions. That is, it is *his* dogma. Doubtless he shares its profits with his loyal and devoted sect, but not with others. Gorky said (in *Novaya Zhisn*) :

"Lenin possesses all the qualities of a 'chief,' including the absolute moral indifference which is often necessary for such a part. This people has

already paid for Lenine's 'experience' with thousands and thousands of lives. It will still cost it tens of thousands more. But this atrocious tragedy never makes Lenine hesitate, for he is the slave of dogma, and his partisans are his slaves. The working classes are to Lenine what minerals are to the metallurgist. Can a Socialist-Nationalist state be made of this mineral? Indeed no, and Lenine doubts it. But why not try? What does Lenine risk if the attempt does not come off? Nothing much."*

Aiming, as it does, at power at any price, in the name of the most ignorant of the masses, Bolshevism cannot embody, or even consistently aim at, idealism. All the other parts of the teaching are utterly subordinate to this: *power for the least developed part of the people*. There is no idealism in this. If some of the leaders endeavor to mix in a certain amount of irrelevant idealism it can have no practical effect. The chief Bolsheviks would not—and could not—allow it to become a dominant note.

Sadoul says (on page 200 of his "Notes sur la Révolution Bolchevique") that, in view of the existing level of the Russian masses, Bolshevism—which appeals to the masses alone—must necessarily end, in Russia, in pure demagogery. He writes:

* These and other quotations from Gorky in the present volume were all written after many years of intimate knowledge as a member of the Bolshevik Party and several months of Bolshevik rule. It is the same Lenine and the same Bolshevik movement that now confront us; *fundamental* change in a year or so is out of the question. The fact that Gorky preferred the Bolsheviks to the Czarists, rejoined them in the hope of bringing them his way, and is now more optimistic about them, in no way invalidates the permanent historic value of his earlier character sketches. It goes to show, on the contrary, that they were written without prejudice. The rest of our evidence indicates that they apply as much as ever to-day.

"The Soviet régime presupposes, it seems to me, a relatively advanced social and political education among the workmen and peasants. In the absence of this indispensable preparation it runs the chance of ending, even more easily than the bourgeois parliamentary régime, either in anarchy or in the tyranny of a handful of men. But this handful, blindly followed by the crude masses, which are moved only by appetites and emotions, can scarcely maintain their authority, or more accurately, preserve their power, except in proportion as they give their consent more and more to proletarian appetites and emotions."

As Gorky said in his newspaper, "Lenine does not know the people. But he does know—from his books—how to arouse the masses and how to excite their worst instincts."

CHAPTER IV

WHAT ARE THE BOLSHEVIKI FIGHTING FOR?

They are fighting *to overthrow democracy*. Democracy, or government by a changing majority, which respects minorities because it knows it may itself be a minority to-morrow, is the deadly foe both of the permanent dictatorship of any sect and of the establishment and fixation of any social system by means of the temporary dictatorship of any sect.

The Bolsheviks are *not* fighting at present *against capitalism*; on the contrary they are ready to make peace with Kaisers and capitalists in order to secure the sinews of war to carry on their fight against democracy; *against private property*, on the contrary they are ready greatly to extend the private property both of peasants and of foreign capitalists in Russia; *against class rule*; they preferred class-ruled Germany to the democracies where class rule is least in evidence.

The Bolshevik high-priests still profess the abolition of capitalism, private property, and class rule. They claim they have guaranteed private possession to the peasants, offered private capital greater concessions than did the Czarism, and established Bolshevik party dicta-

torship or class rule only *temporarily*. They say—and being fanatics, doubtless believe it themselves—that they will ultimately use all these forces to destroy capitalism, private property and class rule. Some of them expect very early revolutions to relieve them of all their present pledges and concessions. But if these revolutions do not come?

Moreover there have already been many subtle and profound changes in the Bolshevik's "doctrines"—for he claims the right to indefinite change, according to a new logic and an idea of "facts" beyond the reach of the non-Bolshevik intelligence. Not only may teachings continue to change, but also the personnel at the head of the sect and the dictatorship. Even less than others, then, can the Bolsheviks be judged by their words alone—whether these words be regarded as those of sincere fanatics or of charlatans. They must be judged by their acts. And what are the Soviets doing, constructing, creating—not in words or ukases, but in fact? Leaving all disputed details aside they have two—and only two—great social *structures* to their credit (or discredit), the Red Army and the despotic Bolshevik Party bureaucracy that governs the country—both institutions by their very nature opposed to democracy and making for a continuation of class rule either by Bolsheviks or by the next social group that gains control of them. Soviets are dissolved or fail to meet, are elected according to orders and act according to directions (see below)—the Red Army and the administrative bureaucracy, under Bolshevik Party orders, continue in control.

Soviet "Democracy."—The Soviets sometimes offer Sovietism as *democracy*, but a democracy which *they*

themselves state is diametrically opposed to everything the world has known under that name. In other words they repudiate and attack democracy, as the world has developed it (whether in Anglo-Saxon or Latin countries, Switzerland, Scandinavia or China), but claim the name, at times, for their anti-democratic doctrine.

Their entire literature shows this position. Often democracy is repudiated as being a "bourgeois" idea and practice. But sometimes a doctrine of "proletarian" democracy is put forth—as in the first Manifesto of the Bolshevik world organization, the Communist (or Third) Internationale, founded at Moscow in March, 1919. The references to democracy in this document, which was signed, for Russian Communism, by Lenine, Trotzky, and Zinoviev, are as follows (we quote from the reproduction given by the pro-Soviet American Socialist Party in its "Labor" Year Book):

"When the proletariat comes into power it merely confirms the utter impossibility of making use of the methods of bourgeois democracy (i. e., the methods of any and all existing democratic governments —ed.). It creates conditions and forms for a new and higher workmen's democracy."

The document then proceeds to defend the methods of "workmen's democracy"—which is defined as the Soviet system as practised in Russia—on the ground that "it is a question of life and death" between the workers and the bourgeoisie or middle class.

All existing democratic governments are characterized as imperialistic: "The collapse of the imperialist state, from the Czarist to the most democratic, is proceeding." Bourgeois monarchy and bourgeois democ-

racy—i.e., all non-communist democracy—are the same; in either case the masses must rise “against monarchical or democratic bureaucracy.”

Whatever gains had been won throughout history by democratic parliaments have now been wholly and utterly destroyed by the war. “This imperialistic war catastrophe has with one fell swoop swept away all the gains of experts and parliamentary struggles.”

Repudiation of Proletarian Democracy by the Communist International.—All evidence needed to show that Bolshevism regards neither the proletariat (when it is anti-communist) nor democracy—even when proletarian—is given by the publications of the Third International. Both in Lenine’s “call” and in the manifesto the world’s labor unions and labor parties are divided into three groups: (1) the social-patriots, who supported the war, are out and out bourgeois; (2) the Centre also belongs to the enemy and must be dealt by with all ruthlessness (this includes all non-communist and ultra-radicals and revolutionists); (3) communists.

Of the Socialists who are trying to restore the merely Socialist International it is said in the Manifesto: “The fight against the Socialist Centre is a necessary factor in the fight against imperialism.” The manifesto then lists this Centre as including “the German Independent Party, the present majority of the French Party (the Longuet faction), the Independent Labor Party of England,” some of the most revolutionary organizations of Europe—and all of them violently pro-Soviet.

But the bulk of the world’s proletariat is repudiated in the denunciation of the “social patriots” or those who supported the war or participate in present day governments. This includes not only whole labor par-

ties, like those of England, Austria, and Sweden, but the overwhelming majority of the labor unionists of nearly every country of the globe—as was clearly shown at the International Labor Union Congress at Amsterdam in August, 1919, where the pro-Bolshevist resolution was voted down by 100 to 1.

How Lenine Launched Civil War.—As soon as the democratic revolution had overthrown Czarism and established a people's government Lenine declared for “a civil war” against democracy. He said that the world war was being transformed into a world-wide revolutionary civil war. When the Kaiser's Government sent him across Germany into Russia, he at once began a campaign for “a permanent state of revolution” and “civil war,” and used these expressions in nearly all his speeches and writings before any civil disturbances of this character had begun. For Trotzky and others who were arrested were released and the Bolshevik press, for a long time, was unmolested, as was Lenine himself. “World-wide civil war” was their political shibboleth.

This world-aim of the Bolsheviks is stated in the May Day proclamation last year of the Communist “International,” in which appeared the phrase:

“Long live civil war; the only just war, in which the oppressed class fights its oppressors.”

A more recent proclamation declares:

“Conquests of the political power mean not merely a change in personnel, but *annihilation of the enemies' apparatus of Government*. The revolutionary era compels the proletariat to make use of the means of battle which will concentrate its entire energies, namely *mass action, with its logical resultant direct conflict with the government machinery in open combat.*”

It was only when the Hungarian Soviets were overthrown, in August, 1919, that Lenin began to claim that his "civil war" was purely defensive.

The Character of the Civil War.—The character of this civil war is illustrated daily by the cables—from a thousand different sources. It is also characterized by the numerous Bolshevik orders that have been published. Here is an example:

The official order of the Commandant of the Fortified District of Petrograd (The "Izvestia" of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Red Army Deputies No. 185, August 16, 1919) :

"I warn all that in the event of repeated cases of arson, I will not hesitate to adopt extreme measures, including the shooting of the bourgeoisie's hostages, in view of the fact that all the White Guards' plots directed against the proletarian state must be regarded not as the crime of individuals, but as *the offense of the entire enemy class*.

Signed: Acting Commandant of the Fortified District of Petrograd, B. Kozlovsky."

A civil war of massacre is being conducted not only against "bourgeois democrats" but also against radical and revolutionary socialists, as we see in the following extracts from the order of Djerjinsky, President of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Fighting the Counter-Revolution:

"The Left Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks that have been arrested will be considered hostages and their fate will depend upon the conduct of these two parties."

—Russkaya Zhizn, May 10, 1919.

Just as the German junkers used the phrase "military necessity" to cover military practices and atrocities that had been abolished for centuries, so the Soviets use the phrase "revolutionary necessity."

The order quoted is simply carrying out the policy of "mass terror" against all formidable opponents, as preached by the official Bolshevik leaders from the beginning. The following official Soviet telegram dated September 2, 1918, justifies mass terror as a reprisal, but also refers to the fact that it had been previously adopted by the Soviets:

"Notwithstanding frequent pronouncements urging mass terror against the Socialist Revolutionaries, White Guards and bourgeoisie, no real terror exists. Such a situation should decidedly be stopped. End should be put to weakness and softness. All Right Socialist-Revolutionaries known to local soviets should be arrested immediately. Numerous hostages should be taken from the bourgeois and other classes. At the slightest attempt to resist or the slightest movement among the White Guards, mass shooting should be applied at once. Initiative in this matter rests especially with the local executive committees."

CHAPTER V

WHAT IS THE CHIEF SOVIET WEAPON?

The chief Bolshevik weapon is *ruthlessness*. Acknowledging no principle but devotion to their sect and expecting no reward except as their sect grows in power, these fanatics permit themselves any act and any statement that seems to serve their purpose. Lenine and his followers are all avowed disciples of Macchiavelli. The Reign of Terror is their method in the physical sphere. In the intellectual sphere their statements are made (in good conscience) solely to create a desired impression and without regard for the facts, except as facts must be regarded to create the impression desired.

The Bolsheviks do *not* deny
the Reign of Terror (they boasted of it—in Russia);
nor the Propaganda—which despises facts, logic,
and principles (whatever irks them is called
“bourgeois” logic, principle, and fact).

The Reign of Terror.—The Bolsheviks do not deny the Reign of Terror. Sometimes they use it as a threat, as when “Soviet Russia,” the organ of “Ambassador” Martens, declares that if the Entente does not change its policy there may follow “total extermination of the Russian bourgeoisie.” This extermination is sometimes to be by the “exasperated masses,” not by direct order.

But we have quoted some direct orders in the preceding chapter, and the entire Bolshevik propaganda is aimed to create popular exasperation to the very highest degree—using any and all methods for the purpose.

Sometimes they apologize for the “terror”—but the apologies contradict. Radek, for example, says that the terror was necessary, not for defense, but in order to secure a minority dictatorship:

“I am one who does not deny that there has been terror in Russia. The government had to adopt drastic measures to keep the hungering, disgruntled, war-weary millions in leash.” (Interview above quoted.)

The Bolshevik leaders do not, as a rule, undertake to disguise or hide the fact that they maintain their dictatorship largely by terror. In a signed article in the “*Izvestia*” of January 10, 1919, Trotzky explains himself very clearly:

“By its terror against saboteurs the proletariat does not at all say: ‘I shall wipe out all of you and get along without specialists.’ Such a program would be a program of hopelessness and ruin. While dispersing, arresting and shooting saboteurs and conspirators, the proletariat says: ‘I shall break your will, because my will is stronger than yours, and I shall force you to serve me.’ . . . Terror as the demonstration of the will and strength of the working class, is historically justified, precisely because the proletariat was able thereby to break the political will of the Intelligentsia, pacify the professional men of various categories and work, and gradually subordinate them to its own aims within the field of their specialties.”

In his speech to national Soviet Congress at Moscow (January, 1920) Lenin cynically betrayed the true and fundamental ground of the reign of terror—admitting it at the same time to be basic. He declared (according to the friendly Lincoln Eyre) :

“Every victory we secure on the basis of this terror will result in that we shall eventually be able to dispense with this form of convincing the peasantry.”

The fact that Lenin facetiously refers to his system of governmental violence as parallel with the propaganda—both “a form of convincing”—is highly significant, for it is a confession that it is by physical and psychological violence that he maintains his power among the peasantry (90 per cent. of Soviet Russia). Our quotations seem to indicate that this is the basis of his power in the cities also. Certainly when the people are once thoroughly subdued and filled exclusively with the official Bolshevik picture of the world they will be easier to control, as Lenin indicates.

In a “Report on Bourgeois and Proletarian Democracies” (Petrograd “Pravda,” March 8, 1919), Lenin says that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is a *permanent* principle of Soviet rule and then that all socialists who are not communists commit treason to the proletariat, a capital offence in Soviet Russia, and, as quotations in Chapter IV show, an ample ground for the terror. Says Lenin:

“The essence of the Soviet authority consists in this, that the permanent and sole basis of all State authority, of the entire apparatus of government, is the mass organization precisely of those classes which

were oppressed by capitalism, that is, of the workmen and of the half-proletarians (peasants who did not exploit the labor of another and constantly had to sell at least a portion of their labor strength).”

“That which the socialists do not understand, which constitutes their theoretic near-sightedness, their submission to bourgeois prejudices and their political treason with respect to the proletariat, is the following: In a political society wherever there is any serious sharpening of class struggle *which is included in its very structure*, there can be no middle course between dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or dictatorship of the proletariat.”

Nor does Lenin always excuse his civil war as defensive even to-day. His address to American workingmen, the text of which was admitted by Martens to be genuine, said:

“In reality the class-struggle in revolutionary times has always inevitably taken on the form of a civil war, and civil war is unthinkable without the worst kind of destruction, without terror and limitations on the form of democracy in the interest of war. One must be a sickly sentimentalist not to be able to see, to understand and appreciate this necessity.

“The class-struggle is permanent. We are living in revolutionary times. In order to fight the class-struggle effectively in such times, in order to get *power* and keep it, civil war, terrorism, etc., are necessary. Here is the whole doctrine.”

A favorite and apparently unconscious trick of the Bolshevik mind is to play fast and loose with all terms—even their own—using them in contradictory senses for different occasions—after having defined them very definitely in their dogmas. They do this with all their

terms, "proletariat," "dictatorship," etc., as the present volume shows. For example take this reference to "the terror" by Lenin—from his speech at the 1920 Soviet Congress:

"We say that terror was forced upon us. They forgot that terrorism was forced upon us by the invasion of the all-powerful Entente. Is it not terror when a world fleet blockades a starving country? Is it not terror when foreign representatives relying on their alleged diplomatic inviolability organize White Guard revolts?"

Here Lenin makes terror, which he and his co-workers employ, as we do, in the sense of "terrorism" and "reign of terror" identical with the use of the "force" of war or of law and order, the pressure of a blockade, or even revolt. The point is that he justifies the use of terror against revolt—and then pretends that this means only the enforcement of order. The real Bolshevik theory and practice of terror is illustrated elsewhere in this volume. If the mere enforcement of order were ever meant, even in one instance, why the use of this very forceful word, which means to everybody—including the Bolsheviks—something quite different?

Gorky calls the "defensive" argument "a pretty phrase." Early in the civil war instituted by Lenin, Gorky wrote (in the *Novaya Zhisn*) :

"The revolutionary army garrison at Sebastopol has already undertaken the last final struggle with the bourgeoisie. *Without much ado they decided simply to massacre all the bourgeoisie who lived within their reach.* They decided and did it. At first they massacred the inhabitants of the two most bourgeois streets in Sebastopol; then the same operation, in spite of the resistance of the local Soviet, was

extended to Simferopol, and then the turn came of Eupatoria.

"Apparently similar radical methods of class war will soon be applied to Greater Russia."

"In Russia conscience is dead. The Russian people, in fact, have lost all sense of right and wrong. 'Pillage whatever there is to pillage.' Such is the motto of the two groups of Bolsheviks. The Red Guards, constituted to attack the counter-revolutionaries, shoot without trial any one whom they suspect. Pillage in all its forms is the only thing which is organized. In Petrograd every Bolshevik citizen may share in the spoil."

Similar methods were soon applied to all Russia, as the order of September 2, 1918—above quoted—shows. Gorky continues:

"For the period of the revolution ten thousand lynchings have already been accounted for. This is how democracy is meting out judgment upon those who have in some way sinned against the new order.

"During the days of the progress of drunkenness human beings were shot down like dogs and the cold-blooded destruction of human lives came to be a commonplace daily occurrence. In the newspaper 'Pravda' the pogroms of the drunken mobs are written up as the 'provocative acts of the bourgeois' which is clearly a misrepresentation, the employment of a pretty phrase which can only lead to the further shedding of blood."

The Soviet officials have at times decided, as long as resistance continued, to exterminate their serious enemies by direct order and execution—as we see in a decree of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Fighting the Counter-Revolution, dated February 22, 1918 (Krasnaya Gazeta, official Soviet organ, February 23, 1918) :

"The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, acting in conformity with the ordinances of the Council of People's Commissaries, sees no other way to combat counter-revolutionists, speculators, marauders, hooligans, obstructionists, and other parasites, except by pitiless destruction at the place of the crime."

The American Consul General at Moscow on September 3, 1918, quoted the official press to show that this policy was being extended to still another class, namely, hostages:

"In connection with the murder of Uritzky, five hundred persons have been shot by order of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution. The names of the persons shot and those of candidates for future shooting in case of a new attempt on the lives of the Soviet leaders, will be published later."

The hostages, however, have proven more valuable when executed on a less wholesale plan, and only in part. Extermination for revenge would have deprived the Soviets not only of a means of controlling Socialists and Democrats (see Chapter IV) but of their new device for maintaining military discipline, both of privates and of officers, as we see in the following Bolshevik news items:

The "Krasnaya Gazeta" (Red Gazette) of November 4, 1919, publishes a preliminary list of the Red Army officers who have gone over to the Whites.

1.) Khomutov, D. C.—Brother and mother arrested.

2.) Piatnitzky, D. A.—Mother, sister and brother arrested.

3.) Postnov—Mother and sister arrested.

- 4.) Agalakov, A. M.—Wife, father and mother arrested.
- 5.) Haratkviech, B.—Wife and sister arrested.
- 7.) Kostylev, V. I.—Wife and brother arrested.
- 8.) Smyrnov, A. A.—Mother, sister and father arrested.
- 9.) Chebykin—Wife arrested.

"Abandonment" of Reign of Terror.—It was only on January 22, 1920, that the Soviets issued a proclamation claiming the official abandonment of the terror. This pronouncement acknowledges the free use of the terror up to that moment. It therefore shows that the many previous statements of Soviet leaders and organs that terrorism had been abandoned were untrue—reports which were supported by nearly every foreign correspondent admitted into Soviet Russia, all of whom were accepted in advance as satisfactory to the Soviets. The Soviets also fail completely to substantiate the many defenses put up for them that their terrorism was "mild." Mild terror is a contradiction in terms, and the Bolshevik leaders' statements all emphasize the severity and ruthlessness of their terror—a policy that is not changed in the above mentioned pronouncement, since—as it declares—the terror may be resumed. The leading phrases in this statement, which is signed by Lenin, Kamenev, and Djerjinsky, are the following:

"The revolution, the proletariat and the Government of Soviet Russia remark with satisfaction that the crushing of the armed forces of the counter-revolution gives them the opportunity to lay aside the arm of terror. Only the renewal of the Entente's attempts by means of armed intervention of material support of rebellious Czarist Generals to shatter the power of the Soviets and to interrupt

pacific labor of the workers and peasants for the construction of a Socialist régime can render obligatory a return to the terror. Consequently the responsibility for a possible future return to this severe weapon will fall entirely and exclusively on the governments and ruling classes of the Entente and upon their friends, capitalists and landed proprietors of Russia."

The new afterthought claim that the terror was defensive is dealt with above. Let us look at the other arguments.

Thus for how long terrorism is "abandoned" we cannot say. The sword, let us recall again, was forced into the Kaiser's hands.

But how far is the terror abandoned? True, it has accomplished its purpose temporarily and all efforts to set up a democratically elected national assembly are held in abeyance. History shows no record of a régime set up by violence that has retained—on a large and costly scale—more violence than enough to retain its power. But the Red Army still rules large territories by terror, the soldiers of that army being forced to militarized labor by violence, Djerjinsky's All-Russian Revolutionary Tribunal continues, and—as the friendly Lincoln Eyre, who reports this document in the New York World, admits, "What we know as constitutional guarantees which safeguard a man's life and liberty are lacking altogether. There is neither habeas corpus nor trial by jury." These are the only sure guarantees evolved by human experience. What hocus-pocus could replace them? Eyre says only that the prisoner must be accused of something or other and is now allowed the privilege of speaking in his own defense!

Even should the Soviets permanently and completely abandon the terror, that would not change their responsibility. Assume they suddenly and totally reformed on January 22, when was the statute of limitations for such offenses as theirs made to run only a few months? Further, if the terror, as they now avow, was used to extend their régime, then their régime remains to-day, to that extent, based on a reign of terror, a rule not by the mere violence of superior force—which is evil enough—but by violence deliberately organized to create fear.

Even if the terror is *officially* abandoned we still have rule by a self-declared dictatorship, the dictatorship of the “proletariat” with judicial processes to correspond. What are these processes?

(1) For those who seriously attack the Soviet régime and attempt to establish popular rule as in the United States, “trial” by Revolutionary Tribunal, which—according to its most able apologists, like Lincoln Eyre, is a “court martial.” Yet Eyre points out there is no disorder in Petrograd and other places, where these Tribunals are held, to justify such methods—if we admit that they are no worse than a court martial in Paris (!) as he implies.

(2) For ordinary offenders, trial by informal self-conscious “proletarian” tribunals, or People’s Courts. Here is the heart of Eyre’s account:

“People’s Courts are bound to be guided by the Soviet Government’s laws and decrees. But as the code is far from complete, Judges (!) are obliged not only to apply but to create the law in which, according to the People’s Commissaries’ ruling, they are to be governed ‘by a sense of Socialist conception of right.’ This is usually translated to mean that a

manual laborer should be treated with greater leniency than anybody else. Certainly the poorest and most ignorant folk have a better show before a people's Judge than any other petitioners or defendants. Often, however, a Soviet jurist (!) faced with the necessity of improvising a law will call for opinions from persons connected with the case, or even from spectators in the courtroom. Sometimes he will even take a vote of those present to determine some knotty point."

Our apologist acknowledges that the Soviets' decrees, promulgated hastily after a total scorn of all previous experience, are "incomplete." Is it not inevitable that they should also be confused and inconsistent? Civilized peoples have known what a "sense of right" is—from the days of Confucius and Buddha, if not earlier. But what is "a Socialist conception of right," especially in the minds of the ignorant, unless a repudiation of previous human experience? As to law "improvised" by ignorant spectators and even by persons connected with the case, what needs be said, except that such law will be especially barbarous under a government calling itself a dictatorship, based upon official propaganda, publicly preaching the righteousness of terrorism as a weapon both of offense and defense, and renouncing most human institutions and all political and legal institutions preceding it or existing in other countries.

Starvation as a Means of Government.—Lincoln Eyre, a sympathetic correspondent, given all opportunities by Lenine, describes (in the New York World of March 6, 1920) the six principal food categories into which the population is divided. It will be noticed that the distribution is only partly according to needs, and

largely according to political considerations. These categories are as follows:

1. Dependents of soldiers get even more to eat than the heavy workers, it being the Government's first concern to keep its soldiers—who are, of course, fed quite separately from the civilian population—and their families contented.

2. The railroad workers and workers in heavy industries receive a supplementary labor ration. Among heavy industries are rated textile, metallurgic, timber, tobacco, optical, printing, building, electrical, leather factories as well as communal kitchens and post offices (!) The labor ration is also received by certain messengers of the food commissariat, controllers of harvest and communal kitchens, grave diggers and road menders.

3. Mothers caring for babies under one year old also draw a supplementary ration, less comprehensive, however, than that for the physical laborers.

4. Manual laborers, the wives, *children* and aged or incapacitated parents of the Red Army soldiers and responsible Soviet officials "working under conditions of the intellectual strain of unlimited time"; postal, telegraph, telephone, drug store, communal kitchen and hospital employees; all transport workers, mothers nursing babies, housewives caring for the wants of a family of three or more persons, and the maimed or otherwise incapacitated soldiers or workers.

5. Employees of such private, commercial or industrial enterprises as still exist; students of schools or colleges over sixteen years old and members of the liberal professions who belong to labor unions (there are now unions for all the professions, even for artists and poets).

6. Persons living on unearned income, professional men not members of labor unions and all others not otherwise specifically mentioned elsewhere comprise the bourgeois category.

There is also a group of categories for children under sixteen, the ration varying according to age. *But children are also discriminated against* (see class 4 above). The Red Guard children also (category 1) are apparently given a special ration as "dependents."

The extra ration of heavy workers and mothers with children are the only ones that can be justified on the ground of special need. Red Guards might be justly in the *same* class, but they are given a higher ration. Nearly all the other classifications also are purely political. The bourgeoisie may be supposed—in some cases—to have a little money left to supplement their part ration, or to go to work and join a proletarian food category when they have no money left. The same might be supposed of category 5.

The listing of certain classes of favored proletarians, such as textile and post office employees as "heavy workers," is clearly political.

In a word, we have three political categories—aside from the two bourgeois classes which might be temporarily explained as a military necessity (in view of the fearful food shortage in the cities), namely, (1) the Red Guard; (2) favored Bolshevik or pro-Bolshevik occupations; and (3) the rest of the manual working people.

The Bolsheviks first justified the use of unequal rations for the purposes of political warfare as a measure against the bourgeoisie; they now use this most fearful of all weapons (in starving regions) indiscriminately either to reward their most valued supporters or to

punish even the neutral or lukewarm proletarian elements. (See their ukase against illiteracy in the following chapter.)

A wireless dispatch from Moscow dated January 27, 1920, shows that the settled policy of partial starvation—using food supplies against the political opponents of the Soviets—is to be continued in the form of favoring hundreds of thousands of members of the immense Soviet bureaucracy as well as the million odd employees of nationalized industries:

"As a result of Bolshevik victories and the progress of the organization of food supplies," the dispatch says, "the Soviet Government is able to announce an increased bread ration from February 1 of one Russian pound per day for all men working eight hours per day. It is further announced that all employees of the Soviet or nationalized establishments will be given preference in distributing rations."

Psychological Ruthlessness.—The entire Soviet propaganda exhibits complete indifference to truth. For example the Bolshevik press has published literally thousands of reports of foreign revolutions which had no foundation. So accepted is the use of falsehood—for Soviet objects—that no explanations whatever are offered and no efforts made to correct these reports after they prove untrue. Thus Soviet Russia believes that all countries are seething with revolution and aching to establish Soviets. The picture presented to the Russian public of present-day England and America no more fits these countries than it does China or ancient Egypt.

The deliberate indifference of the Bolsheviks to truth is easiest to show in their propaganda about foreign

countries—which we can test by our own direct knowledge. For example:

Lenine said in a speech quoted by the Severnaya Kommuna, March 14, 1919, that the bourgeoisie was governing all countries “exclusively by violence.”

“Pogroms against the Bolsheviks are taking place in America.”—Report by Lenine, Petrograd Pravda, March 8, 1919.

The great May Day manifesto of 1919 declared of the war that “in some countries almost the entire male population has been killed.”

“The League of Nations is a veritable league of murderers or bandits. It is murdering and destroying not only the *entire* nations of Hungary and Germany, but even those nations that compose it. Its *sole* object is the *restoration of monarchy* in every land where it has been swept out of existence by popular waves.” (Our italics.)—“Izvestia.”

Indicative of the inexplicably and totally false ideas concerning other nations which are being handed out to the ignorant Russians by the Soviet leaders is the circumstantial interview with Lenine by Lincoln Eyre (published by the New York World, February 20, 1920). In this interview, which is presented in a wholly friendly spirit, Lenine is quoted as saying:

“Your government (the United States) is instituting more violently repressive measures not only against the Socialists but against the working-class in general than any other government, even the reactionary French. Apparently it is persecuting foreigners. And yet what would America be without her foreign workers?”

The Bolsheviks do not take even their own decrees seriously. Indeed they are often intended as propaganda

rather than as laws. If they have the desired result in stirring hatred or implanting a prejudice, they are approved by the Bolshevik party. They have no other object. For example:

“These (village) decrees, which in actual practice could not be carried out immediately and fully, have played an enormous rôle for propaganda.”

—Lenine’s Report to 8th Congress of Russian Communist (Bolshevist) Party, Petrograd Pravda, April 5, 1919.

The all-important rôle of “propaganda” in the Bolshevik scheme for capturing the world is sufficiently evidenced when even some of the most vital legislation is drawn up largely, if not primarily, for that purpose.

CHAPTER VI

TO WHAT IS THE POWER OF THE SOVIETS DUE?

Their power is due chiefly to exceptional favoring conditions: to the utter paralysis of a great nation destroyed by German militarism and propaganda, to its economic backwardness and the ignorance of its masses, and to the unfamiliarity of the rest of the nations with this new form of a world menace—against which they have been even more unprepared than they were against Prussianism.

The Bolsheviks have *not* developed any superiority of economic organization,
of military organization,
of government (Sovietism means whatever the Bolsheviks want it to mean from day to day),
of education (the Bolsheviks do not deny that they regard their propaganda as education, and have transformed the schools into propaganda centers).

The Soviet constitution contains no constructive principle. It is entirely absorbed with the destruction of the social structure. The preamble unmistakably declares: "It is necessary to destroy the existing social structure."

Gorky thus described the condition of the foundation

of Russian life, the rural structure, in 1918 (in his newspaper) :

“All observers of the village to-day are unanimously of the opinion that the process of disintegration and demoralization is proceeding there with irresistible force. All this must lead, and in some places has already led, to a war of all against all, and to the most senseless chaos and universal destruction and murder.”

The deterioration predicted did continue, as we see in Gorky’s declaration in 1919, made to Frazier Hunt, a sympathetic correspondent:

“Bolshevism and revolution must run their course,” said Gorky. “There can be no short cuts, no compromises. All that is finest in art, in culture in Russia, all that has been built up with such pain and sacrifice, will ultimately be destroyed. The angry peasant, nursing revenge for bitter wrongs, which he believes that *the city leaders* (the Bolsheviki) have inflicted upon him, would destroy the very life of those cities. He will revolt until the whole country is thrown into anarchy. Only the strongest will live through this terrible period. The peasant through *sheer brute force of numbers* (democracy) *will take over the Government and rule.*”

The Bolshevik industrial failure is admitted. They endeavor to shift the blame on the Czarism, the world war, and the civil strife. Thus the question becomes what they say they *would* do if they had a chance.

The Economic Disorganization.—The lifeblood is being drained from Soviet Russia by four causes:

1—The immense cost of the Red Army, the backbone of the Soviet revolution;

2—The high cost of the Soviet government with its

padded payroll and vast propaganda expenditures;

3—The subsidies of most of the leading Soviet industries, which do not even meet expenses; and

4—The aftermath of the refusal of the agriculturists (or peasantry) to pay all these bills by providing food and raw materials as “loans” or for paper money. Soldiers having been sent to every village to expropriate “surplus” products, the peasants have refused to plant or to labor to produce a “surplus.”

All these facts are amply proved from Soviet sources. Transport facilities are only a fraction of what is needed. But of 9,000 engines in Soviet Russia on May 1, 1919, only 4,300 were in repair. In the entire month of March the seven largest railway shops in Moscow built only 10 engines and 250 cars.

The railroad policy, like the industrial nationalization policy, is based not upon industrial or food needs but upon the political needs of the Soviets.

“Nationalization,” Commissary Rykov confessed at the Congress of the Soviets of Public Economy, “was effected independently of the questions of supply, of economic considerations, but aimed exclusively at a direct fight with the bourgeoisie.”

As a result the railways in the first six months of 1919 paid for only one-fifth of what they cost, and the nationalized industries for little more than one-half their cost. The rest was a Soviet subsidy, procured chiefly from the plunder of the peasantry by the Red Guard expeditions sent into the villages (the city middle classes have long ago been exhausted).

The transportation crisis complicates the fuel crisis —for the temporary occupation of the chief mining cen-

ters by the civil enemy, the destruction of the mining machinery, and Soviet management crippled the coal mines and made it necessary to use wood.

Each of these great problems, transport, fuel, and food, depends upon the other two. Industry is, of course, crippled by this situation, which means still another unfavorable reaction on food, fuel, and transport. For example, the number of scythes absolutely indispensable for the production of food in the summer of 1919 was 3,000,000, while there was only one works with a daily output of 600 scythes to offer any material relief to the situation.

Even before the war and the revolution, the agricultural equipment and methods of the peasantry were the most miserably backward in Europe, the only advanced agriculture being on the large estates. (See the author's *Russia's Message*, re-published by Knopf in 1917.) Instead of subdividing these in an orderly manner, as advocated by the other parties, the Bolsheviks encouraged such peasants as were fortunate enough to be near any estate (far less than half the total number) to seize everything it contained and divide the lands without any effort at justice or at system. When the Bolsheviks came into power Russia paid the penalty.

"The greater part of the private lands, and, moreover, the best had already been appropriated by the peasant, so that the Soviet organizations can only make use of the remnants. Moreover, as before mentioned, most of the stock has been destroyed at the expulsion of the landowners. According to official data (*The Economic Life*, March 4, 1919, No. 49) the number of working hours has decreased by 80 per cent; oxen by 58 per cent and milch cows by 75 per cent. In nine provinces of Central and South-

eastern Russia the 786 Soviet estates of 400,000 acres possess only 1,821 horses, namely, an average of less than three horses per estate of 550 acres.

The difficulties of conducting large agricultural enterprises are very great. This was recognized by the Bolsheviks themselves as soon as they passed from writing decrees to executing them.

"We are compelled to subdivide large estates into small holdings, thereby throwing ourselves back for several decades and dooming the population of Russia to famine and shortage. Such is the earliest prospect of our land organization."—(The Truth, May 16, 1919.)

Then came the disorganization of industry, through anarchic so-called workmen's control, and the paralysis of transportation, both through this cause and through the nation-wide "civil war" which was the beginning and end of Bolshevik political policy.

In their frantic efforts to cure all these evils of disorganization by their sovereign remedy, violence, the Soviets issued decrees expropriating all "surplus" products of agriculture for the use of the Soviet "Republic"—everything not required to prevent the early starvation of the peasants being regarded as surplus. This policy effectively extended the civil war to every village—which Lenin's decrees had already declared was one of the chief aims of his policy. He had hoped, however, to secure the support of the "poor" and later of the "middle" peasants. His methods, on the contrary, united the village against him, as he bitterly complained against the "middle" peasants (whom we should call wretchedly poor) in a Moscow wireless of December 11th, 1919. He declares that their view that the grain is their own is a crime against the state

and that the civil war in the village must be redoubled—by lining up the “workers” against these “landowners and capitalists.”

At the end of June, 1918, the first military detachments went to the villages. In the paper “Sievvernaia Oblast,” July 4, 1918, the detailed instructions for the requisitioning detachments were published. When the detachment arrived in the village, it was to call together a meeting, not of all the peasants, but only of the poor and those who shared the views of the Soviet authorities. From those who actually met, a committee was to be formed of from five to seven members. Eventually, under a threat of being shot, the population was to give up all their arms to that committee. The hiding of arms entailed the strictest punishment, even death. After the peasants had been disarmed they were to be ordered to bring their surplus grain to the grain receiving stations within three days. Any one who had destroyed or hidden the grain would be regarded as a traitor and shot.

Moscow alone sent out 30,000 men for this bloody work within a short period (*Pravda*, July 4, 1919). Out of 36,500 men sent out from June to September, 1919, 7,309 were killed by the peasants while collecting the grain (*Izvestia* of the Food Commissariat, December, 1918).

There are some forty provinces in Soviet Russia. Here is an account of what occurred in one of them:

“In Kharkov alone there appeared, besides the local supply organizations, representatives of 17 organizations from Great Russia, such as the Military Food Bureau, The Moscow Food Soviet, various Moscow and Petrograd coöperative societies, etc. The purchases were carried on unsystematically,

large sums of money were squandered, and prices rose enormously. Here, too, the Soviet Government made use of requisitioning detachments: 49 armed detachments of 25-30 men each were sent into the Kharkov province alone, but the peasants met them with rifles and machine guns. This entailed the sending of punitive expeditions and the grain thus procured was stained with the blood of the tiller of the soil."

The only way the peasants have devised to protect themselves adequately against armored cars and machine guns is not to have any "surplus grain." Here is the latest and chief cause of the Russian food shortage, blame for which is placed by the Soviets and their sympathizers on the Entente blockade.

Lenine's speeches frequently show that he is fully aware that the economic collapse into which the Soviets have brought Russia spells the doom of Sovietism. He shows that he knows this is not due to the blockade, but to the inability of a party consisting almost wholly of agitators, propagandists and self-appointed shepherds of the proletariat to furnish any administrative, technical or constructive talents. Hence he has confessed these must be hired—which is easier said than done. Possibly half of this kind of ability in Russia he has killed, the other half, naturally, is not very friendly. But the point is that the Bolsheviks confess they have practically no training or industrial ability among them.

Lenine complains that the other Bolsheviks failed to even recognize their own incapacity—holding that phrases of "enthusiasm" were sufficient to run the industry of that great country. He says:

"There is a lack of appreciation of that simple and obvious fact that, if the chief misfortunes of

Russia are famine and unemployment, these misfortunes cannot be overcome by any outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and universal organization and discipline, in order to increase the production of bread for men and fuel for industry, to transport it in time and to distribute it in the right way."

"Thorough and universal organization and discipline" cannot be had by pronouncing these words. America and other advanced peoples have achieved them in large measure, but only through generations of coöperative effort on the part of millions of people. Like Czar Peter the Great, Lenine would create a new civilization by ukase—after destroying nearly everything needed to maintain Russia even on the level on which it has hitherto existed.

But this statement of Lenine's is not to be taken too seriously. All reconstruction has been made to wait, and will continue to be made to wait, on the needs of the Bolshevik party and the "proletarian" civil war. As Prof. Issaieff has pointed out, there is only one persistent and consistent Bolshevik economic policy and there can be no other.

"All the reforms, including the agrarian, in spite of all their seeming ambiguity, and instability, exhibit one fundamental trait—namely, the desire of strengthening and maintaining the supremacy of their party."

The Bolsheviks are not giving their chief attention either to feeding starving Russia or to reorganizing its disappearing industry and railroads. They are giving their chief attention to the Red Army, propaganda and the Reign of Terror. Their efforts in these directions

are on a vast scale and permeate every corner of their territory. Their industrial efforts are puny by comparison.

Nor is their chosen line of effort forced upon them. The kaiser said "the sword is forced into my hands." The Bolsheviks had never preached anything but propaganda, terror, and Red Armies. They had no political or economic program which they themselves took seriously. They have no training, ideals, interest, or ideas in this direction.

Russia Starved by the Entente!—Bucharin, head of the Moscow propaganda bureau, says in a captured letter to American Communists written late in 1919 (published by the New York Times): "We ask you to stress the factor of our economic strangulation."

"Economic strangulation"—the words, like all the expressions of this important letter of instructions, are deliberately and well chosen. Strangulation, for the food and transport crisis of Soviet Russia will be little relieved by the capture from Denikin and Kolchak of the wrecks of a few hundred trains or the remains of the coal mines. Exactly similar victories last winter and spring did not relieve the crisis in an appreciable degree. Nothing can help but a large scale importation of locomotives and modern machinery, and even then the Bolsheviks count upon prolonging their rule only until revolutions in other countries help them out.

If any verification of this, the real, economic condition of Soviet Russia is needed it is only necessary to glance at "Ambassador" Martens' publication, "Soviet Russia," for December 20th, 1920, which, attempting to make an optimistic report, gives the whole situation away and shows that Sovietism is on the very verge of com-

plete economic collapse. The victories of the Red Armies and the strenuous military efforts made at points thousands of miles apart are largely responsible—though the Reign of Terror, the contradictory and Utopian industrial decrees and the expenditure of vast sums for “propaganda,” to use a mild term for this literature, have also played their part in the wrecking of the nation. Isaac Don Levine, whose reports are highly approved by “Soviet Russia,” says that fully half the locomotives are used for military purposes.

“Economic strangulation,” says Bucharin. If he had meant starvation only, he would have said so. The trouble lies in industrial and transport paralysis, not in the crops. Russia’s crops have been cut down by the refusal of the oppressed peasantry to plant grain to be taken to the cities by Lenin’s military detachments for the use of the half-idle workingmen and the armies. But still we read in this report that there is ample provision for 1920:

“The months of July and August will be the most critical, as Soviet Russia will have to live during these months upon last year’s harvest. The minimum required of eight to ten million poods is, however, more than covered by the quantity of corn known to exist in reserve, but energetic agitation in the village will be required.”

The meaning of “energetic agitation in the village” has already been explained.

Soviet Finance.—The value of the ruble has steadily and rapidly fallen so that no comparisons may be made of earlier and later national expenditures or income of the Soviet governmental and industrial régime. But

the proportion of expenditure to income makes a profitable study.

	1st half 1918	2nd half 1918	1st half 1919
Expenses..... (in billions of rubles)	17.6	29.1	50.7
Income.....	2.9	12.7	20.4
Proportion.....	16 p.c.	44 p.c.	36 p.c.

In the second half of 1918, expenditures were a little more than twice income. In the first half of 1919 they were two and a half times as much. The deficits moreover are accumulating, and the full situation can be seen only by adding them together. (Official report of Commissar of Finance, Krestinsky.)

The problem is far more serious than at first appears, for the government budget includes that of the railways and nearly all industry. In the first half of 1919, the government expended 11 billion rubles on industry and received only 5 billion income. This covers only establishments operated and does not take into account the nation's loss from the complete shut-down or partial operation of the majority of establishments.

The Bolshevik Labor Policy.—The most powerful leader of the Bolsheviks after Lenin and Trotzky, one Zinoviev, in a comprehensive, long article ("Izvestia," April 15, 1919, No. 81) asks:

"Has the Soviet Government, has our party done everything that can be done for the direct improvement of the daily life of the average workingman and his family? Alas! We hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative.

"Let us look the truth in the face. We have committed quite a number of blunders in this realm."

Zinoviev is not the only leader of the Bolsheviks who has admitted the total failure of their labor policy. About a year ago in a whole series of speeches, Lenin warned the Soviets that the failure of their labor policy was so complete as to threaten his entire dictatorship—which he insists upon calling the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Numerous other writers of Bolshevik newspaper articles admit the same thing and give full details.

The failure of the economic and labor policy of Sovietism is closely connected with their policy of nationalization. Not only did they nationalize such industries and services as are claimed by progressives in many countries to be ripe for nationalization, but proceeded to make a clean sweep, as is evidenced in the following quotations from the Bolshevik press:

"Now almost all the large and medium-sized establishments are nationalized." (See No. 46 of "Ekonicheskaya Zhizn"—"Economic Life.")

"A year ago there were about 36 per cent of nationalized establishments throughout Soviet Russia. At the present time 90 per cent of industrial establishments are nationalized." (No. 49 of "Economic Life," 1919.)

"This process, at first a revolutionary one, and actively carried out in life by the Bolsheviks, now takes its course by its own momentum, and it may be, even against the will of those who started it. The shortage of fuel and raw materials, the low efficiency of the workingmen, the disorganized exchange of commodities create conditions that make enterprises yield only losses to the owners. Hence,

these owners abandon their factories and establishments to their fate, preferring that they be nationalized.” (Professor Issaieff.)

“The only salvation for Russia’s industry lies in the nationalization of large enterprises and the closing of small and medium-sized ones.” (From an article by the Bolshevik, Bazhenov, No. 50, “Economic Life,” March, 1919.)

Along with this nationalization went, necessarily, radical changes in labor policy.

The result was the closing of an overwhelming majority of the factories, and the cutting down of production in those remaining in operation to a fourth or fifth of the normal.

“The number of industrial establishments in the City of Moscow had shrunk to 173 by the first of March, 1919, from 681 in 1917.” (No. 51, “Economic Life.” Report of the Council of National Economy of the City of Moscow.)

“In the government of Novgorod 162 large establishments have ceased to operate (three-fourths of the total number) for lack of raw materials.” (No. 37, “Severnaya Kommuna.”)

The Soviet newspaper, “Trud” (No. 23, April 28, 1919), an organ of the trades unions, telling about the closing of 19 textile mills, attempts thus to explain the causes of the crisis:

“In our textile crisis a prominent part is played also by the bad utilization of that which we do have. Thus the efficiency of labor has dropped to almost nothing, of labor discipline there is not even a trace left, the machinery, on account of careless handling, has deteriorated and its productive capacity has been lowered.”

"Such are the facts! They show graphically that one of the main factors at the bottom of the lowered productivity of factories and mills in Soviet Russia, is the decline of efficiency on the part of the workers; the former is the result of the latter."

A year ago this Spring of 1920 a new policy was instituted and the most hated anti-labor policies of reactionary employers were introduced; the Taylor system, piece wages, premiums, bonuses, etc. In order to introduce these hated methods it was necessary completely to abolish any interference of the factory or labor "Soviets" with the industry and also to completely abolish whatever remained of the labor unions. Lenin easily explained this change to his fanatic and gullible followers by the hokus-pokus of a few words. He said a dictatorship was a dictatorship and of course had to be extended into the factories. Having accepted the dictatorship principle, this argument was, of course, perfectly logical.

As early as the spring of 1918 a decree was published by which the entire railway administration was handed over to managers endowed with a dictator's full powers. Economic dictatorship was gradually introduced and is advocated by Lenin as a fundamental principle.

"Every large industrial and technical undertaking demands the most complete and stern unity of will, which directs the simultaneous labor of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of individuals. Such a strict unity of will can only be realized by the subordination of the will of thousands to the will of one individual. Such a subordination may sometimes assume the acute forms of a dictatorship." ("Immediate Tasks before the Soviet Power," pp. 11, 13.)

All this mentioned above shows how rapid has been the transition of the Bolsheviks from "the revolutionary creative work of the masses" to dictatorship. As to the masses, they are allowed to exhibit their creative powers at meetings.

"We must learn to unite the democratism of labor mass meetings, stormy as a spring flood, overflowing their banks, with the *iron* discipline of work hours, with the *absolute subordination* to the will of one individual—the Socialist director." ("Izvestia," No. 48, 1919.)

An overwhelming majority of Russian labor unionists, including most skilled and semi-skilled labor, are not and were not Bolsheviks; for labor unions were dissolved at the very beginning of Bolshevik rule so that their resistance to the new despotism counted for nothing.

From the point of view of efficient Prussianism the new industrial system is working better than the old. But it has by no means brought back Russian industry to the level it occupied before they came into power. For example, in the same Nevsky works referred to, where the productivity of the workingmen had fallen to one-fifth, it has been raised again to three and a half times its low point so that it is now about 70 per cent. of the low 1916 level. (No. 259, "Severnaya Kommuna.")

So "in the Tula Munition Works, after the old 'premium' system of wages had been restored, the productivity of the works and of labor rose to 70 per cent. of what it was in 1916." (Report of the Bolshevik, Rykov, "Izvestia," No. 467.)

After two years of "constructive work," the Bolshe-

viki have reduced Russian industry to two-thirds its efficiency when they took charge. This is not all the evil they have done, for they lost fully a year and a half of valuable time at the low production level of one-third to one-fifth of normal—that is where the factories were working, which is only in a small proportion of the whole number, as above shown.

The Repression of the Labor Unions.—The struggle going on within the ranks of labor in Soviet Russia will best be disclosed by the following excerpts from the editorial which appeared in the “Severnaya Kommuna” on the 30th day of March, 1919:

“At the present moment a tremendous struggle is going on within the ranks of the proletariat between two diametrically opposed currents. Part of the proletariat, numerically in the great majority, still tied to the village, both in a material as well as ideological respect, is in an economic sense inclined to Anarchism. It is not connected with production and not interested in its development.

“The other part is the industrial, highly skilled mechanic, who fights for new methods of production.

“By the equalization of pay, and by the introduction of majority rule in the management of the factories, supposed to be a policy of Democracy, we are only sawing off the limb on which we are sitting, for the flower of our proletariat, the most efficient workers, prefer to go to the villages, or to engage in home trades, or to do anything else but remain within those demolished and dusty fortresses we call factories. Why, this means in its truest sense a dictatorship of unskilled laborers.”

“The skilled mechanics of Russia in their majority never did belong, nor do they now belong, to the Communist (Bolshevist) party. They have remained in the ranks of the Menshevist wing of the

Social-Democratic party and in the Party of Socialist-Revolutionists." (Report on the Conference of Labor Delegates of the City of Petrograd.)

As a result, the leaders of the Soviet government in 1919 began to realize the fallacy of their policy, and a new wage scale was introduced by a decree of the People's Commissaries, founded on the principle of extra pay for skill. The higher skilled a workingman or employee—the more he is to earn. This wage scale was introduced on the 1st of March, 1919 (No. 66, "Severnaya Kommuna"). According to this scale, there are to be twenty-seven classes of workers. The lowest, unskilled class of laborers, domestic, and so forth, receive 600 roubles per month (1st class), 600 roubles (2nd class), etc.

Higher employees, specialists, are put in the last classes (20 to 27), and receive from 1,370 to 2,200 roubles a month.

The differentiation between skilled and unskilled labor is therefore approaching once more the normal. But the reader must not be deceived by the large number of roubles mentioned. The value of a Bolshevik rouble is only a few American cents.

The relation of Bolshevism to the labor unions underwent a change last Spring at the same time. The labor unions, against the protest of all leading organizations, had been merged with the state; under the new policy the labor unions were totally abolished by the state, as we see from the following evidences:

"Only practical utilitarian considerations prevent us from completely merging the trade unions with the administrative apparatus of the State." (Mos-

cow Conference of Shop Committees and Trade Unions, March, 1919, No. 51, "Economic Life.")

This stand, supported by the Bolsheviks or Communists and continually repudiated by the Socialists (Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks), betrayed its weak spot with particular clearness in the case of the Russian railroads.

At the congress of the railroad men (February, 1919) the Bolshevik, Platonov, making his report, "sharply and categorically opposed the merging of the trade unions with the State. This has taken place on the railroads, following the first railroadmen's congress in 1918, in the shape of the anarcho-syndicalist principle: 'The railroads to the railroadmen.'" (No. 42, "Economic Life.")

And the Bolshevik, Krasin, one of the most prominent specialists on factory systems, points out that "the labor control on the part of the trade unions confined itself the whole time to a perfunctory supervision of the activities of the plants, and completely ignored the general work of production. A scientific, technical control, the only kind that is indispensable, is altogether beyond the capacities of the trade unions." (No. 12, "Economic Life," 1919.)

As a result, this congress adopted a resolution "to replace the workingmen's control by one of inspection—i. e., by the engineers of the Council of National Economy."

"Thus a breach has also occurred in the cardinal point of their labor policy," says Prof. Issaiev, "but it occurs at a time when the entire structure of Russia's industry is nearly destroyed, and control, be it of Labor,

be it of the State, has no object left over which it can be exercised.

"The Bolsheviks admit the 'mistakes' of their labor policy, and repudiate its methods, but only after miserable shreds remain of Russia's industry."

"The authorities have developed a graded scheme of punishment for striking. The men were first told that the greatest crime of a worker is sabotage against the workers' state. Two ways were open to them—the honor system in the name of altruism or forced employment if they wished to live. Continued refusal to work was followed by degradation in scale of employment, reduction of rations, withdrawal of rations, execution after trial for inciting strike and shooting on sight if engaged in strike."—Alonzo E. Taylor, in *The Saturday Evening Post*.

Alonzo E. Taylor has given us this paragraph summarizing the latest Bolshevik decrees and policies taken from their own publications.

The economic failure of this "dictatorship of the proletariat" has gone so far as to halve the numbers and force of the proletariat itself—according to one of the most powerful of Bolshevik leaders, Bucharin, who says:

"Our position is such that, together with the deterioration of the material production—machinery, railway and other things—there is a destruction of the fundamental productive force, the labor class as such. Here in Russia, *as in Western Europe (?)*, the labor class is dissolving, factories are closing and the labor class is reabsorbed into the villages."—*"Izvestia"* of the Central Executive Committee, March 21, 1919.

Soviet Russia Establishes Compulsory Labor.—Soviet Russia's Code of Labor Laws (published in the official American organ, "Soviet Russia," February 21, 1920), provides for compulsory labor for the entire population over 16 years of age. Married women are exempted only for eleven weeks at the time of a confinement. The most significant paragraphs of this code are the following:

Compulsory Labor

16. The assignment of wage earners to work shall be carried out through the Departments of Labor Distribution.

17. A wage earner may be summoned to work, save by the Departments of Labor Distribution, only when chosen for a position by a Soviet institution or enterprise.

24. An unemployed person has no right to refuse an offer of work at his vocation, provided the working conditions conform with the standards fixed by the respective tariff regulations, or in the absence of the same by the trade unions.

29. An unemployed person who is offered work outside his vocation shall be obliged to accept it, on the understanding, if he so wishes, that this be only temporary, until he receives work at his vocation.

45. In case of urgent public work the District Department of Labor may, in agreement with the respective professional unions and with the approval of the People's Commissariat of Labor, order the transfer of a whole group of wage earners from the organization where they are employed to another situated *in the*

same or in a different locality, provided a sufficient number of volunteers for such work cannot be found.

Compulsory Wages

7. Labor conditions in Government (Soviet) establishments shall be regulated by tariff rules approved by the Central Soviet authorities through the People's Commissariat of Labor.

65. Excepting the remuneration paid for overtime work done in the same or in a different branch of labor, no additional remuneration in excess of the standard fixed for a given group and category shall be permitted, irrespective of the pretext and form under which it might be offered and whether it be paid in only one or in several places of employment.

67. Persons receiving excessive remuneration, in violation of Section 65, shall be liable to criminal prosecution for fraud, and the remuneration received in excess of the normal (standard) may be deducted from subsequent payments.

Compulsory Standard of Work

117. The production standards of output adopted by the valuation commission must be approved by the proper Department of Labor jointly with the Council of National Economy.

120. The Supreme Council of National Economy jointly with the People's Commissariat of Labor may direct a general increase or decrease of the standards of efficiency and output for all wage earners and for all enterprises, establishments and institutions of a given district.

Militaristic State Socialism the Final Outcome.—Before the Soviet experiment, with its kaleidoscopic reversals of policy, radical Socialists were unanimous in wholly repudiating militaristic State Socialism, from that of ancient Peru to that of modern Prussia. Theirs was “a movement of emancipation, not of slavery to the state.” The latest move of Trotzky completes the circle and embraces this very policy. Already compulsory labor had been made a part of the Soviet code. But now comes the final—and the last conceivable—step towards State slavery, the proposal to mobilize the *entire* population under military discipline. We take the following from the official Soviet organ of America (“Soviet Russia,” March 13, 1920) :

“The Third All-Russian Economic Congress was opened on January 23, 1920, in Moscow; 224 delegates were present. Trotzky spoke on mobilization, and said that the mobilization of labor was not an infringement on personal liberty. Free labor in a bourgeois state had invariably led to the exploitation of the workers. The constitution of the Soviets anticipates the *mobilization* of the workers. Henceforth the entire military administration must be adapted to the economic conditions. *The entire population* of a region will become an association of labor, and at the same time *a unit of the Red Army.*”

Already several army corps, according to this official account, have been turned into industrial serfs. The leading Bolshevik organ approved the policy, as did the Economic Conference, and it is in process of extensive execution.

The Soviets show their consciousness that *militarization* is a complete reversal of all Socialism, Communism,

and democracy by consistently avoiding that word and using, instead, the word *mobilization* for this new move!

The whole Red Army movement, which absorbed the chief efforts and was the principal achievement of Sovietism in 1919, is to be turned in 1920 into an engine of compulsory labor, backed by fanatical military discipline. At the Economic Congress, Trotzky said:

“We shall succeed if skilled and trained workers take part in productive labor. Trade unions must register skilled workmen in the villages. Only *in those localities where trade union methods are inadequate other methods must be introduced, in particular that of compulsion, because labor conscription gives the State the right to tell the skilled workman who is employed on some unimportant work in his village, ‘You are obliged to leave your present employment and go to Sormovo or Kolomna because there your work is required.’*

“Labor conscription means that the skilled workmen who leave the army must take their work books and proceed to places where they are required, where their presence is necessary to the economic system of the country. We must feed these workmen and guarantee them the minimum food ration.”

Thus compulsory labor replaces labor unionism. But the most sinister part of the program is the use of the fanatical Red Army for this object. Referring to the work of the Red Army, Trotzky said:

“They (the soldiers) have learned under the very hardest conditions to lead hundreds of thousands of organized masses and have led peasants into battle. They will be trained officers. There is still one way open to the reorganization of national economy—the

way of uniting the army and labor and changing the military detachments of the army into detachments of a labor army.

"Many in the army have already accomplished their military task, but they cannot be demobilized as yet. Now that they have been released from their military duties, they must fight against economic ruin and against hunger, they must work to obtain fuel, peat and other heat producing products, they must take part in building, in clearing the lines of snow, in repairing roads, building sheds, grinding flour, etc.

"We have already organized several of these armies and their tasks have been allotted to them. One army must obtain foodstuffs for the workmen of the districts in which it was formerly stationed and it also will cut wood, cart it to the railways and repair engines. Another army will help in the laying down of railway lines for the transport of crude oil. A third labor army will be used for repairing agricultural implements and machines, and in the spring will take part in the working of the land."

A proclamation of the Soviet government issued in February in protest against the "holidays" (strikes?) of the workers in the Northern railway shops indicates that this policy is already decided upon—and in a thoroughly military spirit. The London Times quotes the proclamation verbatim. Here are its most significant phrases:

"Martial law must be introduced into the railway shops and the guilty must be subjected to all its rigors.

"We cannot put an end to the ruinous conditions of our situation, combat hunger, and save the Soviet Republic except by carrying on a furious struggle on the labor front."

Compulsion for Industrial Managers.—As the Red Army was provided with officers by compulsion and the taking of families as hostages, why cannot similar methods be applied to the technical and managerial brains indispensable for industry? One of Lenine's chief economic counsellors, an American engineer, named Royal Kelly, has advised Lenine to this effect. According to Lincoln Eyre, who read his report, Kelly says:

"There must be in your industries a Trotzky who will be given the powers of a Foch and the Government's unqualified support. There must be an industrial army rationed, billeted, clothed and *punished, when necessary, along military lines.* Into this army there must be drawn *by inducements, similar to those by which the Czarist officers were drawn into the Red Army,* trained executives and specialists. It is a painful sight to see the best qualified industrial minds in Russia wasted."

Special Revolutionary Tribunals for Labor.—The Soviet reign of terror was maintained (as long as any serious opposition continued) chiefly by special revolutionary tribunals. Trotzky now proposes to utilize this efficient engine of compulsion, as well as the ferocious discipline of the Red Army, in order to compel the workingmen to serve the Bolshevik dictatorship more efficiently in industry. Trotzky was asked by Lenine to prepare a memorandum on this matter, seen by Lincoln Eyre, who reports that Trotzky in this document advocates "the organization of special revolutionary labor tribunals for the enforcement of that rigid discipline without which," he alleged, "there could be no economic salvation."

The Secret of Red Army Success.—The victories of

the Red Armies inside of Russia, military critics agree, were due mainly to vastly superior numbers. These soldiers were obtained by conscription. How were they *held?* This is a matter of opinion, but the opinion of the friendly Lincoln Eyre (in *The New York World*) is certainly worthy of consideration, as he was given every opportunity by Lenin. Eyre says:

“But obviously the bulk of the 3,000,000 Red soldiers is composed of peasants *who serve for the reason that somebody in authority tells them there is no other way of saving their land from restoration to the old proprietors.* Non-communists in the cities consent to don uniforms, first, because it is dangerous to resist, and, secondly, because they and their families get more food by so doing.”

The truthfulness of the Soviet propaganda is dealt with elsewhere in the present volume. Its vast extent is a matter of Soviet pride. But it is peculiarly effective and important in the Red Army. As Eyre says, “The Red Army’s publications are numberless, for every week a fresh newspaper appears. Twenty-five newspapers are published under the jurisdiction of the political department, with a circulation of 800,000.” (See below.)

The unread, and for the most part uneducated, soldiery no doubt believe everything, or nearly everything, they are told—especially about foreign countries. The Soviets, moreover, are masters of propaganda for ignorant readers.

Sovietism and Bolshevism.—“The Bolsheviks follow the most despotic policy. They disperse one after another local Soviets suspected of hostility to the government. The members of the Soviets are no longer parliamentary representatives, but func-

tionaries. Each one is, as a matter of fact, appointed to an administrative committee, in which he has a fixed rôle: to obey the direction of the Central Executive Committee, represented in the provinces by commissars provided with the most absolute powers."

This quotation from a report by the pro-Bolshevist Jacques Sadoul to the French Government bears the date of April 15, 1918. It was, therefore, written before the Bolsheviki could defend their despotism with the plea of military necessity. They were at peace with all the world.

The Soviets are the political expression of Bolshevism, in fact its sole real expression of any kind. By instituting so-called Soviet government, molding the Soviets to their purposes from day to day, controlling them, and making them mean anything they want, the Bolshevik sect rules Russia—and this is the beginning and end of their doctrine and their social system.

Sovietism and Bolshevism are practically identical. The closing sentences of the Bolsheviks' wireless New Year's message for 1920 were: "In 1919 was born the great communist international. In 1920 will be born the great International Soviet Republic."

The Bolshevik May-day manifesto for 1919 declared:

"In 1920 we shall attain a victorious end of civil war. Siberia, the Ukraine, the Don region and the Caucasus desire *Soviets*. There will also be *Soviets* at Berlin, Washington, Paris, and London. *Soviet authority* will be supreme throughout the world."

The entire aim of Bolshevism is Sovietism—to establish Soviets.

The first international communist congress in 1919 declared:

"The workmen of all countries have understood that the decisive moment has come. 'Soviets,' by this you will conquer." As a constructive measure after the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," per the communist sects, we have recommended—a Red Army on the Russian model.

Sovietism, the political aspect of Bolshevism, is the perfect tool and the chief expression of "the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Sovietism may have several shades of meaning, each of them legitimate, but a word means in politics and practical life what it means to most people. In Russia and all over the world, Sovietism is usually employed as a synonym for Bolshevism or Leninism. But what does Sovietism mean among the educated and the well-informed, and among the practical leaders of the world? What will it continue to mean, in spite of all efforts to give it an ideal and democratic connotation? Why, nothing less than this: the political system of Bolshevism—communism being its economic system.

Sovietism means the *governmental system* of the Bolsheviks. Scattered and relatively unimportant non-governmental committees, local governing groups, etc., of a thousand varieties existed in Russia from the day Czarism was overthrown. There was also rapidly organized a national system of labor "soviets" in all the industrial centers. This system did not claim to take the place of the government or to represent the entire nation. It was nothing more nor less than a federation of the central labor bodies of the towns, which were composed of the delegates from factories, instead

of the delegates from trades as in other countries. The name soviet thus gathered so much prestige that it was also loosely applied by the ignorant population to all the local bodies and governing committees instead of longer and more cumbersome titles.

But none of this is what is now meant by Sovietism. As soon as the Bolsheviks saw they might capture the whole labor soviet system, they began to demand that the labor soviets (and no others) should be given a *monopoly of governmental power*. At the same time, they both narrowed and enlarged the system. They narrowed it by superintending all factory elections by Red Guards and spies and throwing leading labor opponents in prisons, by quashing all anti-Bolshevist factory or municipal soviet elections that were too unfavorable, and by passing "constitutions" which not only disfranchised the middle classes, but gave each Russian or foreign Red Guard several votes. They enlarged the system by giving the peasants (ninety per cent. of the population) a representation as a minority in the national and each provincial soviet. Further, all election laws and elections that proved embarrassing, in spite of all these precautions, were laid aside by ukases of Lenin, always with the phrase, "proletarian necessity."

Alonzo E. Taylor and other defenders of the Soviets (as distinct from Bolshevism!) admit that this is "not a democracy or a representative form of government." As the peasant elections, being indirect by two degrees, are even more subject to manipulation than the elections in the factories, this is a rather obvious truth.

This is the history of sovietism *as a form of government*. From the first, this governmental sovietism has been nothing whatever but the political expression of

Bolshevism. Yet the pro-Sovietists would have us believe the preposterous proposition that the peasants are attached to the soviet form of government, that it originated with the historic local village government (*the mir*), that Kerensky might have saved Russia by adopting it, and that communism is one thing and sovietism another.

On the contrary, this village democracy (*the mir*) leads to and demands nothing but national democracy—which means a constitutional assembly with a huge peasant majority. (There could be no objection to calling this a Soviet—or anything else.)

Taylor, like other pro-Sovietists, presents us a Soviet system as a fact, though he elsewhere confesses it is purely imaginary. For he admits the usurpation and dictatorship of Lenin and his Bolshevik minority as having prevailed throughout Soviet Russia from the very beginning of the Soviet government. This imaginary Soviet system does not exist even on paper—in Russia. For the Bolshevik paper constitution is a totally different thing, aiming on every page to destroy democracy and provide a rock-ribbed system of unequal representation.

Here is Taylor's Soviet system:

"All men and women in a township vote to select a soviet (!) At the meeting of the township soviet a certain number of members, according to population, are elected as delegates to the county soviet. A council is elected to run the township. The county soviet, consisting of the representatives of the township soviets, meets and elects representatives to the state soviet and also selects a council for administration of the affairs of the county. Cities above a certain size have an urban soviet, like a commission

form of municipal government. The representatives of the county soviets form the state soviet, this elects representatives to the national soviet and names a council to conduct the affairs of the state. The national soviet selects a cabinet or commissary to administer the affairs of the nation, under direct legislation of the national soviet.

"Under such a scheme the direct expansion of the primitive soviet would represent *a form of pure democracy*, without conflict between legislative and executive. Such a scheme of democratic government gets rid of primaries, general elections, partisan organizations and representation by professional politicians."

Although such a system never existed in Russia, even on paper, Taylor represents the real Sovietism as a sort of accidental corruption of this ideal. For the practical failure of the Soviets he apologizes by saying that "any political system is capable of corruption." So also is any political system capable of defense—provided it is first idealized, and the reality then regarded as a corruption. Taylor says:

"With the modifications introduced by Lenine and Trotzky the system was raised to the *nth* power as a political machine. Lenine and Trotzky are not the expressions of the opinions of the Russian people; they are the manipulators of the Russian people. Within a year they developed a political machine that for autocracy and arbitrariness exceeds anything ever dreamed of by a ward heeler, and one that lends itself to infinite variety of corruption."

These were not "modifications introduced by Lenine and Trotzky." They were the very essence, the whole reality, the *raison d'être* of Sovietism. It was called

into being for these purposes, and continues to exist solely because it continues to function, as it always has, to uphold the Bolshevik "dictatorship of the proletariat," and to prevent democratic government.

Taylor says:

"The peasant was for the time being glad to accept the idea of communism of the land so long as the government was a soviet and the peasant controlled the soviet.

"The urban worker was willing to accept a soviet government, in which he would have only a numerically minor representation, so long as the factories, mines and other industries were communized."

This is as far as you can get from the truth. No soviet paper constitution, no soviet executive, ever even promised peasant control; no urban worker was ever told by either authority that he was to have a numerically minor representation. On the contrary, it is a "proletarian" dictatorship, and it was only the "poorer peasants" (the mere poor being excluded) who were promised a minority representation, but only—as Lenin expressly and repeatedly states—if they accept the leadership of the proletariat. (See below.)

As to national communism, it is not and cannot be a main issue in the village. The peasant takes no direct interest in the administration of city industries, except to demand cheap supplies and a good market. He does demand an equal voice with the city wage-earner, which would give him a majority in the national government, including the railways and the tax system—which are the things that matter to him.

Nor is there any more relation between the village commune (or mir) and city communism than there is

between the mir and the proletarian soviets. Provided the peasants have all the land, many might continue to prefer the communal system to which they are accustomed. It was continued under Czarism, it continues under Bolshevism, and it may or may not continue under democracy. But it has no relation to national communism, except that we non-Russians use the same word for two different things. The village communes allow private property to exist in the same village without any jealousy. They are not propagandists, and many members of village mirs advocate private property in the village, though it is always a minor consideration. The question has nothing whatever to do with their attitude to Bolshevism or Sovietism.

Educational Reform?—The most amazing Soviet propaganda has been circulated—often by deceived dupes—about Bolshevik educational reform, “10,000 new schools” and “children’s palaces”—in the midst of terrorism, industrial collapse, and starvation! Lenine set these tales to rest (though they circulate as much as ever) by his remarks at the Soviet education congress last May (quoted by the sympathetic correspondent, Isaac Don Levine) :

“In the field of the education of the illiterate we have done little,” said Lenine. Destruction, as always, had gone along beautifully, but construction had not even begun, as we see in Lenine’s further remarks:

“*Having destroyed* the old institutions *we must begin* to solve the first problem of the proletarian revolution—i. e., the organization of tens, or hundreds, of millions of people. After a year and a half of experience we must finally stand on the right road which would conquer that ignorance and dark-

ness and savagery with which we constantly come into conflict."

We can judge whether Lenine's attacks on all previous civilization, and his appeal for class hatred and mass terrorism would decrease or augment this "darkness and savagery."

Attempt to Sovietize the Schools.—The attempt to sovietize the organization of school control has so outraged all human experience that a mere statement of the plan finally adopted is sufficient. We quote from Lincoln Eyre's interview with Lunacharsky (New York World, March 27th, 1920) :

"Each school is managed not by the teacher alone but by a committee composed of teachers, representatives of the children's parents and delegates of the pupils, themselves over the age of twelve, to which is added an envoy of the local branch of the Commissariat of Public Instruction."

We leave this brilliant plan for the consideration of any human being who has ever had anything to do with the administration of schools. Let it be remembered in drawing our conclusions that—according to the Bolshevik ukase against illiteracy—a very large part, if not the majority, of the parents given such an important control over the schools are illiterate, while the teachers, according to Lunacharsky, are chosen primarily because they are sufficiently fanatical communists!

Bolshevism Against Freedom of Conscience in Education.—Bucharin, editor of the official Bolshevik newspaper Pravda, published, in Moscow in 1918, a book called The A B C of Bolshevism (said to be used in the school of propaganda of the Soviet government). In this volume we have a striking revelation of the fact that

the Soviets have set up a new type of compulsory sectarian education; they propose to fill the children with their fanatical doctrines from infancy. Of course they present this in the guise of freeing the children from other doctrines, but as they propose to combat not only the religious but the political beliefs of parents, it is clear that their aim is positive and not merely negative. Bucharin's statement, quoted by Alexander Severoff in the Estonian Review (March, 1920), is in a line with other Bolshevik pronouncements. Says Bucharin:

“Freedom of conscience in parents has merely been used by them to poison the minds of their children in the same way as they themselves were poisoned in old days by the Church. . . . The salvation of the young mind and the freeing it from noxious reactionary beliefs of their parents is one of the highest aims of the proletarian government.”

Education and Propaganda Merged.—The whole “educational” policy of the Bolsheviks can be grasped only if we understand that they frankly regard all their educational and cultural activities as part of their propaganda, since all of these activities are acknowledged to be permeated with fanatical communist teaching. The fanatic character of this communist teaching appears throughout the present volume. It consists in two parts: (1) a violent denunciation of all previous and existing cultures and of all the institutions built up by humanity in ten thousand years; and (2) amazing pictures of the things the Bolsheviks are going to do for the people. The very fact that such propaganda must be brought to the people indicates its wholly undemocratic origin.

The official organ of the Soviet government in America, “Soviet Russia,” publishes (March 20, 1920) a

Soviet government radiogram summarizing the Bolsheviks' work for education and culture in schools, theaters, the Red Army, etc. As in all Bolshevik documents no sharp distinction is made between what has already been achieved, and what is promised, though remaining entirely upon paper.

This wireless message gives an excellent illustration of the total confusion of education and propaganda in the Bolshevik mind. Speaking of the "cultural" work going on in the Red Army the radiogram says:

"The cultural and educational work does not cease, even on the most active fronts, in a military sense, and is carried on almost under artillery fire.

"In the region of Samara there have been organized in the railway stations *political bureaus* which furnish literature to troops stopping there and organize meetings, lectures and talks. Almost all the army units have communist propaganda sections. This revolutionary propaganda extends to the enemy camp, and there often achieves better results than artillery fire; the White Guards come over in whole regiments to the side of the Soviet Power.

"*The cultural and educational organizations of the Red soldiers are the long-range guns which will silence the most perfect batteries bought by international capital.*"

This is typical. All the so-called educational work of the Soviets exists primarily, if not exclusively, for the purpose of the propaganda of communist fiction. It may be imagined what is left of genuine education as it is understood by experienced, civilized, and democratic communities.

In the same radiogram we get a glimpse of how the propaganda work goes on and the true significance of

the Bolshevik ukase against illiteracy (see below). It is obvious that the Soviets cannot fill the minds of the illiterate with their doctrines nearly so readily as they can the minds of those who can read their journals and pamphlets. Thus we have the following touching picture of the campaign against illiteracy as it is being carried out in a certain town: "All of the mobilized must read *journals* and *pamphlets* to the illiterate, and explain to them the unfamiliar words." Beyond question these are Bolshevik propaganda publications. The Soviet government is proud of this work and does not seem to realize that it has here given to mankind a key to its educational policy.

In the same radiogram we have an account of the number of volumes in the "Palace of the Red Army at Kazan." Out of 8,514 books, including fiction, there were 2,360 books of a communist nature. Against this were less than 2,000 non-fiction works which were not communist! Possibly a handful of these communist works may have contained a certain amount of reliable information.

Finally, the radiogram gives a good and excellent example of the naïve habit of the Soviets of putting forth promises as identical with achievements. For instance, we have the following list of the sections of the department of public instruction in the Province of Penza:

1. Cultural and educational social activities.
2. Libraries.
3. Lectures and schools for adults.
4. The Museum.
5. Popular lectures and conferences.
6. Cottage reading-rooms.
7. People's houses.

8. Proletarian universities.
9. Popular theaters.
10. Clubs.
11. Scientific societies.

To newspaper reporters who have given no thought to the necessary ramifications of educational work even in its most crude form, and to newspaper readers similarly placed, this list is doubtless impressive, but, as a matter of fact, it means nothing. There is no indication of how much is done nor any comparison with similar previous work in Russia or in other countries, while there is every reason to suppose that in the condition now prevailing in Russia all this work is crude to the last degree and promising only to the enthusiastic Bolshevik fanatic.

Through the wholesale revolt of the teachers of the Russian common schools early in the revolution, we know something of the destructive work of the Bolsheviks in the sphere of education; Lunacharsky confessed that the numerical deficiency of common school teachers had just been made good from communist ranks. Is it necessary to picture the equipment of the average literate communist as a school teacher? And yet we are assured that communism was the first requirement.

The deficiency in secondary school teachers has not yet been made up. The following quotations from the interview of Lincoln Eyre with Lunacharsky (New York World, March 27, 1920) show that the Bolshevik interest in education is to use the schools for propaganda purposes.

"We can only intrust the teaching of our children to those who share the ideals to which we aspire."

"The situation is still *cloudy* as regards the secondary stage of the uniform industrial school."

"Our second difficulty is closely linked with the *hostile attitude of the secondary teachers*. Instruction in the bases of Communism must be developed to a considerable extent in the high schools. It cannot be done unless the teachers are themselves Communists or sufficiently in sympathy with Communist principles to essay with a full measure of sincerity to implant a sympathetic understanding of these principles in the minds of their pupils."

"Vigorous efforts have resulted in the establishment of a considerable, though still inadequate, number of training centers for teachers.

"Thus the former Catherine Institute, one of Moscow's foremost institutions of learning, is devoted altogether to preparing for educational work, a rapidly growing class of Communistic instructors. Graduates of this institute are sent out into the country to spread the knowledge they have acquired among their less forward colleagues. There was opened on Feb. 1 the so-called Sverdloff University, to which will come students from all over Russia, desirous of gaining a thorough insight into Communist doctrines from the political, social, and economic point of view. Sverdloff University is designed primarily for the training of the exponents of Communism and world revolution but it will undoubtedly produce plenty of good teacher material."

We are now in a position to grasp firmly the reason for new "educational movement" of which the Bolsheviks and their admirers in all countries are making so much. The propaganda cannot be spread so quickly and effectively by word of mouth as it can by printed matter. For this reason the ukase compelling all citizens between the ages of eight and fifty forthwith to become literate has attached to it the severest penalties. Evading the

duties specified by the decree or interfering with its provisions means trial by the dreaded "revolutionary tribune"—to which, by the way, all matters of importance to the Bolshevik government are turned over—being taken away from the less easily controlled People's Courts. Besides the severe penalties in the background any one failing to become literate is not only disfranchised—(which may be justified)—but, according to Lincoln Eyre, "receives only a third category food card."

We can imagine the equipment for school teaching and educational work of a government which fixes such barbarous penalties even on the failure to learn.

But reading is indispensable to Bolshevism. With a reading public one propagandist fanatic can do one hundred times as much work as he could by word of mouth.

Lincoln Eyre recognizes that, besides the propaganda carried on in the schools, the *avowed* propaganda campaign is also an important and integral part of "the Soviets' educational activity." (See Chapter VII.)

CHAPTER VII

WHAT SUPERIORITY HAVE THE BOLSHEVIKI DEVELOPED?

A superiority in propaganda. Among the educated peoples any successful long continued propaganda has been impossible for so many years that the use of propaganda had been abandoned. The democratic peoples had almost forgotten the art of propaganda among the ignorant. Of this the Bolsheviki have made a life-long study, using to begin with the experience of their German Socialist masters in this field. Having made this for years the sole object of their existence they have been able *conscientiously* to throw overboard all scruples and so to become masters of propaganda, not only among the ignorant, the wretched, the thoughtless, but also among all those with "the will to believe."

The Bolsheviki are *not* geniuses or social philosophers, representatives of the masses. (Not one out of ten of the leaders is a workingman. They have gone to the masses with a ready-made dogma, which they have constantly re-worded to suit mass psychology.)

Do the Bolsheviki Represent the Proletariat?—Bolshevist statistics show that the Bolshevik sect, which governs the Soviets with an iron rule in the name of

the proletariat, represents neither the rural nor urban masses (see Chapters I and VIII). After eighteen months it did not represent even the factory workers—not even in its stronghold, Moscow. Here are a few figures from the Bolshevik publication, “Communar” (May 17, 1919) :

“The Sytin Printing Works—Employs 1,600 persons. In the communist nucleus there are 10 communists and 60 sympathizers. After a meeting at which an anti-Kolchak resolution was defeated, a ‘vindication committee’ was elected to explain in the press the true attitude of the shop: The workers of the shop are against Kolchak, but they would not adopt the resolution because it came from the Bolsheviks.

“‘Postavschik’—Employs 2,660 workers. The nucleus has 36 communists and 10 sympathizers. Of these there are only 8 persons in the place and no party work is therefore conducted. The shop-committee consists of communists. Literature is well distributed. Seven hundred copies of newspapers and from fifteen to 200 copies of magazines.”

Here we see that even the immense Soviet subsidies for propaganda are futile—in spite of the fact that the workers are advanced Socialists, shut off from the outside world, and without an independent press. It will be noted that in most of these factories the economic dependence of the workers on the Soviets for jobs, bread tickets, and factory subsidies—to say nothing of terrorism—has led to Bolshevik committees or shop officials:

“‘Bromley’—1,200 workers employed. The group consists of 10 communists and 15 sympathizers. The group meets every week. The factory committee is communist. The general state of mind is improving.

“‘Einem’—Employs 1,400 workers, 850 of whom are women. The nucleus has 40 communists and 8 sympathizers. Their influence in the factory is little. The presiding officers of the shop-committee are communists. Lectures are arranged occasionally. Newspapers are well distributed.

“‘Centrosoyuz’—900 workingwomen are employed. The nucleus has 25 communists and 4 sympathizers. The women are very backward and party work among them is very difficult.

“‘The Electric Station of 1886’—1,300 workmen are employed. The communist group has 27 members. Party work is not being conducted. The general state of mind is calm. The shop-committee is communist.”

The Bolsheviks, so popular among the distant workingmen of France and England, are ill appreciated at home. The “Communar” lists 16,000 workers in one part of Moscow and finds only 687 Bolshevik party members and sympathizers. Only one union in the entire district shows even half its members in either of these classes. Including this we have only 2,500 pro-Bolsheviks in 20,000.

As Gorky declares, Bolshevism does not emanate from the Russian proletariat, and is against their interests:

“The practical Bolshevism of the anarchistic-communalistic visionaries which emanates from the Smolny Institute is injurious to Russia, and, above all, to the laboring class.”

Bolshevism is without the support either of the Russian urban workingman or of the Russian people:

In the Province of Riazan the party had less than

6,000 members out of a population of three millions ("Izvestia," May 9, 1919).

In the Province of Kalouga the party has less than 4,000 members out of a population of two millions ("Izvestia," May 8, 1919).

In the Province of Moscow, including many suburbs and a total of more than a million inhabitants, the party had less than 3,000 members ("Izvestia," February, 1919).

In February, 1919, the report of the 8th Communist Congress showed that the membership of the party was less than one-half of one per cent. of the population of Soviet Russia.

It must be remembered that membership in the Bolshevik party may now secure public office or a private job, and certainly secures protection and bread.

As to public offices, a leading Bolshevik, Monastirev, says in the Bolshevik paper "Pravda" of the 14th of May, 1919: "All history has not shown such a Chinese system in the large number of functionaries as our Soviet institutions. This has been commented on in all the Soviet papers." Yet in spite of all these rewards for joining the party, ninety-eight adult Russians out of one hundred have refused to have anything to do with it.

In the Soviets, on the contrary, the situation is reversed. In these institutions—which are supposed to represent at least the urban proletariat and the poorest peasants—that is a considerable minority of Russia—the Bolsheviks always maintain a preponderance by decrees of the dictators or by the help of the Red Army.

"At the second congress of Soviets of the Province of Moscow, the Social Revolutionists were excluded.

The deputies without party, who protested (against this exclusion), were arrested by the Extra Commission for Fighting the Counter-Revolution." ("Izvestia," No. 191, 1919.)

The same newspaper gives information of the dissolution of the Soviets of Cronstadt, Voronege, and other important places, or the exclusion of non-Bolshevists.

Political strikes have been frequent and have been suppressed with the greatest severity, being denounced by Lenin as treason against *the dictatorship of the proletariat*. According to the Bolshevik "Krasnaia Gazeta" a Petrograd strike affecting 35,000 working-men (half of those of Petrograd at that time) lasted from the 6th to the 26th of March, 1919. The previous summer the Petrograd labor unions struck as a protest against coercion in the Soviet elections.

Maxim Gorky's newspaper, the "Novaya Zhisn," which furnishes the report probably most nearly correct, shows that the Bolsheviks won through the votes of the unemployed, the Red guards, artificially created government organizations and alleged unions. The Soviets, at the point of the bayonet, arrested opposition leaders, stopped meetings, suspended newspapers and closed factories and workingmen's clubs.

In all the Obuchovsky and Nevsky district martial law was proclaimed. Many workingmen were arrested. Patrols and armored automobiles filled the districts.

As a result a one-day protest strike was declared.

According to a resolution adopted by the Petrograd shop-stewards' committees, day and night, in the streets and in houses, murders occurred, carried out not only by criminals but also by responsible agents of the Soviet government. The resolution declared:

"Murders are committed in the guise of fighting the counter-revolution, and the victims belong not only to the enemies of the people but very frequently to the most peaceful class of citizens, workers, students, peasants and soldiers.

"Murders are committed without any inquiry or trial, deliberately and coldly, and in the name of the revolutionary proletariat.

"We, the representatives of the Petrograd working class, before the entire people of Russia, proclaim that these murders are polluting the honor of the revolution, of democracy and socialism. We repudiate with indignation all responsibility for these sanguinary deeds, which form a stain upon our socialist banner.

"We call upon all workers and upon all honest citizens to join us in our protest and demand a public trial of the authors of these bestialities and murders."

What Is New About Bolshevism?—The characteristics of Bolshevism so far mentioned do not present any new features. History has known of many other political sects, struggling for power, subordinating their own doctrines and all other principles to that struggle, utterly ruthless in the use of violence and falsehood for their object, and fighting to the death against all liberty and self-government except that prescribed by the sect.

If we are to grasp Bolshevism at all the understanding of these characteristics is the first essential. We come now to what is new about it. That there is something new is obvious at first glance. It is new that an international sect has captured the government of a great modern nation. It is new that an ultra-revolutionary sect professing proletarianism has secured the support or sympathy of considerable numbers of non-proletarian

intellectuals in many countries. It is new that a crude propaganda, so extreme that it is fantastic, more violent than any we have known for centuries, with only the slightest foundation of fact—and even less in logic—should receive a world-wide hearing.

All this seems not only new but startling. Surely, it will be said, Bolsheviks must have some extraordinary gift or powers to have accomplished all this in such a short space of time! There is, of course, an underlying superiority and efficiency. But that superiority is not what it seems to be on the surface. All intelligent people are now interested in the Soviet phenomenon. But only a handful, outside of Russia, are familiar with the long preparatory evolution of Bolshevism before the Soviet revolution, and comparatively few have had either the will or the opportunity fully to grasp the very exceptional conditions in Russia—quite beyond the imagination of the average western mind—which made everything ready for the Bolsheviks and almost automatically carried them into power.

Those who have studied and participated in the international revolutionary movements of Russia and other countries for the past quarter century (since Bolshevism was born) can testify to the gradual and natural evolution of this movement. This does not mean that, after coming into power, it has furnished no surprises. Nor would such inside observers deny that some of these surprises have been of a fundamental importance—for example the unexpected willingness of the Bolsheviks to enter into arrangements with kaiserism and capitalism at the inevitable cost of the peoples and revolutionary movements of other countries. But nearly all the fundamentals have remained what the leading international

Socialists near at hand expected and predicted they would be—for example, Kautsky of Germany, Guesde of France, Bauer of Austria, Branting of Sweden, and many others.*

What then is the explanation of Bolshevik power—according to these most competent observers?

The Bolshevik plan for revolution did not spring up suddenly in the brain of Nicolai Lenine or any man. For twenty-five years Lenine and hundreds and thousands of the members of his sect have been studying how to attain power. Their purpose, sectarian rule, required a dictatorship. But where should they obtain their following? The mass of the Russian people, the peasantry, had shown, by following the populists and social revolutionists, that they wanted a great peasant democracy—a fact finally demonstrated by all elections, from that of the first Duma (1906) to the Constituent Assembly (1917). That excludes a Bolshevik dictatorship.

The brain-workers, minor professionals, the “intellectuals” and middle class generally, inclined either to radical liberalism or to the other Socialist parties (the

* The writer had the advantage of interviewing Lenine at length in Russia as early as 1907 and of two years' intimate contact with and study of his and other Russian revolutionary movements at that time. He sat with Lenine throughout the important colonial debate at the international Socialist Congress at Stuttgart and later met Trotzky, Lunacharsky and other Russian Bolshevik and revolutionary leaders in their places of exile in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, London, Paris and New York—using this knowledge as the foundation for several books on the international Socialist movement favorably received by the Socialists of several countries. For example, Jean Longuet, the pro-Bolshevist leader of the French Socialists, has said that the author's book on the Socialists and the War (1915) was the best work on the subject. The writer is, therefore, confident that he here accurately reproduces the views of the great moderates and scholars among the Socialists of the leading nations (see also Chapter XIX).

Social Revolutionists or the Menshevik wing of the Social Democrats). But anyway this "intellectual proletariat"—the name given these elements when they are favorably viewed, though they are known as bourgeois when in disfavor—are not numerous enough to furnish the basis for a Bolshevik dictatorship—the frankly avowed objective of Lenin's pre-revolutionary writings.

The "conscious" proletariat, that is the skilled workmen and labor unionists, were overwhelmingly moderate Socialists of the Menshevik wing—the most bitter opponents of the Bolsheviks.

What was left then but to appeal to the unskilled and "unconscious" mass and to make them "conscious"—of Bolshevism? Among these could be included not only the unskilled of the cities but the least able peasants, become part-time laborers—and, later, peasants cut off from their villages by the war, and become professional soldiers—but soldiers who wanted, above all, to stop fighting.

In the Soviets (composed of workmen and soldiers) these elements—once mobilized by the Bolsheviks—inevitably became the majority.

For a quarter century the Bolsheviks had developed the seed. And here, at last, was the fertile soil. And in several other countries—such as Hungary and Italy—conditions were not dissimilar. For a quarter century thousands of able propagandists—coöperating—had been giving their entire time and energy (or most of it) to elaborating every possible appeal, truthful or untruthful, that could hold such a mass together.

The superiority of the Bolsheviks then consists in this laboriously achieved mastery of propaganda for the most ignorant and most desperately needy part of the mass—

an ideal element to be molded to the propagandists' mind and will, once a hearing is obtained—especially after the propagandists have seized the seats of power and can give every outward symbol of success. No more subservient and uncritical following could be imagined or desired.

The Bolsheviks undoubtedly have some first-class minds among them—but they are minds of the peculiar and abnormal type of persons who are willing and able to abandon themselves utterly to securing leadership of the ignorant by any and all means that will achieve that end.

The Extraordinary Propaganda Efficiency of the Soviets.—We can agree with Lincoln Eyre when he refers to the extraordinary efficiency with which the Bolsheviks propagate their theories among their fellow countrymen. Undoubtedly the Bolsheviks have developed one of the most amazing organizations the world has ever seen for propaganda among the ignorant and needy. The efficiency of this machine for its purposes is scarcely inferior to that of Prussian militarism. Indeed the German propaganda bureau undoubtedly paved the way for the Bolsheviks, as did also the efficient propaganda machine of the German Socialists. The capacity of the Bolsheviks in this direction rises to the height of genius, although it must be said that they have had few, if any, competitors. No large part of any civilized democratic people could conscientiously so discard all interfering principles as effectively to compete—even if they were disposed to do so. But the important point is that all the successes of the Bolsheviks without exception can be traced to this one “superiority.”

For example, take the “aeroplanes which dropped

appeals, literature, etc.,'' used, as we read in the official Soviet radiogram quoted in the previous chapter, for appealing to the imagination of the peasants. No trained school teacher would advocate such methods because he would realize that the amount of literature distributed and the attention it got would not justify the trouble, but could there be a better way to strike the imagination of the illiterate? Then we have the use of the moving pictures into which the Bolsheviks have turned a large part of their resources. The innumerable newspapers and pamphlets (the pamphlets and newspapers of rival revolutionary parties being prohibited, or all but prohibited). It may be said that a large part of the several hundred thousand members of the Bolshevik party speak or write and constantly demand means of expression and an audience. But, above all, the entire resources of the state are put at their disposal, all printing plants are seized for their use, and indeed, the whole structure of the Soviet government rests upon the foundation of propaganda. Danton said "after bread, education." Lenin practically declares, before bread, propaganda. No other interpretation can be given to the vast expenditures for propaganda in a starving country. The head of the propaganda department, after the head of the Red Army, is undoubtedly the most important post in the commissary cabinet.

The energy and organization of this vast propaganda movement are equal to its absolutely unprincipled use of any and all arguments or statements of supposed fact that will accomplish the purpose. As an illustration take the following account of the propaganda trains given by Lincoln Eyre (New York World, March 27, 1920) :

"The cars of the train were painted in fearsome fashion, somewhat reminiscent of circus trains in America, with allegorical scenes luridly depicting capitalistic serpents being slain by the Red Army, happy peasants exchanging fraternal greetings with equally happy workers and so forth."

"There were five such trains in existence, each boasting ten cars, equipped with libraries, cinematographs, a printing plant that publishes a daily paper, a wireless equipment and a telephone which at each station could be hooked up with the local exchange."

The Undemocratic Origin of the Propaganda.—Bolshevist literature frequently betrays the fact that the entire propaganda is from the top down and in its origin, almost entirely external to the working-class. The chief Bolshevik himself gives us frequent examples.

"Lenine, in a message from Moscow, dated February 23, 1920, addressed to the French Socialists' Congress at Strasbourg, in advocacy of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat,' called attention to an article which he published in the Communist International publication, declaring that 'the recognition of the dictatorship signifies the absolute necessity of mercilessly revealing the treacherous rôle of Social Democracy during the war' and the '*necessity of lowering one's self to the depth of the popular masses and of raising them to the necessary height for overthrowing capitalism*, instead of limiting one's self to a fight for improvement of the conditions of labor.'

It would be interesting to know how many of the 300,000 Bolshevik Party members are of the Slavic race and of the manual working-class, to which the party appeals. If the proportion of these elements of the Rus-

sian population is maintained inside the party, they should constitute 90 per cent. of the organization. If all indications are to be trusted it may be doubted if they are one half.

How Does the Propaganda Succeed?—By teaching whatever the particular social group they happen to be aiming at desires to believe. To the British and American middle class “intellectual” they claim to advocate or actually to be putting into practice a whole program of constructive democracy. To the illiterate masses—especially those of Russia, Italy, and other backward countries—they preach the simplest nihilism of “proletarian” destruction. Everything hitherto known is then labeled “bourgeois” and hence the unskilled proletarian is convinced that he is the intellectual equal of the skilled and educated workers of hand and brain (the bourgeoisie).

The most authoritative Bolshevik writings and pronouncements until recently—having been addressed to the ignorant and unskilled—are all based on this second platform: the destruction of existing civilizations, institutions, and ideals.

CHAPTER VIII

CAN THE SOVIETS WIN BACK THE PEOPLE?

Eighty-five per cent. of the Russian people are peasants; so far the peasants have been paying the bill for the Soviets. Factory workmen, railroad workers and all other classes of workers in all other industries, except only the agriculturists, have been heavily subsidized. These subsidies have not been paid for—as is commonly asserted—by the issues of paper money; for wages and salaries have been steadily raised in approximate proportion to the increase in the cost of living or the fall in the value of Bolshevik roubles.

The peasant has paid the bill—by the forced surrender of a part of his product.

There is no explanation whatever that could be offered by the Soviets that would satisfactorily explain to the peasantry this active expropriation. Not even the blockade has any bearing on the subject in his mind. For it has not been the Entente which has entered into the villages and has taken away his crops. He knows that the Entente has not created the food shortage and the Bolsheviks themselves show that they, too, are fully aware of this fact.

Compulsory Agriculture.—In November, 1919, Lenin, speaking before the “First All-Russian Conference on the Work in the Villages,” disclosed, for the hun-

dredth time, the ultimate dependence of Bolshevik success upon the peasantry, and the hopelessness, therefore, of the Soviet outlook in the country. He said (according to "Izvestia" of November 13) :

"Here we have the most complicated and important problem of socialist reconstruction. The Soviet and Socialist power will be finally solidified, only when the peasant is in unquestioning alliance with the workers.

"The victory over Denikine, which is now not remote, will not be the final destruction of capitalism. This is understood by everybody. They will make more than one attempt yet to throw the noose about the throat of Soviet Russia. The peasant, therefore, has no alternative; either he will help the worker—and then we shall conquer capitalism—or the *least little wavering* will bring again the shackles of capitalism."

Lenine understands, as he has understood from the beginning, that there is no outlook for Russian Sovietism if the peasant continues obstinately to reject it. Therefore, his efforts are bent largely on the peasantry and his overtures are ceaseless. He declares:

"The peasant who lives by his own labor is the friend of the worker. To this friend the worker will give his assistance, him he regards as an equal. For such an ally the workers' power does everything possible, and there is no sacrifice which the Soviets would not readily make to satisfy the peasant-toiler who lives by his own labor."

This is the great middle peasantry which has been in the habit neither of hiring nor of being hired (as Lenine says below). But this majority of the peasantry has not merely refused to accept Soviet rulings, it has revolted. As Lenine says:

"Among the peasants are very often to be observed extraordinary disaffections, which reach the stage sometimes of repudiations of the entire system of Soviet economics."

Therefore in order to make any progress whatever this hostility had to be dealt with. Whatever friendship was to be offered them later, their open hostility could not be ignored. Therefore, the Herculean task was undertaken of introducing iron order into Russia's hundred thousand villages—a task never accomplished even under the Czarism. Says Lenine:

"It is necessary that the work in the village should be conducted in a disciplined manner, like the work in the Red Army."

No part of the country is more averse to discipline than the village; nothing would be more certain to make its hostility permanent.

But it is Lenine's economic rather than his political policy which is causing the chief trouble. He says:

"Between the peasants who bore the burden of capitalism and those peasants who exploited others, stands the mass of the peasantry. And here our task is the most difficult."

"In this case we determined our policy firmly. We say to the middle peasantry, in a language which they understand best, that there will be no attempt to force a transition to communal economy."

So far, so good. (Though, for the adoption of the contrary policy, see below.) The peasant has his land, but he is not entitled to its product! Lenine continues:

"The middle peasantry is undoubtedly accustomed to individual farming; the middle peasantry

—these are the peasant-owners. Although these peasants have no land in their ownership, although private property on land is abolished, yet, the economy remains in the hands of the peasant, and mainly, the peasant remains the owner in regard to the means of sustenance. Being the owner of the remainder of the grain, he becomes the exploiter of those who have no bread at all. He becomes the exploiter of the workers. Here lies the fundamental contradiction. The peasant, being a toiler, being a man who lives on his own labor, the man who bore all the burdens of the landowner and capitalist, stands with the workers. He understands more and more every day that only in unity with the working class will he be able to get rid of the capitalist. And the peasant as an owner, who has in his possession the remainder of the bread, thinks that he can sell that bread on his own conditions.”

This economic conflict, we see, cannot be avoided. It is permanent, the result of the economic collapse of Bolshevik Russia.

Two economic facts create the conflict, neither being remediable either by force or the most daring and ingenious system of Soviet ukases. (1) The peasant is in first possession of his product (despite all decrees), and (2) the Soviets have little or nothing to offer him in exchange. Let Lenin continue:

“But the peasant who exploits, who has a surplus of grain, and sells it to the starving population at profiteering prices, he is our enemy. The peasants do not all understand that unbridled trading in grain is a crime against the state. The peasant is accustomed to consider this his right. He reasons this way: ‘I produced the grain, I worked on it, the grain is in my hands, and I have a right to

trade with it.' This is the reasoning of the peasant with the old habit of an owner.

"With a right distribution of bread all will be satisfied, and then we will be able to get out of all difficulties. And to have a correct distribution, it is necessary that the peasants should assist in every way. Here there will be no indulgence on the part of the Soviets. The peasant must give the surplus of grain to the state in the form of a loan. At present we can give no commodities to the peasants because we do not have them; there is no coal, the railroads and the factories are stopping. To reconstruct the destroyed economy it is necessary that the peasant should, from the first, give his surplus products as a loan to the state. Only with such loans will we be able to get out of all difficulties.

"Every peasant will agree that when a worker is dying from starvation, it is necessary to give him bread on credit; and yet when it comes to millions of workers and millions of peasants they do not understand it. And the peasant resorts again and again to the old form of exploitation."

This does not give the peasant's side of the case. The peasant contends that the effort is being made to compel him to bear the entire burden of the Soviet experiment without his consent. He feels that Russian agriculture, the most wretched and backward part of the whole industrial structure, is the least able to bear this burden. Lenin declares in this speech that the hostile forces in the village "must be brought under the control of the real representatives of the proletariat," i. e., the Bolsheviks, and he repeatedly says that the urban proletariat must lead. So the peasant feels that even if there should be any gain from Sovietism he will be the last to receive a dividend. But he does not see the gain. So far he is getting the worst of it at every point.

The civil war has been waged over the countryside rather than in the cities. The favored bureaucracy and Red Army have taken a larger portion of the workmen than of the peasants. The farms are producing a considerable part of their normal product, the factories only a small part. The workingmen are being subsidized through the government's payment of the vast sums to cover the industrial deficits. The peasant is seeing his diminishing product seized without compensation. His agriculture has been rapidly degenerating for the lack of every essential—fertilizers, implements, animals, seeds—which he can only buy with his "surplus." Yet this surplus is seized by the military detachments as a "loan" and when he resists, he is called an exploiter.

If, as Lenin says, "the least little wavering" of the peasantry spells the end of Sovietism, then certainly its end is not far off. For the peasant has refused to plant the surplus, and his methods have merely changed from an active to the more effective passive resistance.

"Up to April 1, 1919, the Military Supply Bureau (from Petrograd alone) sent 255 military requisitioning detachments to various provinces." (The "Northern Commune" No. 73, September 4, 1919.)

"According to the report presented to the Moscow Conference of Soviets, 30,000 men had been sent in the course of a short period, but the majority of them were incapable of performing their task, while others were themselves gross speculators." (The "Moscow Pravda," No. 105, July 4, 1919.) "An atmosphere of aggression, espionage and bloody strife permeated the villages, coupled with an uncertainty as to the results of agricultural labor. The situation is best illustrated by the fact that *out of the 36,500 men forming the total of the food requisitioning detach-*

ments during the period from June to December, 1918, 7,309, i. e., 20 per cent., were killed and wounded by the peasants while collecting the grain." ("Izvestia" of the Food Commissariat for December, 1918.)

The results were what might have been expected.

The peasants, deprived of the possibility of disposing of their grain, and compelled to sell it at prices out of all proportion to those of other commodities they stood in need of, listened suspiciously to any new declaration on the part of the Bolsheviks, especially as in practice everything remained unchanged. As, hitherto, their endeavors to oppose requisitions by force had failed they had recourse to the only means of self-defence in their power; they curtailed their crop area, sowing barely enough to satisfy their own needs. According to the data of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the crop area in twenty-eight provinces of Soviet Russia had decreased by five million dessiatines (13,500,000 acres), the corresponding shortage of grain and forage being 3,035,714 tons (the "Economic Life," No. 54, 1919). The Tambov province, which habitually yielded 357,124 tons of surplus grain, now passed into the category of famine-stricken provinces ("Izvestia" of the General Executive Committee, No. 417). According to non-Bolshevist information the crop area curtailed was considerably larger.

The Bolsheviks themselves entertained a very gloomy view of the future. A correspondent from Samara wrote in the Bolshevik press: "The political side of this year's grain campaign (1919-1920) will be difficult and extremely complicated. The entire peasantry is united in staunchly defending its interests." After a

tour through the corn-producing regions Svidersky, a member of the People's Economic Council, reported: "In spite of corn being more plentiful this year, the new corn campaign should be considered more complicated politically than it was last year; this is also enhanced by the altered correlation of forces in the village itself."

What concrete benefit can the Soviets confer upon the peasants—even if they are in power for years to come—to compensate for the hostility they have created? What mere propaganda can atone for this systematic plundering and violence of the Red Armies in the villages?

People who have not seen a dictatorship at work in a backward country argue that if the peasants do not revolt this indicates that they passively accept the existing régime. There is no foundation whatever for such a view.

In spite of almost universal passive resistance, utilizing such armies as they have, 35,000 Soviet soldiers with machine guns, were able to overcome a resistance of 35,000,000 peasants poorly armed and scattered throughout 50,000 villages; with little, if no inter-communication.

The peasants are revolting as well as they are able—by passive resistance and the refusal to plant "surplus" crops.

Bolshevism vs. Agriculture.—The latest and most vigorous defender of the Soviets' agricultural policy is Lincoln Eyre of *The New York World*. Not the Bolsheviks themselves make more extraordinary claims for Bolshevism in rural regions. The Bolshevik revolution "has bettered the lot of the Russian peasant, mentally, morally, and materially, to an enormous degree." He is growing "rich and fat." His last harvest, helped by

a favorable year, according to all accounts, "surpassed by fully 25 per cent. the pre-war average."

Eyre speaks of his intimate and constant contact with Bolshevik authorities, whom he frequently quotes, and we need not doubt—however amazing it may seem—that these were indeed their claims, and that he believed them. We have already quoted sufficient Bolshevik material to show that they boldly and completely *reverse* the truth—according even to their own evidence. Eyre has been so far deceived as to give the Bolshevik credit for abolishing vodka, which all the world knows was carried out years previously by the Czar! He speaks of the priests' influence being curtailed by the Soviets "almost to nothing"—when the author can personally testify by visits to scores of villages all over Russia thirteen and fourteen years ago, that this was already the case in most of them. He says the peasant now owns his land and suggests that he owes this to the Bolshevik. Lenin's own figures show that the peasants could increase their previous holdings only some 25 per cent. by expropriating all the land not already in the hands of very small proprietors under the Czar. Eyre says they got this new land through the Bolshevik revolution. As a matter of fact they took most of it under the Kerensky régime and he guaranteed that they should have all under the constitutional assembly—which actually gathered at the time he promised and was almost unanimous for this land program.

Eyre says, "Russian peasants, although accustomed from ancient times to work collectively, have always clung tenaciously to the principle of private ownership." As a matter of fact Russian peasants, although accustomed from ancient times to communal ownership,

have always clung tenaciously to the principle of working individually in their agriculture—a truth to which I can attest from two summers in many parts of rural Russia—a truth which is proved by all authorities, from Lenin and the Liberals to the Reactionaries.

I quote Eyre at some length, not because he is exceptionally extreme, but because his statements are typical of the entire pro-Bolshevist propaganda for foreign consumption (such statements would be futile for Russia). He goes so far as to attack the peasants because they do not feel the faintest gratitude to the Bolsheviks, and because they are anti-Bolshevist, while the pro-Bolsheviks among them he calls "unusually progressive." He expresses no indignation, on the other hand, at the Bolshevik attitude towards the peasant, which he summarizes in the following paragraph:

"The Bolsheviks believe, however, that they can 'show him' where his best interests lie, just as soon as their factories are able to turn out agricultural machinery and fertilizer, etc. Their scheme is to give the Sovietist farms and rural communes all the manufactured products they require and give nothing or virtually nothing to individualistic farmers. They figure that this is bound to place communistic land cultivation on a much more prosperous level than individualistic endeavor.

"The solitary plowman, trying to squeeze riches for himself out of his patch of land, would soon comprehend, they argue, the error of his ways once he were confronted with the visible evidence of the greater prosperity of his communist neighbors."

Eyre, who certainly cannot be suspected of hostility to the Soviets, then proceeds to relate some of the details of their policy. His tendency to put them in a

favorable light does not really obscure the essential facts. We read:

"For the present the Soviet Government is treating the peasants *tenderly but firmly*. It has been drummed in upon their consciousness that, however repugnant the idea may be to them, they cannot escape turning into the state a certain fixed amount of their product and livestock *at a price specified by the Soviets*. The grain tithe varies from eleven pounds per head in the northern sections to fifteen in the south, where the yield is more abundant. Potatoes are collected in about the same proportion. These percentages are *only about a third* of the total that can be produced. In order to insure a minimum of production, the regional authorities notify each township how much grain it will be called upon to supply by a certain specified date, the estimate being based on the township's average harvest in past years. Collections are usually made three times a year. Products such as milk, butter, and eggs are *bought* in the same fashion, but at weekly intervals. On the average, 10 per cent. of the peasant-owned horses, cattle, and other animals have been requisitioned." (My italics.)

"Tenderly but firmly." This is the way we handle unruly children, criminals, or animals. No doubt it is the way the better and more intelligent Bolsheviks try to handle their peasant subjects (90 per cent. of the population). They take *only* about a third of the crops that can be produced. Surely a third is a good deal from a woefully and incredibly backward agriculture! And *about* a third of what *can* be produced would surely prove oftentimes the larger part of what *is* produced. The last word quoted, "*requisitioned*" surely fits this proceeding more accurately than the word "*bought*."

But we are only in the middle of the story. Eyre

continues to minimize the peasants' compulsory "sacrifices," but he does give us the list. He says:

"The *only* other sacrifice imposed upon the rural populations is labor duty, which consists chiefly in devoting a certain number of hours to cleaning the snow off the railroads. Carting wood is *also* obligatory, but since one can make 900 rubles by hauling a single load five miles or so it is not a very self-sacrificing obligation." (My italics.)

This last remark may be questioned. What is a Bolshevik ruble?

Eyre even gives a glimpse of the politics of a village—which all information shows to be typical. The village government was not Communist, "*as the village is controlled by the Volost or township soviet which, while usually not possessing a Communist majority, always elects Communists to executive offices, is in fact a cog in the Bolshevik machine.*"

Eyre makes much of the fact that the peasants, having been cowed into submission, now no longer revolt. He says:

"Despite much grumbling, however, the country folk on the whole get along on amicable enough terms with their Bolshevik rulers. Sensing rather than understanding the Communist party's *might* they obey the Soviet's commands unquestioningly. The days when the Council of the People's Commissaries had to take corn from the farmers at the point of the bayonet have passed, though the bayonet is still kept sharp lest it should be required again. In other words, there are still in existence special agricultural detachments of the Red Army charged with the task of assuring the prompt rendition of the grain demanded by the state. Soldiers composing these units have a fairly easy time of it nowadays, however."

Yet Eyre favors the Bolsheviks as against the peasants, as already indicated, and with them (as against the peasants) throws the blame on the Entente blockade and gives the Bolsheviks the praise! He says of the peasants:

"Even more disturbing to them than the task of farming machines is the peasant's shortage of fertilizer. It is one of their chief causes of complaint against the Government—for *understanding nothing of the blockade*, they blame the Government for all their troubles, while *cunningly withholding praise* for such success or benefits as the Soviet régime may have brought them." (My italics.)

Surely Lenin never more accurately estimated in advance the probable course of any of his hand-picked visiting correspondents.

Communism to be Forced in Agriculture by Partial Confiscation of Crops under the Name of Taxes.—Lenin's official American organ, "Soviet Russia," on February 28, 1920, contained the following illuminating item:

"Beginning with November, 1918, to this old system there were added on two taxes of a purely revolutionary character which stand out apart within the partly outgrown system 'taxes in kind' (decree of October 30, 1918), and 'extraordinary taxes' (November 2, 1918).

"Both decrees have been described as follows by Comrade Krestinsky, Commissary of the Finance, at the May session of the financial sub-divisions:

"These are decrees of a different order, the only thing they have in common is that they both bear a class character and that each provides for the tax to increase in direct proportion with the amount of property which the taxpayer possesses, that the poor

are completely free from both taxes, and the lower middle class pays them in a smaller proportion."

"The extraordinary tax aims at the savings which remained in the hands of the urban and larger rural bourgeoisie, from former times. Insofar as it is directed at non-labor savings it cannot be levied more than once. As regards the taxes in kind, borrowing Comrade Krestinsky's expression, 'it will remain in force during the period of transition to the Communist order until the village will from practical experience realize the advantage of rural economy on a large scale compared with the small farming estate, and will of its own accord, *without compulsion*, en masse adopt the communist method of land cultivation.'

"Thus the tax in kind is a link binding politically the Communist socialized urban economy and the independent individual petty agricultural producers.

"Such are the two 'direct' revolutionary taxes of the latest period."

Krestinsky's claim that this intended transition to agricultural communism is not to be compulsory will deceive no one. He himself classes it with the other *revolutionary* tax which is to destroy the larger bourgeoisie of both town and country so completely that it can be levied only once. This policy, aimed against the majority of the population, could not be proposed unless the present minority dictatorship were intended to be lasting. In the meanwhile, in order to obtain the means to maintain the subjection of the small capitalist peasantry, a large part of Russia's patrimony of natural resources are offered to foreign capitalists. Doubtless revolutions are hoped for to cancel this debt—but it cannot be known that these revolutions will occur.

CHAPTER IX

ARE THE BOLSHEVIKI REFORMING?

"If the Bolsheviks want to stay in power, circumstances will force them to be practical and to give up their theories." Here is a widely prevalent view. On the surface and without analysis several extremely important facts seem to bear this opinion out. (1) The Bolsheviks have abandoned their alleged economic principle, communism. (2) They have thrown over their alleged political principle, Sovietism. (3) They have completely reversed their labor control of industry by introducing compulsory labor. (4) They have replaced ultra-pacifism by aggressive militarism and imperialism.

All very true and very important and illuminating too. But—each one of the policies now abandoned had been taken up by the Bolsheviki only as an after-thought. Their revolution was at first far more successful than they had dreamed it could be—and their heads were turned. Before the revolution they were neither pacifists, syndicalists, Sovietists, nor communists. In fact they never became pacifists for a moment, breathing always both civil war and a revolutionary international war when the time would be ripe. The State Socialism they are now returning to was the natural industrial form they expected their highly centralized revolutionary organization to take when it captured the government. The alternative experiment (labor control of

industry) which they have now discarded was but an interlude—a concession to popular demand, temporarily granted in order to popularize the revolution. As to Sovietism it was scarcely dreamed of before March, 1917, when its germ appeared in the Kerensky revolution, nor was it finally adopted by the Bolsheviks until February, 1918, when Lenin saw he could not coerce the Constitutional Assembly. The Bolshevik revolution of November, 1917, was a Bolshevik Party revolution; the Bolsheviks have never relinquished their hold either of governmental power or of the Soviets for a moment; and it is no real change that the Soviets have visibly become a mere empty form to-day.

So also with communism. Until their final abandonment of democracy in February, 1918, the Bolsheviks had claimed to be Socialists; they said they stood not for equal incomes and division of all possessions, but for the nationalization of capital. They are now saying this again.

As a matter of fact they stand now where they have always stood (in practice)—they are for any political and economic institutions that will keep them in power. They are reversing their policies from time to time, but they are not reforming. They are and must remain (at the bottom) what they have always been. They got their power and held it as *propagandists* and *fighters*, who could organize the illiterate, desperate and helpless mass. By a process of natural and artificial selection the Bolshevik Party was built up of persons with gifts for this kind of work. It cannot change its own nature. The administration of government and industry is entirely beyond its ken and power. The fever of fighting and propaganda now going on completely fulfills the

wildest dreams and the entire life-object of ninety-nine Bolsheviks out of one hundred. They can only become constructively practical as they abandon their power to another kind of men—the very kind which, in all classes (especially among peasants and workingmen), they have excluded from their party and made their worst enemies.

Propaganda and war must remain the chief activity of the Bolshevik Party and their Soviets. Peace at home or abroad can only be a truce—as all Bolshevik publications for home consumption—or for foreign revolutionary allies—never cease to declare. Civil war for perhaps a decade or a generation, world-revolution and national wars against capital, this is the beginning and end of the program “for the present period,” as Lenin himself says.

About a year ago Lenin grandiloquently announced to the world a new policy, he was going to employ freely non-Bolshevik industrial administrators and experts. And because he faced in the right direction, it was at once assumed by Soviet sympathizers everywhere that he was going to equal if not surpass other countries! Several considerations were forgotten. If this is the right road then the previous policy—followed during the first year and a half of Bolshevik rule—was wrong, as Lenin himself confessed. The evil already done in killing off and driving out of the country the industrial brains of Russia cannot be repaired in a single year or perhaps in a generation. Even the physical decay and destruction of industry and plunder of the factories will take years to repair. And after the Soviets had finally brought industry to where it was when they began to destroy it, the new and permanent handicaps of Sovietism would

continue to hold it back. Vast sums must go from a starving people for propaganda, to subsidize foreign revolutionists, to send armies to help revolutions nearby. And the Bolshevik bureaucracy—which Lenin's new policy confesses to be all but useless for industrial or constructive purposes—must be paid, fed, and (even worse) given a large amount of power, especially in the factories and among the workmen, upon whom the Bolsheviks aim to rest their whole régime. Leading Bolsheviks themselves complain (see above) that this bureaucracy of agitators already numbers several hundred thousand. To justify their existence they will keep busy—and above all in the factories. Even an approach to industrial efficiency will remain impossible with such handicaps.

Lenin may hire a few constructive experts. In proportion as they oust the Bolsheviks—few of whom ever constructed anything—the régime would change. In proportion as they serve the Bolsheviks it remains the same. The Bolsheviks know this, and take pains that their creatures are not numerous enough thus to oust them one by one—without a revolutionary struggle. The destruction of the skilled and expert has been rapid, wholesale, and thorough. Their resurrection must be slow.

The great reversals of policy prove, further, that the Bolsheviks secured power by false pretences. They got the active support of a considerable part of the masses of the towns by promising bread, peace, and liberty, land for the peasants, the election of officers by soldiers, the control of the factories by the workers, “all power to the Soviets, etc.” Large sections of the working-men were dazzled by the program. Though they did

not believe in or vote for the Bolsheviks they could not refuse to listen to such promises or to hope that they would be carried out. Indeed the Bolsheviks' program was simply constructed, they merely offered the masses everything they wanted—using the exact promises and the very words of the German propagandists who were also working to overthrow Kerensky's democratic régime. It was a warfare of fanaticism and these promises were nothing but the most available psychological weapons with which to rally an ignorant population.

The chief Bolshevik weapons were the bayonets of the Cronstadt sailors and the Red Guard, but their propaganda allowed them to consolidate their power. Their promises were not kept, some of them because they were impossible and therefore either dishonest or irresponsible from the beginning. For example, only a fraction of the land offered was in existence (see above). And now comes the great reversal: such power as the Soviets ever enjoyed is taken away. Czarist military discipline is introduced; instead of peace the revolutionary-imperialism of the Red Army chiefs; instead of labor sovereign, labor enslaved. The new policies may or may not be better than the old, they constitute a complete abandonment of the promises by which the Bolsheviks built up their power. Long ago the peasants were undeceived. Now has come the turn of the workingmen.

Thus the great and spectacular reversals of policy, which the conservative world has welcomed as a return to common sense, show rather that the Bolsheviks are discarding their opportunistic concessions to anarchy and returning to their earlier plans for a lasting party dictatorship. They prove, second, that the new Bolshe-

vist program has not had even that limited popular support enjoyed by the old. And finally they certainly demonstrate that a party which cannot be trusted by its own people can scarcely be trusted by the foreign nations which—up to this very moment—it has regarded as enemies.

PART II
THE PRO-BOLSHEVISTS

CHAPTER X

"AUTHORITIES" ON BOLSHEVISM

Lenine's régime openly defends its policy of allowing none but sure friends to enter Soviet Russia or to remain there. Hence all correspondents and others who have been permitted to get a glimpse of the country under his tutelage *without exception* have been reliably pro-Bolshevist to begin with—or else gave complete satisfaction to Lenine and his agents upon examination in Russia. And, in every instance, Lenine's judgment has been justified by the event. He has made no mistake, from Arthur Ransome and Philips Price to Professor Goode, Isaac Don Levine, and Lincoln Eyre.

The reliable witnesses are those Lenine did not willingly permit to leave the country, but who left without his permission. There is nothing new about this policy. It was successfully followed by Germany all through the war; only being better organized not so many got through the German net.

Tens of thousands of Russian Socialist workingmen and peasants as well as intellectuals have escaped. I do not refer to aristocrats or to other supporters of Czarism, but to those elements who died by the hundred thousand fighting against Czarism and for democracy and who finally overthrew the old régime (the Bolsheviks, their leaders safe refugees in other countries, contributed insignificantly to *this* revolution). These ultra-progres-

sive and Socialistic democrats swarm in Finland, Poland, the Baltic provinces, Germany, Austria, and a dozen other bordering countries. There is no question as to the nature of Sovietism in Eastern Europe—where these people dwell. It is only in England, France and America, where there are relatively few of these witnesses in the place of tens of thousands, where any doubt remains in the public mind. There are no "liberals" in near-by countries so indifferent to Russia's ills, so perverted as to defend Sovietism. They take it seriously, as would America and England if the menace were as near home.

A Summary of the Amazing Claims of the Soviets.— Following Philips Price and Arthur Ransome, the Manchester Guardian sent to Russia Prof. William T. Goode, who was received with open arms by Lenine. Goode has made the following typical summary of the claims of Bolshevism—which he supports. He says:

1. It has tackled the question of the illiteracy and ignorance of the masses with a certain measure of success in the present and the promise of more in the future.
2. It has preserved and extended the art galleries and brought them to the comprehension and enjoyment of the workers.
3. It maintains theaters, opera, ballet in full work as before.
4. It provides concerts in the open air and in halls; it caters for the tastes of children on the boulevards and in special theaters.
5. It has provided, for the first time in Russia, universal tolerance for religions.
6. It has endowed motherhood and provided for the guarding of infant life.

7. It brings medical assistance to every one.

8. It has put the worker on a decent economic footing, man or woman.

9. So far as it has been possible, already it has improved his housing and will continue the work when the Allies permit.

10. It has kept 3,000 factories working and supplied *in what measure it can* the needs of the people. (My italics.)

11. It has improved a transport system broken down by barbarous use in war time and made it answer the desperate needs of locomotion, food and military service.

12. It has kept the great towns free from epidemics.

Most of these claims are contradicted by Soviet admissions as to the real *facts*, to be found in this volume. Some of them also exhibit the extraordinary logic of the Soviet propaganda. Claims one, nine and ten admit that not much *has been* accomplished, but go on to state what the Bolsheviki *will* do, as having the same weight as if they had already done it, also suggesting that nobody could have done better (for example, as to housing). Further we are calmly asked to believe that Bolshevik shortcomings are not due to the Bolsheviki but to their enemies—an extraordinary statement in the midst of an argument intended to provide the facts to prove this very claim.

Claims six, seven and eight have the same defect in an even higher degree. The meaning is clearly *not* that the Soviets *have accomplished* these things, which it would take advanced rich and orderly countries years to perform, but merely that they *say* they *will* accomplish them! The first demand of the Soviets in the "raise

the blockade" agitation, for instance, has been for at least a limited supply of the most urgently useful medical materials—which are lacking. The present Soviet intention—or expressed intention—"to bring medical aid to everyone" is taken as wholly equivalent to bringing that aid! So with nearly all the other Soviet "achievements."

Points two, three and four avoid the real questions—how much and how many? Theaters and concerts exist, but how much service do they do in Soviet Russia compared to other countries or to the conditions under Kerensky or before the war? *To what degree* have the illiterate workers (in the midst of suffering and civil war) been educated in the appreciation of the fine arts?

Claims five, eleven and twelve flatly and completely contradict the Bolsheviks' own evidence, as the present volume demonstrates.

Thus not one of these claims comes to anything. All are either against Bolshevik testimony, avoid the real issue, or take Soviet promises for accomplished fact. This is typical of the entire propaganda, none of which is more able and plausible than that put forth by Professor Goode. Endlessly repeated, with a thousand minor variations and with a score of different signatures, it has made a deep impression not only on all those with "the will to believe," but also upon the busy world generally which has time neither to check such statements by known facts and credible witnesses, nor to examine them for inherent improbability.

CHAPTER XI

THE ORIGIN OF PRO-BOLSHEVISM IN SMOLNY INSTITUTE

Thousands, if not millions, of persons have come to misplace their confidence, temporarily no doubt, in certain self-constituted "authorities" on the Russian situation, individuals almost without exception who have gained their sole knowledge of Russia from a few months, weeks or days spent in that country without any previous knowledge or preparation or any special equipment for disentangling the fundamental facts, usually even without a knowledge of the Russian language. Almost without exception these persons have spent most of their visit in Russia under the Bolshevik dictatorship and were dependent on the Bolsheviks not only for information but for the privilege of entering the country, or staying there, of moving from place to place, of eating, of being protected from Red Guards, of having facilities needed to accomplish any practical investigation whatever under disturbed conditions and in a limited space of time.

By excluding every new visitor of whose sympathies they were not certain in advance, by professional favors, by every means of misinformation, the Bolsheviks could be sure of the most favorable reports and even of occasional conversions. Once having converted two or three of these "nonpartisan" observers, it was still

easier with their help to influence others, until certain stories came to be repeated and were eventually accepted by ever-widening circles.

To every one of these pro-Bolshevist witnesses stamped with the O. K. of Lenine there are to be found a hundred on the other side, persons who know the language and have lived for years in Russia, persons familiar with Russian history and politics and representing every nation from Russia to America, and every social class. Especially competent are those Russian socialists and revolutionists who all their lifetime have known the Russian masses, workers and peasants, and have been acquainted with the Russian Bolsheviki for the last quarter century, also the labor leaders from neighboring countries who have followed Russian affairs from the labor and revolutionary point of view for many years, have known Trotzky and Lenine and in many cases have visited Russia since the Revolution—such as Albert Thomas of France, Vandervelde of Belgium, Branting of Sweden, Bauer of Austria, and Henderson of England—every one of them Cabinet Ministers during the war. To these may be added Kautsky of Germany, recognized as the greatest living Marxian, a life-long student of Russia and advocate of Russian revolution. But the misinformed part of the public does not know these men; it does know some favorite correspondent, writer, or charity worker who has suddenly been set up as an authority.

The earliest propagandists of pro-Bolshevism were two English journalists, Philips Price of the Manchester Guardian, and Arthur Ransome of the London Daily News, both correspondents of ultra-pacifist and free trade organs, which have favored the Bolsheviki because

they were for "peace at any price." These two men did not stop at pro-Bolshevism but have become accepted as out and out Bolsheviki, their pamphlets issued by the Soviet agencies alongside those of Trotzky and Lenine. Ransome's official Bolshevik account of the Soviets is hailed by kindly and unsuspecting American newspaper reviewers as "straightforward reporting," "a plain unvarnished tale," and "one of the most informative authorities"—these conservative American organs being apparently unaware that Ransome is regarded as entirely satisfactory by the Bolsheviki themselves. Karl Radek, the Bolshevik emissary sent to Germany to introduce Bolshevism in that country, not only recommends and writes an introduction for Ransome's pamphlets on the Soviet Government, but refers to him—from first hand acquaintance—as having "passed from the Cadet (Liberal) view of Russian affairs to that of the Bolsheviks." Another American review refers to Philips Price as "competent and responsible." How competent and responsible we may see from his account of the fundamental Russian problem, the land question. Like most pro-Bolsheviks he represents two-thirds of the old Russia as having belonged to landlords. This is true only of the inaccessible, uncleared and swamp lands. Price says that two-thirds of the old Russia had to work for the landlords. On the contrary Lenine's own statistics show that more than two-thirds of the cultivated lands belonged to the peasants even before the revolution, and all the rest were solemnly pledged to them by the Kerensky régime. Price's account of the Russian people—90 per cent. peasants—is exactly this "competent and responsible."

Ransome and Price, personally and indirectly influ-

enced a dozen other correspondents who were later admitted into Russia by the grace of Lenine, and every one of these has lived up to Bolshevik expectations, following the main lines previously laid down. But Ransome undertook a further work for the Soviets—to spread their influence beyond journalistic circles. Together with certain English-speaking Bolsheviks he undertook the conversion to Bolshevism or pro-Bolshevism, of the younger and more susceptible of the few Americans who remained in Russia after the Soviet overturn, for the Red Cross work and Y. M. C. A. For every such convert there were a dozen who refused conversion and repudiated the Soviets. But enough were convinced to form a fair sized little group, together with certain American writers and radicals, such as John Reed, Albert Rhys Williams, Louise Bryant (Reed's wife), and Bessie Beatty, the two former officially connected with the Bolshevik Government. Lincoln Steffens, sent to Russia along with William C. Bullitt, was also in touch with this group. Through contact with one another in Russia these persons brought back very similar stories to America and did all they could to reinforce one another's propaganda—and with no small success.

America's Unpaid Propagandists for the Soviets.— A few months ago Bolshevik armies and Bolshevik propaganda were threatening the world. At the present moment Lenine (like the Kaiser last year) wants a compromise peace, a peace that will leave him his power and give him time to prepare to attack his "bourgeois" neighbors under more favorable circumstances—his territories having recuperated economically while revolutions and wars are sown among his enemies.

In accordance with this new Bolshevik policy the

direct propaganda of revolution among the working classes in Europe and America has been temporarily slowed down, while sympathy or toleration are being sought for among the liberal middle classes. While Lenine and Trotzky and the Bolshevik press of Russia are as bloodthirsty as ever for home consumption, every statement for foreign consumption is now drawn up according to the new diplomacy. The revolution, we are now asked to believe, is not merely proletarian, but democratic—and represents all Russia, even the peasantry! Bolshevism is not engaged in international aggression against world democracy, but in national defence against world imperialism! It is guiltless of any economic destruction, all of Russia's myriad industrial troubles being due either to the old Russia or to the Entente! It is no longer waging a war to the finish with the "bourgeoisie"—a war in which no promises are binding. On the contrary it is ready for any and all reasonable compromises and can safely be trusted!

Unadulterated Bolshevism made a limited appeal (1) to the extremists among the working classes and (2) a few anarchists among the intellectuals. But that doctrine, which was sufficient for the Germanized Commissars and the motley Red Guards—composed partly of Chinese, Letts and Hungarians, and largely of illiterate Russians—was unable to win over the great body of the labor unions or even the Socialist parties of western Europe, and secured almost no adherents outside of the wage-earning classes.

The pro-Bolshevist doctrine now finally evolved—by the aid of Lenine's foreign advisors in Russia, Europe and America—is a very different article. Where the Russian product gained one adherent the new export

doctrine gains a dozen among the wage earners and a hundred among the "intellectuals" and middle classes. It has already captured the Socialist parties of France, England and America, and may yet capture the British and French labor unions, if it has not already done so. It has not yet gained more than a minority of the middle classes in any country. But that minority, both in England and America, is far larger than most people realize. It is a most articulate minority, when not vociferous. And it combines easily—as did pro-Germanism—with every kind of discontent, intelligent and unintelligent, justified and unjustified—from the irrational revived nationalism of the small and secondary nations to the growing demand for radical labor reform. The just movements it confuses and perverts; it gives a new force and unity to the unjust.

What is this new fanatical force which is trying to usurp the title "liberal"? How can its campaign in support of the unspeakable Soviets claim such a considerable following? A hundred thousand young American "intellectuals," graduates of our colleges and higher institutions of learning, are weekly being taught this anti-American, anti-democratic, pro-Soviet doctrine by certain "high-brow" publications, irresponsible correspondents, and enthusiastic lecturers who have toured Bolshevik Russia under the personal supervision of Lenin, having proven themselves acceptable to the dictator. The general public leniently looks on at the movement as wrong-headed but comparatively harmless "parlor Bolshevism." On the contrary, it is a serious, persistent and world-wide attack on the foundations of democratic civilization—more insidious, more flexible and more dangerous than Bolshevism itself.

The pro-Bolshevist is he who persistently gives actual aid to the Communist enemy. And we need never be in doubt when this aid is given. The Bolsheviks quickly recognize their friends and always express appreciation of arguments that help their cause.

The pro-Bolshevist is he who wants to do for the Bolsheviki what they ask to be done. To-day the Bolsheviki want (1) economic aid, (2) the economic and moral recognition implied by such aid, for use against their internal foes and (3) that financial aid be withdrawn from all small neighboring peoples, which, without exception, are their enemies. In view of the aggressive purposes of the Soviets, publicly avowed a thousand times (until they fell into their present unfavorable predicament) and having regard to their breaches with "bourgeois" governments, against which their very constitution declares war unending, the acceptance of this program is pro-Bolshevism. Also the Bolshevik may be just as effectively aided without consideration of any of these international questions, simply by the defense either of Bolshevik theory or of Bolshevik practice as applied in Russia.

This is pro-Bolshevism, and the movement has had a considerable effect not only on the "intellectuals" but also on the general public, which is in no sense pro-Bolshevist. For example, the pro-Bolshevik, by filling the newspapers with false reports and interpretations, have succeeded in all but *annihilating the effect of an immense amount of reliable Russian information from innumerable other sources.*

One of our leading newspaper editors went so far as to say that "we know nothing about Russia," a state of mind that could only have been brought about by

giving precisely the same weight to pro-Bolshevist propaganda as to all the other sources of information combined. For the newspapers have freely published every Bolshevik document or speech of any importance, including a whole book of Trotzky's and the daily cables of their official foreign mouthpiece, Arthur Ransome. The confusion came from the boldness of such dispatches. Though they bore every possible internal evidence of their own falsity, and were often disproved within a short time by later disclosures, they were sufficient to cast an artificial obscurity over the entire Russian situation. They failed to gain credence for themselves, but they succeeded in raising doubt about all the news that came from other quarters.

CHAPTER XII

VARIETIES OF PRO-BOLSHEVISM

I—The Near-Bolsheviks

There are several degrees of pro-Bolshevism. The most extreme, which may be called near-Bolshevism, does not hide its hearty admiration either for Bolshevism or for the Bolsheviks. It stands not only for the Soviets but for more or less similar movements in other countries. To this group belong William C. Bullitt, Lincoln Steffens, and the "radical" generally, from the regular Socialist party to the Nation and the Dial. It is on the most friendly terms with the Communists in Russia. It wants the United States to do everything in its power to aid the Bolshevik Soviets against their internal and external enemies—such aid, as outlined by Lenin in his offer to Bullitt, being economic and moral. A second group has the same object, but professes opposition to Bolshevism. This group is best represented by Raymond Robins, who admitted in the United States Senate hearing that he favored "an economic alliance" with Lenin. Robins and his faithful scribe, William Hard, have been so voluminous that a summary is necessary to show his position. With Robins is also a small minority group of Red Cross and Y. M. C. A. associates, who have been equally active and enthusiastic in trying to win the philanthropists and churches for the Soviets.

To these have been added several of the new so-called "liberal" weeklies like *The New Republic*.

Then there are the advocates of a benevolent neutrality. It will be remembered that neutralism and pacifism was the final form of the German propaganda and that it succeeded in victimizing a number of earnest and intelligent people whom the Germans could not have reached by a direct method. Certain academic circles especially would now disarm and render helpless all parties and governments that are struggling heroically against the Red tide—by describing the Bolsheviks as being bad, very bad, but no worse than their opponents. Americans who defended Germany's armies, saying they were no worse than those of the Entente, were accurately called pro-German, and those who take the same position as to the Soviets are rightfully termed pro-Bolshevists. Let us review briefly the arguments put forth by these three groups. We need not stop long with the near-Bolshevists. We can take their word that they are not Bolsheviks. But for all the public purposes the difference is not important. They are even more valuable to Lenin than his official ambassadors, precisely because they claim to be non-partisan. Their criticisms of the Soviets are always so mild as to practically amount to praising them by faint damns. They center their entire energy and animosity on the opponents of the Soviets, attacking bitterly every one of the anti-Bolshevik critics, regardless of their origin. Caught red-handed in this unfair partisanship, they answer, like *The Nation*, that the anti-Bolshevik side has already been overstated—an excuse that would serve equally as well to cover the entire Bolshevik (or any other) propaganda.

Bullitt's mission to Russia was limited to a few days,

when he brought back *a report which contained exactly what his Paris acquaintance had informed the American Government it would contain*—a “whitewash” of the Bolsheviks. In this brief space of time he says he found out the views of a hundred million people scattered over a large section of Europe and Asia. The Soviet form of government, he reports, “has acquired such a hold on the imagination of the common people that the women are ready to starve and the young men to die for it.” Bullitt does not condescend to deal with figures; he saw the nation as a whole. We must conclude that in these few days he read widely in Russian, i. e., the Bolshevik press and found out what the illiterate Red Guards are told they are fighting for and against, or otherwise he could have no basis for this statement.

In the same few days Bullitt was able to evaluate the entire Soviet governmental machine or chaos (which-ever it may be) and to summarize the order or disorder, in these vast territories, for he informs us that “the destructive phase of the revolution is over and all the energy of the government is turned to constructive work.” As the chief example of this constructive work he refers to the famous revolution in education in Soviet Russia. For the schools are a subject he also mastered since he gives his endorsement to the Bolshevik report that “thousands of new schools have been opened up in all parts of Russia.”

The reader may say that such unsupported statements of obvious Bolshevik origin need not be taken seriously. But they are taken seriously, not only by the pro-Bolsheviks but by a larger public whom the pro-Bolshevik propaganda has confused or reduced to a hopeless quandary as to Russian affairs. Bullitt and his group are

dangerous especially in their claim that Lenin is evolving and is ready for almost any concessions in order to retain his power. Even if this were true, knowing Lenin, we should be accomplices in his crimes, past and to come, if we aided him to retain his power. But it is not true.

The near-Bolsheviks do not have much weight as individuals, and are not very numerous. But they are incredibly active: they are what the French call "energumenes," that is, men who have the mania of energy. The Bullitts and Steffenses are omnipresent and persistent. As Jean Longuet, leader of the pro-Bolshevik French Socialists, says: "Bullitt and Steffens have been the best and most useful allies of the Soviets." Moreover, writers like Ransome and Price, practically without responsibility in their statements and fluent beyond belief, have an effect on the ignorant and credulous which is world-wide and not to be underestimated.

CHAPTER XIII

VARIETIES OF PRO-BOLSHEVISM

II—The Pro-Soviet Propagandists

More influential and dangerous than the near-Bolshevist is the group that works towards political recognition of the Soviets. While these persons do not propagate Bolshevism directly, they lose no occasion to defend the Bolsheviks or to attack their opponents. The leader in this movement, Raymond Robins, who spent eleven months in Russia for the American Red Cross, saw nothing of the old or Czarist Russia and little of Russia under the Kerensky revolution, arriving in Moscow and Petrograd only a few weeks before the overthrow of the Kerensky government. Nor did he see much of the real Russia—the agricultural and peasant country. He describes his sojourn, in the Senate hearings, as having been confined chiefly to Petrograd and Moscow, together with several trips across the country—which, in the land of vast distances, means weeks consumed on trains. The Russia of 100 provinces and 100,000 villages, or any considerable or representative part of it, is difficult to know even when one knows the language and country and when the trains are running regularly and there is no disintegration of the railroads or civil war.

What Robins lacked in knowledge and language of the people, he believes he made up by getting on friendly

terms with the Bolshevik leaders. He tells us, and no doubt told himself, that he did this with the idea of serving America and the Russians, but he proceeds to speak of Lenin and Trotzky in terms of friendship and admiration, and where he has one word of criticism of their policies, he has a hundred of apology and even of praise. Robins doubtless intended to serve America. It is certain that the Bolsheviki believed he was serving and still serves the Soviets—a view which is reinforced by the high regard he expresses for them, by his failure to give any telling evidence against them, and by his readiness now to extend them the very aid they say is most needed to continue their operation. That eminent Bolshevik, Karl Radek, who is described by William Hard, in his articles on Robins, as their “most powerful propagandist and journalist” and “a person of power in Petrograd” writes of Robins with enthusiasm. Radek says that the Red Cross colonel fully endorsed the central position of the Bolshevik policy and the Senate hearings later demonstrated this to be a fact. Radek says that Robins agreed with his Bolshevik mentors that “in Russia only two things were possible, either the Soviet Government or else complete chaos.”

“He did not waver,” adds Radek. Indeed he did not. He states before the Senators that he stayed in Russia trying to maintain a semi-official connection with the Bolsheviki as long as he could, then returned to America to endeavor to secure political recognition for their government. The Bolsheviki themselves did not ask for political recognition, however, so he then turned his efforts to securing economic recognition; “an economic alliance,” as he states it, with this Communist government.

William Hard describes Robins' functions in Russia as having been entirely above mere diplomacy. He was a sort of super-diplomat. Ambassador Francis, on the contrary, describes him as having been entrusted merely momentarily and semi-officially with certain public matters, as thousands of private individuals have been entrusted before without thereafter claiming to have had an official status. Our ambassador also speaks of Robins as having presented himself as "the mouthpiece of America," at Bolshevik headquarters, and as having proved most acceptable to them. Robins' "outdoor" diplomacy is rather a long story, as Robins tells it, and Lenin and Trotzky are the only other witnesses. The quality of this story, however, may be tested by a written memorandum of Ambassador Francis, which was the best evidence Robins could produce of delegated authority. This memorandum is clear, strong, and regular, or "indoor" diplomacy. When Robbins produced it triumphantly to prove his case, down tumbled the whole "outdoor" structure. This memorandum was dated January 2, 1918, before the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. It concluded: "If the Russian armies now under the command of the people's commissioners commence and seriously conduct hostilities against the forces of Germany and her Allies, I will recommend to my government the formal recognition of the de facto government of the people's commissioners."

Francis was concerned solely with Bolshevik performance. Robins wanted and still wants economic assistance to be extended to the Soviets not on the basis of Bolshevik *performance* but on the basis of Bolshevik *promises*. For Robins says of Lenin and Trotzky that they could keep their word. Dealing with Robins and

pleased with him, it seems they kept certain promises they made with him in regard to the Red Cross, condensed milk (which they consented to accept), and similar matters, so why couldn't they be trusted as to all foreign relations?

Lenine trained his Red Army, his Bolshevik Party, and his Soviets to the doctrine that no faith need be kept with the bourgeois. It is impossible to believe that he will ever permanently change his view. And if he does, he will have no Bolshevik following. The Russians who can be trusted are the ninety per cent. who have never been successfully indoctrinated with Bolshevism. Lenine's "concessions," which affect only his own following, are worthless.

The opening wedge for coöperation with these self-declared enemies of existing civilization, as proposed by the pro-Bolshevists, is to be the sending of semi-military supplies (such as locomotives—always held as contraband) into Russia. Now the Bolsheviki have declared they will annihilate all existing governments, and they may well be able to put their threats into effect against some of the neighboring states. As late as last September, Trotzky declared that he would crush the armies of Poland and Roumania in turn, and if the Finns did not make peace he would begin a "campaign of extermination such as has hitherto been unknown in history." Such bloody threats have been made almost every day by Bolshevik statesmen and editors, and in so far as they have had the power the threats have been only too well executed.

Robins understands, as well as Lenine, that the whole future of Bolshevism depends upon the Bolshevik lead-

er's success in obtaining foreign economic support, until revolutions, aided by the pressure of the Soviet armies, can be fostered in other countries. He quotes the Soviet Czar as saying:

"The Russian revolution will probably fail. We have not developed far enough into the capitalist stage; we are too primitive to realize the socialist stage; but we will keep the flame of revolution alive in Russia until it breaks out in Europe."

How does Robins defend a statement like this? Why, simply by saying that he does not believe that "the Soviet government would send troops, if it had troops to send, into another country unless there was a revolutionary movement of the peasants and workers of that country." Robins himself admitted that as soon as Soviet groups were formed against the new German government this satisfied the Bolshevik requirements and gave a sufficient ground for attack. Upon being pressed he further admitted that they would, in general, send troops into England and America, if they could, to support a revolutionary minority in these countries, no matter how small that minority might be!

Turning to the internal situation, Robins says that the Bolsheviks have carried their "class, materialist, force formulas beyond the range of theory, to where these formulas produce class terror and economic ruin." After a few words of this kind he proceeds to a lengthy defense of the Soviets' internal policies—even adopting their class-war theory under another name. Russia, we are told, is a very strange country and the Russians a strange people. In Russia there are no middle classes. There are only "the seven per cent. who enjoyed some advantages under the old régime and ninety-three per

cent. who did not." Now this proposition, applied generally, is all there is to the "class struggle" doctrine. As a matter of fact, the middle classes in Russian town and country were numbered by the tens of millions and existed in countless varieties. Yet it is the Lenine doctrine that the world consists exclusively of "proletarians" and "bourgeois" who necessarily seek one another's enslavement or destruction. Only Lenine is more consistent than his American apologist. A large part of the peasantry, if not the majority, he admits are middle class.

This strange, crude dogma is the basis of Robins' reasoning about Russia. He says: "The seven per cent. had everything, the ninety-three per cent. had nothing." Yet fully two-thirds of the hundred million peasants were exclusively occupied on their own farms. He says: "There were only two things in Russia, the Soviet and the old régime." Yet the Soviet has not dared to have one election by universal, equal and secret ballot in a single industrial center of Russia, while all the popular and middle-class parties, except the Bolsheviki, favor a Constitutional Assembly as against Soviet rule.

This civil war on class lines inevitably leads to the Terror—a fact that Lenine and Trotzky have never ceased to recognize and proclaim. Yet Robins adopts the recent excuse and after-thought of Lenine that the Terror was due solely to Entente and American intervention. "In the capitalistic community," wrote Lenine, last spring, in the Copenhagen Politiken, "there can be no middle course between bourgeois dictatorship and proletarian dictatorship." Even America and Switzerland, he says, are "bourgeois dictatorships." If we accept this reasoning, whether especially for

Russia, as does Robins, or for all countries, Lenin's conclusion is unavoidable, namely, that "in such a state of things the proletarian dictatorship is not only fully justified as a means to overthrow the extortioners and suppress their resistance, but is also absolutely necessary for the protection of the mass of the workingmen against bourgeois dictatorship."

Lenine and Trotzky leave no doubt that this means Terror. Long before the intervention Trotzky said in Petrograd: "You are perturbed by the mild Terror we are applying against our class enemies. But we know that not later than a month hence this Terror will take a more terrible form on the model of the French revolution." This threat was abundantly carried out. Trotzky especially urged it against the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionists who he admitted were numerous enough to give great trouble. It was Trotzky who also issued the first army order to take officers' families as hostages. We read in "Beidnota," a Bolshevik paper: "Let the deserters know that they are betraying at the same time their own families, their fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, wives and children. I charge Comrade Aralov with carrying out all necessary steps for the detention of the families of the traitorous deserters."

One of Robins' answers to the charge of innumerable and monstrous crimes committed by the Bolsheviks must have appeared in every Bolshevik organ of the world. Against the charge that they are criminals Robins declared: "Suppose they are: some of us have been in politics and dealt with American political bosses, and if there is any one more corrupt or worse in Smolny than some of our crooks, then they are some crooked, that's all." As if the leaders of Tammany Hall, or any

of our political organizations, could or would prepare the systematic slaughter of opposition leaders!

Enough has been said to demonstrate where Robins' sympathies lie. He not only defended the Bolsheviks where they refused to defend themselves. He seemed to forget his early admissions in the zeal of his later apologies. After admitting that the Bolsheviks had introduced "class terror by carrying their class, materialist, force formulas beyond the range of theory," he said that they were "very moderate" until the time he left and that "no general terror prevailed." Pressed later by Major Humes, he explained: "I saw no organized terror, Mr. Humes. . . . I happened to see nobody stood up and shot." Surely a very different matter. A hundred witnesses might have been in Paris during the whole Reign of Terror without seeing anybody killed or executed.

Robins suggests that the credentials of one of the Soviet congresses which he saw proved that it adequately represented Russia. An expert commission knowing Russia and the Russian language would take a long time to reach any such conclusion—since (1) the Soviet election laws have been changed repeatedly by Lenin and his associates, (2) intimidation prevails in the factories, and (3) any undesirables have only to be called counter-revolutionary to be excluded from the vote. He similarly passes judgment on the composition of that other all-important Bolshevik body, the Red Army, stating positively that there were not any Chinese in it before he left. Numerous eye-witnesses have stated the contrary. But, however that may be, it is certainly amazing that Robins should undertake to guarantee to us the composition of this entire army, divided as it is into a thou-

sand cantonments, only a few of which he could have seen. He says that the detachments sent to expropriate the grain in the villages only took the surplus stocks of the well-to-do and often had the "laughing coöperation" of the peasants. Yet hundreds and thousands of members of these detachments were killed, according to official Bolshevik reports, and the universal resistance they have created is admitted by Lenine and the other leaders as the most serious internal problem they have to face.*

* That my view of Robins' Russian propaganda is widely shared could be shown by many quotations. The following from the usually pro-Soviet New York *Globe's* review of William Hard's "*Raymond Robins' Own Story*" (the work above quoted), will suffice:

Mr. Hard bases his story on the solid premise that Raymond Robins is "the most anti-Bolshevik person" he has ever known, who believes the "economic system of Bolshevism is morally unsound and industrially unworkable." But this having been stated on an early page, there is little else in the book to warrant the premise. On the contrary, Colonel Robins' efforts to have his own country recognize and accept the Soviet in Russia, and Lenine and Trotzky as trustworthy agents, gives the impression that he is in sympathy with the present régime in Russia, because he regards it as successful and believes it will endure. It seems to us that Robins' story would be much stronger, if it could be said that he is pro-Bolshevik, because of what he saw in Russia, under exceptionally favorable circumstances, and because of his own experience with Lenine and Trotzky, whom he found honorable in all their dealings with him.

Colonel Robins' book, in fact, throws such a favorable light on Lenine and Trotzky and the Bolshevik government that it is difficult to believe in his own anti-Bolshevism. It would be a curious thing if he should convert a great many people to something he himself does not believe in. Yet it looks as if this might happen, since up to date he is the star witness for the case of the Bolsheviks. If he saw anything in Russia to discredit Bolshevism, at least he does not tell it.

CHAPTER XIV

VARIETIES OF PRO-BOLSHEVISM

III—Benevolent Neutrality

Robins merits attention because he is the most influential of the friends of the Soviets—and because he is typical of a dozen others who are putting out the same arguments on the same slender basis of fact. His group is undoubtedly the most valuable to the Bolsheviki, if we except the dominating factions of the Socialist and Labor parties of Europe—only the extreme left wings of which are out-and-out Communists. But there is another group in England and America that is rendering important assistance to the Soviets; that is, those who propose a policy of benevolent neutrality.

Especially in academic and literary circles there is a considerable number who not only find about as much to say for the Soviets as against them, but go further and decry all effective opposition. Leading scientific publications have adopted an attitude that gives the strange “evidence” of the pro-Bolshevists as much space as their most scrupulous and competent critics, thus causing the uninformed to remain in doubt as to their position. The Annals of American Academy and the Political Science Review give an amount of space to these apologists that is equivalent to liberal contribution to the pro-Bolshevist agitation. A writer typical of many of this kind is R. M. Story, Ph.D., whose main

thesis is that the Bolsheviks and the Soviets are two different things.

Like Robins, Story renounces Bolshevism briefly and defends it at length. He says, "It mocks international obligations and revels in intrigue. With audacious impertinence it seeks to override existing democracies and voices its claim to world dominion." But he takes away all practical value from this denunciation, first, by applying equally strong language to the anti-Bolsheviks and then by praising the Bolshevik Soviets. "Unutterable infamies" have been committed—by both sides. So the entire Reign of Terror, though inaugurated by Lenine and by Lenine alone, is disposed of. The Russian Socialists and liberals, victims of the Terror, who have been calling for help, are all lumped together with worthless refugees of the old régime as the "soulless vulturous creatures, who from their emigre havens outside of Russia have been calling the world to rescue their prey for them." The entire opposition to the Soviets, voiced by half a dozen parties, nearly all democrats or revolutionists, is referred to as the "misery and wailings of former oppressors."

The Bolsheviks, we are told, saved the social and economic character of the revolution from the moderate Socialists. The Russians do not want democracy as America and the rest of the world have evolved it; their desire is for the Soviets! The average Russian peasant and workingman trusts the Soviets but would not trust a Constitutional Assembly! How Story came to know the opinion of the average resident of this great Empire in a few months he does not say. But what is certain is that it is only two years since Russia expressed its confidence in a Constitutional Assembly in the only real

election the country has ever had. Story is concerned to find an apology for the fact that the Soviets are but creatures and tools of the Bolshevik party—as they were intended to be when the Bolsheviks endowed them with sovereignty and gave them the political power. He by no means denies this glaring fact of minority control. “For the moment the party in power may even resort to the suppression of minorities in the Soviet.” He admits further “executive usurpation, legislative perversion and the substitution of inquisition and terrorism for judicial procedure” and that even the Soviets’ weird “principles” are not safe from this iron party dictatorship and anarchic violence. “Wanton violations of Soviet principles have been serious. In order to gain time and the appearance of unity the ruthless suppression of minorities and every immorality known to statecraft have been employed.”

Is this not enough of an indictment? It troubles our witness little. Though the Soviets have been under the rigid control of the Bolshevik party from the moment they were given supreme power, we are assured they offer “immediate, effective, and constant opportunity for party change” and that “there is and can be no assured tenure of party control so long as the Soviet as an institution continues to function!”

In spite of the “popular” Soviets, Story admits that the power of Lenine, the chief commissar, is absolute and that “the word of Czar was never more authoritative.” How is this Czarism to be reconciled with popular control? Very easily; it is the same as in the United States! “The position and power of the chief commissar in Russia has been actually as strong as that of an American president during the war, perhaps stronger.”

Of course, Story's first statement was the true one—Lenine is following the precedent of Russian Czarism and not of American presidents. The power of life and death is held theoretically but is little exercised by our presidents; it was the power that governed Russia in war and in peace under the czars and it is the power that governs Russia in war and peace under the Bolshevik dictatorship.

The Soviets have become the rallying cry of ultra-radicalism in America as in other countries. But this is not the real danger here. The danger is that a great many who were not ultra-radicals have been brought gradually and subconsciously to that position by their championship of the Soviets, and many of these are still unaware of the full implications of the moral aid they are giving the Bolshevik movement and Bolshevik principles. Sovietism is the wedge by which these people are being separated from democracy. The point is not that they favor Bolshevism, for the Soviets may soon pass away, but that they are abandoning our democratic principles and ideals and introducing a perverted form of reasoning and a habit of playing with truth that is likely to be used for the next bad cause that comes along. That cause may come soon and it may be neither so hopeless nor so obviously anti-American as the cause of the Soviets. *The pro-Soviet "liberals" are laying the foundations in America for a permanent anti-democratic revolutionary movement on the European model.*

CHAPTER XV

NON-BOLSHEVIST SUPPORT FOR THE RUSSIAN SOVIETS

Bolshevism has proven and still proves useful to many non-Bolsheviks—a part of whom therefore give it, temporarily, an active or passive support. This was seen by the whole world when the Kaiser and Ludendorff did all in their power for the Bolsheviks against all other parties in Russia.

Thus Bolshevism appeals to many, though not to all, members of the following non-Bolshevist groups:

Pro-Germans.

Anti-British.

Embittered pacifists, filled with a violent desire for revenge against all governments that participated in the late war.

Certain diplomats, variously interested in Russia, who expect the Soviets to serve either to strengthen or to weaken, to divide or to unite that all-important country.

Certain financiers, who want the Bolsheviks either to destroy their rivals' Russian loans, concessions, or trade or to provide them with concessions, trade, or raw materials. Some expect these purposes will be best served by a temporary Bolshevik régime followed either by a democratic or by a monarchist revolution, others look forward to their evolution into rulers somewhat on the Mexican or Chinese models.

The extreme opposition politician, attacking whatever governments do as wrong, or endorsing without enquiry any anti-governmental foreign policy that has any following whatever, on the principle that most people are indifferent about it, that it will never be tried out, or that—even if it makes him trouble—it will not make him as much trouble as to take a definite stand on any controverted domestic question.

An effort is now being made to unite all these non-Bolshevist supporters of Sovietism, the pro-Bolsheviks and all vaguely “liberal” and humanitarian sentiment in a friendly policy described alternately as an effort to give the Soviets a fair chance and leave the Russian “people” free to work out “their own” destiny and as an effort to kill Sovietism by kindness.

Killing Sovietism by Kindness.—For a whole year past, American Communists, Socialists and parlor Bolshevik publications have been concentrating on peace with “Russia” propaganda—the first-named undoubtedly, by direct instructions from Moscow. The chief argument has been that the sufferings of the Russian people are due to the Entente blockade and not to the Bolsheviks. The evidence on this point has been summarized in Chapter VIII.

The women and children of Russia have been deliberately sacrificed in order to preserve Soviet rule over the anti-Soviet population, especially the peasantry, ninety per cent. of the Russian people.

Here is the beginning and the end of the “starvation” of food-producing Russia, which has been blamed upon the Entente blockade and made the basis of the whole pro-Bolshevist press campaign. The real objective, of course, has nothing to do with food (for the Red armies

are well supplied) but with military supplies and machinery to reinforce the Red armies and prop up Lenin's crumbling industrial structure.

But while these military supplies might enable Bolshevism to spread rapidly in neighboring countries or to conquer them by the sword, they probably could not save Russia from a vast amount of starvation. For if the peasant continues to plant for his own needs only the Russian city population cannot continue to exist through another winter and spring. The Bolsheviks know this. Hence they expect to expend the last ounce of their energy in 1920. As their New Year's message suggests 1920 is the year to establish permanent Soviet rule in other countries. If this can be done Bolshevism will have accomplished its object—whatever may happen in Russia afterwards. As Lenin said to Raymond Robins, this is the sole hope, as Russia is not ripe for Bolshevism, anyway! The Russian people are being forced to pay the bill, the other peoples are to get the "benefits"!

The world is at peace with the Soviets at the present moment as far as any remnants of military operations are concerned. But what the Soviets want is a declaration of peace involving recognition so that there may be no political obstacles to trade and that they may have the prestige of being a regularly recognized government. The ulterior purpose of this desire for a *declaration* of peace is finally and sufficiently demonstrated by the following words in Lenin's address before the so-called Council of the People's Commissaries during the negotiations on the Prinkipo proposal (see *The Daily Chronicle* of March 6, 1919):

"The successful development of the Bolshevik doctrine throughout the world can only be effected by means of periods of rest during which we may recuperate and gather new strength for further exertions. I have never hesitated to come to terms with bourgeois governments, when by so doing I thought I could weaken the bourgeoisie. It is sound strategy in war to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of a mortal blow possible. This was the policy we adopted towards the German Empire, and it has proved successful. The time has now come for us to conclude a second Brest-Litovsk, this time with the Entente. We must make peace not only with the Entente, but also with Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, and all the other forces which are opposing us in Russia. We must be prepared to make every concession, promise and sacrifice in order to entice our foes into the conclusion of this peace. We shall know that we have but concluded a truce permitting us to complete our preparations for a decisive onslaught which will assure our triumph."

Foreign Capital to Rescue Sovietism?—Russia being wrecked industrially, according to their own figures, the Bolsheviks now propose to persuade foreign capital to save it. First a promise was made to pay Russia's debts and to grant concessions. As the foreign capitalists did not feel they could rely on these promises no attention was paid to them. Next, huge supplies of surplus wheat, flax and raw materials were offered. In the opinion of so high an authority as Herbert Hoover there is comparatively little wheat or other raw materials to export. The flax situation (Russia formerly produced seventy-nine per cent. of the world's supplies) is es-

pecially important as helping to account for the pro-Soviet position of the powerful textile and other British interests represented by the Manchester Guardian. But even this flax surplus, which might do so much to help the Bolsheviks in their desperate needs, has also disappeared under the Soviet economic policies. According to Lincoln Eyre, Rikov's report, which is the basis of the action of the Supreme Council of Public Economy, shows the following condition:

"The ground sown with flax has been diminished by about forty per cent. and the harvest reduced from some 20,000,000 pounds yearly to less than 5,000,000, the likelihood of a still further decrease revealing itself moreover in December and January. The chief reason for this lay in the fact that the peasants prefer to raise corn rather than flax, because they could sell the former to speculators, whereas the only purchaser for the latter was the Government, which, of course, paid fixed prices. Stocks of flax now in hand are only sufficient to supply Russian industry for from eight months to one year.

"There is no possibility of England and Northern France, which consumed large quantities of the thirty per cent. of Russia's flax crop that was exported in peace times, getting any considerable quantity of this commodity in the near future."

The proposal that world capital should rescue the world revolution, ostensibly directed against capital, is itself an amazing proposition—showing the boldness and duplicity of the propaganda the Soviets have spread over the earth, and suggesting the sinister intrigue with reactionary or piratical capitalist groups that has all along accompanied it.

But this insufficiency of raw material for export indicates that after all the proposal of an economic alliance with private capital, which could not come to much for a long period—and every moment is critical for Soviet Russia—is a mere cloak for a deeper, more practical, and more immediate policy.

Recognition the Real Object of the Economic Propaganda.—If Herbert Hoover is right, and Russia has neither large means, a large raw material reserve, or transport facilities to pay for large imports, then what is the main object of the world-wide economic propaganda of the Soviets? A statement of the Soviets issued March 15, 1920, shows that the objects are (1) political recognition and (2) limited emergency supplies, such as railway engines, which would double the Soviets' military and industrial power. Further Russian trade, beyond these emergency supplies, must be extremely slow to develop—but it is to be dangled before the eyes of certain foreign capitalists as a reward if they obtain political recognition of the Soviets by their government. The Soviet statement is as follows:

"Announcement was made by the Commercial Department of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau (the Bolshevik organization here headed by L. C. K. Martens) that in accordance with definite instructions received from the Soviet Government the bureau would not entertain any offers from American firms or manufacturers for export to Soviet Russia until such time as commercial intercourse between the United States and Russia had been fully established.

"It is obvious that no trade between the two countries can be carried on with freedom and mutual representation without free communication by mail and wire and without a definite understanding be-

tween the two countries concerning the exchange of commodities and security for all Russian funds in the United States," the statement said.

The only deviation for the present from this policy, it was said, was that the bureau had been authorized to place orders in the United States for 2,000 locomotives and the corresponding amount of railroad cars and equipment, for which payment would be made in gold or its equivalent upon delivery at ports in Soviet Russia as soon as these were open to foreign trade.

Mr. Alonzo Taylor reports (in the Saturday Evening Post) an illuminating interview with a leading Bolshevik which is typical of hundreds of Bolshevik declarations showing that what Sovietism needs most was *not* the Entente proposal to provide clothing, agricultural implements and other necessities but the raising of the military blockade, and that this meant recognition. Mr. Taylor asked:

"What is the most imperative thing for Russia, *and for Communism in Russia*, at the present moment?"

The Sovietist answered:

"Establishment of peace, lifting of the blockade; and restoration of trade relations with the world."

We need not doubt that what Communism most needs in Russia and in the world is (1) the military reinforcement of the Soviets by imported supplies and (2) direct or indirect recognition by other nations.

Just what this recognition would mean is shown at length in the following chapter. It is sufficiently indicated for our present purpose by an important speech of the most influential Bolshevik leader after Lenin and Trotzky.

Zinoviev, president of the Petrograd Soviet, speaking

February 2, 1919, on the subject of the Princes Island proposal, said:

"We are willing to sign unfavorable peace with the Allies. It would only mean that we should put no trust whatever in the bit of paper we should sign. We should use the breathing space so obtained in order to gather our strength in order that the more continued existence of our government would keep up the world-wide propaganda, which Soviet Russia has been carrying on for more than a year."

Mr. Taylor asked another question of his Bolshevik authority: "Suppose peace were declared to-morrow, would you cease propaganda?" The answer was that in that case no other propaganda would be needed than the continued existence and apparent success of the Soviets. Propaganda "in an organized manner would cease at once," he said, "but of course, Socialists all over the world have a right to come to Russia and study our system and return to their homes and attempt to bring it in operation there if they come to believe in it." These non-partisan (?) observers would then be able rapidly to absorb the training and propaganda of Moscow, and would return on the supposition that they had been converted by what they saw on the spot. The methods they would use to try to bring Sovietism into operation in their home countries are not mentioned. But we have before us the Russian model—also Lenin's instructions to the Communists of America, Italy and other countries.

But even such visiting delegations would not be necessary. The wireless and the mails would be working and there are now enough of Bolsheviks in all countries to spread the glad news and, where feasible, to organize

revolt—or at least to keep going “the revolutionary class-struggle” which is to prepare the way.

We have the word of one of the Soviet dictators as to this part of the “peace” plan. (See the following chapter.)

Compromising with Bolshevism.—Pro-Bolsheviks are constantly proposing various compromises with the Soviets with the idea of moderating them. Yet each concession made is interpreted by them as a victory and adds to their aggressiveness. So, at the 1920 Soviet Congress, Lenin spoke of the Entente decision to cease all intervention, as having been based exclusively on the Soviets’ military power and ability to create mutinies in the Entente armies:

“For thinking that the workers and soldiers exploited by international capital would manifest their sympathy for us in the long run we have been accused of being Utopians. Experience has shown, indeed, that we cannot always depend upon the action of the proletariat abroad. Still, thanks to the true class instinct of the workers and the peasants in the Entente armies, the British and French were compelled to withdraw their troops. This was our greatest victory over them. Against the infinite military and technical superiority of our enemies we placed the solidarity of labor and we won. Our enemies shout about democracy, but not in a single Parliament have they dared to say that they have declared war on Soviet Russia.”

So, also, the Estonian peace was spoken of as a second great victory, proving that the Esths had recognized that the Entente was worse than the Soviets, while the sympathy expressed by certain French, British, and

American "intellectuals" is taken as a third great victory, leading Lenin to the conclusion that even "the least educated bourgeois" were transferring their sympathies to the Soviets.

"Will concessions—inevitably regarded as victories—increase the probability of Bolshevism yielding to democracy, or will they increase Bolshevik confidence and aggressiveness?"—this is the question.

In this same Congress the only effective argument offered against Bolshevik despotism was that of the Social Democrat (Menshevik) leader, Martoff, that the foreign powers would never recognize an anti-democratic Russia. What argument will Russian democrats have with which they can overthrow Bolshevism if other nations begin to yield to the Soviet dictatorship?

Let us consider the present Communist diplomacy: Momentarily the Soviets have gained all they can by military efforts—until they have time to recuperate. In the meanwhile they hold a great people as hostages, and vast natural resources and trade routes with which to negotiate. But it would be a gross error to suppose that their diplomacy is conventional or that their simple aim is to increase their economic and military strength. It has become generally understood at last that they know that their future depends upon other countries, and that besides "the propaganda of the word" there is "the propaganda of the deed," that is, the very existence of the friendly Soviet régime encourages the revolutionists of other countries to revolt—both because they know they can count sooner or later on direct or indirect aid from Russia and because they see the thing can be done.

But even this is not the bottom of the Soviet diplo-

macy. What the Bolsheviks are striving for now is not merely the prestige and the encouragement to other revolutions that would come from recognition by other governments but for concessions by capitalism to communism. For this is precisely how all compromises will be viewed not only in Russia but by the millions of admiring pro-Bolsheviks in all countries. They will claim—with every plausibility—that capitalism has recognized communism as a permanent régime. As we read in "Soviet Russia" (March 27, 1920):

"Many people have thoughtlessly said that the Soviet system and the capitalist system cannot exist side by side. The answer is that they do exist, and that they will continue to exist for a long time, until one or the other disappears from history. As long as they do exist side by side, mutual concessions are necessary."

Yet "the will to believe" persists even in some unquestioned anti-Bolshevik quarters. Though the Soviets' activities have not only been *accompanied* by an amazing propaganda of falsehood but have *consisted largely in this propaganda*, it is still held by many that they may be rapidly and marvelously transformed into an honest régime. Though their foreign policy has been based consistently and exclusively upon a diplomacy openly as hostile to all other governments as that of Prussia formerly was, and at times as secret, we are told that there is a reasonable chance, yes, even a probability that they may change all this and become reliable! Editors who refused absolutely to trust the obviously far less fanatical Germans are now suggesting calmly that we may soon be able to trust the Bolsheviks!

A conservative New York paper—one of the most influential in the country—furnishes an example. It says:

"Testifying before a Senate committee at Washington, Mr. Martens, representing himself as the Ambassador of Soviet Russia to the United States, boasted that his government, now 'strong enough to fight the world,' has abandoned the idea that it could be maintained only by undermining and destroying other governments. Thus happily situated, the Soviet Republic, he says, does not care 'at present' what kind of government other people have.

"There is virtue in the words 'at present.' If Mr. Martens tells the truth, the somersault executed by Lenine and Trotzky in their foreign policy is spectacular . . .

"Assuming that Mr. Martens' use of the phrase 'at present' indicates something more than a temporary concession, it is possible that in time it may be accepted as warranting recognition of a régime that undertook at first to run amuck with its Red outlawry, now an admitted failure."

"No other nation is attempting to deprive the Russians of a government of their own choice. Cured of its criminal propensities, the Lenine republic might easily be tolerated abroad as long as it shall be at home."

There is surely nothing in the proven character or the performances of the Bolsheviki that would justify either the assumption that they will cure themselves of their "criminal propensities" or that they will abandon their movement, which is a propaganda and fanatical sectarian movement through and through—especially after it will have received full political recognition and a sufficient measure of economic assistance.

There is no danger that the conservative elements

which express such views will become pro-Bolsheviks at heart. But many of them are lining up shoulder to shoulder with the pro-Bolsheviks as to the one matter in regard to which opinion outside of Russia counts the most—the relation of other governments to the Soviets—being possibly moved thereto by some of the motives suggested at the beginning of this chapter.

PART III

SOVIETISM OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOVIETS' PLANS FOR WORLD REVOLUTION*

That the Soviet Government of Russia will never be content merely to reign supreme over Russian territory, but must develop an intensely aggressive foreign policy backed by force of arms, aiming to impose its own system on other nations, can be abundantly proven from the public pronouncements of its leaders and highest officials.

Nicholas Lenine and others now dominating the Russian Soviet Government, have frankly and repeatedly announced, both in the years before they attained their present power and after, that their ultimate aim is to force the world into one great International Communist Republic, wiping out all national boundaries. Preliminary to this, all existing "capitalistic," that is to say, non-Communist, governments in the world must be overthrown. The government of the United States is frequently specifically mentioned.

Road to International Dictatorship.—This dominant idea of provoking international revolution throughout the world in order to establish a universal Communist government was already clearly developed in the group

* The documents in the first part of this chapter were collected and published by The Christian Science Monitor, and are used—together with some of the comment—with consent.

of Bolsheviki, which afterward came to power in Russia, when it took part in the famous Zimmerwald conference in Switzerland in 1915.

The book written by Zinoviev and Lenine, "Against the Current," published at Petrograd in 1918, says:

"The chief task which we set ourselves at the very beginning of the war was to turn the imperialistic war into a civil war." And further: "In the discussions (at Zimmerwald in 1915) regarding the question—What would the proletariat party do if a revolution were to put it in power during the present war?—we (i. e., Lenine and Zinoviev) replied: 'We would offer peace to all combatants on the basis of the liberation of the colonies and of all dependent, downtrodden and subject races. Neither Germany nor France nor England would accept these terms under their present governments. We would then prepare to carry out in full by the most decisive measures our minimum program, and also systematically to stir up revolt among all the peoples at present oppressed by the great Russians, amongst the colonies and dependent countries of Asia, India, China, Persia, and so on, and also, above all, to call to arms the Socialist proletariat of Europe against their governments and in spite of their Chauvinist Socialists.' There is no doubt that the victory of the proletariat in Russia would create exceptionally favorable conditions for the development of revolution both in Asia and Europe."

Lenine and Zinoviev seized the power while the war against Germany was still being fought, and their actions at the head of the Soviet Government followed exactly the lines laid down by them for themselves in 1915. Peace was offered to all combatants as they had foretold they would offer it.

Their hypocritical move for peace was unsuccessful, as they had foreseen it would be, and they then went on to the next step in their carefully matured plans. They made a separate peace with Germany. Immediately following it, in the natural and inevitable sequence of their carefully prepared program, they attempted to combine with the Bolshevik elements in Germany through their "ambassador" in Berlin. This attempt resulted in Mr. Joffe's expulsion from Berlin.

A Revolutionary Offensive.—The Bolshevik Foreign Minister, Tehitcherin, said in his report to the fifth Soviet congress held in Moscow in July, 1918:

"The basis of our foreign policy since the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 has been a revolutionary offensive."

Lenine's "Theses" made to explain why he favored making peace with Germany:

"There is no doubt that the revolution must and shall break out in Europe. All our hope in a decisive victory of Socialism is based on this conviction, on this scientific hypothesis."

The program of the Russian Bolsheviks not only aims at international revolution which is to be fostered and encouraged from Moscow, but the Bolsheviks of all countries hold the same views and look to Moscow for encouragement and material assistance.

The Soviet Government officially put itself at the head of the International Revolutionists by summoning a gathering of representatives of violent revolutionary Communist parties from all parts of the world, called the Communist International or the Third International,

to meet at Moscow in the spring of 1919. A manifesto from this meeting to the world was published in the Bolshevik newspaper, "Severnaya Communa," of March 8, 1919, and says:

"We Communists, representatives of the revolutionary proletariat of the different countries of Europe, America and Asia, assembled in Soviet Moscow, feel and consider ourselves followers and fulfillers of the cause, the program of which was proclaimed 72 years ago. . . . It is our task now to . . . unite the efforts of all revolutionary parties of the world proletariat and thus facilitate and hasten the victory of the Communist revolution in the whole world."

"In all countries where the toiling masses live and are conscious, soviets of workmen's, soldiers', and peasants' deputies are being established and will be established. *The most important task at the present moment for the conscious and honorable workmen of all countries* is to strengthen the soviets, to increase their authority, *and to imitate the governmental apparatus of Russia*. . . . By means of the soviets the working class will direct all branches of the economic and cultural life of the country just as this is taking place at the present moment in Russia."

Instruments of Revolution.—In his book, "Russia in 1919," on pages 118 and 119, Arthur Ransome, an English journalist who has enjoyed Nicholas Lenine's friendship and confidence, quotes an interview in which Lenine said:

"Strikes and soviets. If these two habits once get hold, nothing will keep the workmen from them. And Soviets once started must sooner or

later come to supreme power. . . . In the beginning I thought they were and would remain a purely Russian form; but it is now quite clear that under various names they must be the instruments of revolution everywhere."

Platform of Third International.—What the Russian Bolsheviks under Nicholas Lenin and Leon Trotzky have done in Russia must also be brought to pass in all the other countries of the world—that is the dominant idea of the Third International, summoned by the official Russian Soviet Government and held under its auspices in the Kremlin at Moscow, its White House and Capitol combined. The platform of this Communist or Third International, published in the Moscow "Izvestia," the official organ of the Soviet Government, brings the working class forward as the sole savior of mankind—not the genuine working class as we know it, but a working class cajoled and bullied by the men and the ideas of the Moscow ruling group and the Third International.

Sovietizing the World.—The first step in this international movement to sovietize the whole world will be as follows:

The platform declares that the revolutionary proletarian movements cannot work in isolation but must rely one upon the other for support and assistance. Now the Russian group is the only one of these groups that has been able to obtain permanent control of any nation's economic, financial, and military resources. Therefore this Russian group—or in other words, the Moscow Soviet Government—in the natural course of events and in the natural distribution of power and leadership based on actual resources, must take the ini-

tiative and assist all the other groups scattered over the entire globe:

“The International that will be able to subordinate so-called national interests to the interest of world revolution will, by this very reason, realize mutual assistance between proletariats of various countries, for without economic and other forms of mutual support, the proletariat will not be able to establish the new society.”

“The proletariat must defend itself at any cost. The Communist International calls on the entire proletariat of the world to take part in this last struggle. Arms against arms! Force against force! Down with the imperialistic conspiracy of Capital! Long live the International Republic of Proletarian Soviets!”

Attitude to United States.—One of the state documents of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Moscow Government is a formal note to President Wilson from the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tchitcherin, presented to the Norwegian Consul at Moscow for transmission on October 24, 1918, and published in the American radical periodical, Liberator, January, 1919.

The Soviet Government of Russia boldly asserts that it is assured of its triumph throughout the world. Its Foreign Minister goes on to say, in this official communication:

“We know that this form of government (i. e., by Councils of People’s Commissaries, elected by a Congress of Soviets), will soon be the general form, and that a general peace, when nations will no more be threatened with defeat, will leave them free to put an end to the system and the cliques that force upon mankind this universal slaughter, and which

will, in spite of themselves, surely lead the tortured peoples to create Soviet governments that give exact expression to their will."

"We propose, therefore, Mr. President, that the League of Nations be based on the expropriation of the capitalists of all countries. In your country, Mr. President, the banks and the industries are in the hands of such a small group of capitalists that, as your personal friend, Col. Raymond Robins, assured us, the arrest of 20 heads of capitalistic cliques and the transfer of the control, which by characteristic capitalistic methods they have come to possess, into the hands of the masses of the world is all that would be required to destroy the principal course of new wars."

"However, Mr. President, since we do not at all desire to wage war against the United States, even though your government has not yet been replaced by a council of people's commissaries and your post is not yet taken by Eugene Debs, whom you have imprisoned; since we do not all desire to wage war against England, even though the Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George has not yet been replaced by a council of people's commissaries with MacLean at its head; since we have no desire to wage war against France, even though the capitalist government of Clemenceau has not yet been replaced by a workmen's government of Merheim; just as we have concluded peace with the imperialistic government of Germany, with Emperor William at its head, from whom you, Mr. President, feel yourself as alien as we, the workmen's and peasants' revolutionary government, feel ourselves from you—we finally propose to you, Mr. President, that you take up with your allies the following questions and give us concise and definite replies."

Letter to American Labor.—On August 20, 1918, the Soviet dictator addressed an open letter to American

workingmen. In this letter, Lenine openly incites the American workmen to revolt against the present American Government to establish Soviet Government in the United States, and indorses the presidential boom of Tchitcherin's candidate for the American presidency:

"The American working class will not follow the lead of its bourgeoisie. It will go with us against the bourgeoisie. The whole history of the American people gives me this confidence, this conviction. I recall with pride the words of one of the best loved leaders of the American proletariat, Eugene V. Debs, who said in the Appeal to Reason at the end of 1915, when it was still a Socialist paper, in an article entitled 'Why Should I Fight?' that he would rather be shot than vote for war credits to support the present criminal and reactionary war, that he knows **only one war that is sanctified and justified from the standpoint of the proletariat; the war against the capitalist class; the war for the liberation of mankind from wage slavery.** I am not surprised that this fearless man was thrown into prison by the American bourgeoisie."

Lenine goes on to express his confidence that the doctrines his government embodies will triumph throughout the world, including the United States:

"We realize that the mad resistance of the bourgeoisie against the Socialist revolution in all countries is unavoidable. . . . We know that it may take *a long time* before help can come from you, comrades, American workingmen, for the development of the revolution in the different countries proceeds along various paths, with varying rapidity. How could it be otherwise! We know full well that the outbreak of the European proletarian rev-

olution may take *many weeks* to come, quickly as it is ripening in these days."

And again here we find, in Lenine's message to American workingmen, the key-note of the Soviet Government's foreign policy:

"We are counting on the inevitability of the international revolution."

"We are in a beleaguered fortress so long as no other international Socialist revolution comes to our assistance with its armies. Workingmen the world over are breaking with their betrayers, with their Gompers and their Scheidemanns. Inevitably Labor is approaching Communistic Bolshevik tactics, is preparing for the proletarian revolution that alone is capable of preserving culture and humanity from destruction. We are invincible, for invincible is the proletarian revolution."

In a second and later letter, to the workmen of Europe and America, published in the official organ of the Soviet Government, the Moscow "*"Izvestia,"*" of January 24, 1919, Lenine rejoices in the progress of the international revolution:

"Comrades, at the end of my letter to American workmen of August 20, 1918, I wrote that we would be in a beleaguered fortress so long as the other armies of the international Socialist revolution did not come to our assistance. The workmen are breaking off from their Socialist traitors, the Hendersons and Renaudels, I added. The workmen are gradually but surely approaching Communism and Bolshevik tactics.

"Since I wrote these words, less than five months have passed and one can see that the international proletarian revolution has developed, in connection

with the passing of workmen of various countries to Communism and Bolshevism, which has taken place very rapidly during this period. . . .”

Soviet Movements Progress.—“At that time, August 20, 1918, the proletariat revolution had taken place only in Russia and the ‘soviet authority,’ that is, the possession of all authority in the state by soviets of Workmen’s, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, seemed to be and in fact was an exclusively Russian institution. Now, January 12, 1919, we see the powerful ‘soviet’ movement, not only in parts of the former empire of the Czar, for example in Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine, but also in western European countries and in neutral countries (Switzerland, Holland and Norway), and in countries that have suffered from the war (Austria, Germany). The revolution in Germany, which is particularly important and characteristic as one of the most progressive capitalistic countries, immediately assumed ‘soviet’ forms.

“The choice is between ‘the soviet authority’ or a bourgeois parliament, under whatever different names the latter may appear—such as ‘National’ or ‘Constituent Assembly.’

“In the same manner the question has been formulated historically for the whole world. Now it is possible and in fact necessary to say without any exaggeration: ‘The soviet authority is the second world-wide, historical step or stage of development for the dictatorship of the proletariat.’ ”

The Black Internationale vs. the League of Nations.—The close connection between the Communist Party in Russia and the other Communist parties throughout the world is clearly demonstrated when Zinoviev, the president of the Petrograd Soviet and dictator of the group of Soviets known as the Northern Commune, acts as the president of the executive com-

mittee of the Communist International, and sends out a broadcast appeal to the workingmen of other nations, calling it a "Protest against the Versailles Peace," dated May 13, 1919, and published in the Bolshevik Petrograd newspaper "Pravda," on May 14, 1919:

"Workmen of France! Workmen of England! Workmen of America! Workmen of Italy! The Communist International appeals to you. The fate of tens of millions of workmen in Germany and Austria now depends first of all on you. You should now say your word. You must take from the bloody hands of your governments that brigand's knife which they hold over the head of the workmen of Germany and Austria. . . .

"Workmen of Germany! Workmen of Austria! You see now that you have only one choice, to overthrow immediately the government of traitors, who call themselves Social Democrats but who are in fact the corrupt agents of the bourgeoisie. You see now to what the policy of Scheidemann and Noske has brought you. You see that your only hope is a war, a proletarian revolution. . . .

"'World proletarian revolution'—the only salvation for the oppressed classes of the whole world. 'Dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of a soviet authority'—the only conclusion to be drawn by the proletarians of the whole world from the Versailles lesson."

The Soviet Government at Moscow is actually extending encouragement to all Communist revolutionaries throughout the world. It also has clearly stated that the hope of the revolutionaries in all countries lies in the Soviet Government at Moscow, which alone can liberate them, because it alone has an army. This army is the hope of the world revolution. A wireless message

sent out by the Bolshevik Government was intercepted September 30, 1919.

"Tashkent, September 22.

To Moscow; to The Commissary for Foreign Affairs, for the Revolutionary Proletariat of the East . . . Turkey, India, Persia, Afghanistan, Khiva, Bokhara, China, and to all.

"The second regional conference of Mohammedan Communists of Turkestan, which took place in Tashkent, sends you on behalf of the 10,000,000 Mohammedan population of Turkestan its fraternal greetings. . . . The Socialistic revolutionary movement is growing daily in the west and has now enveloped the whole world. The impressive strike of workmen in England and America and the revolutionary movement in all European countries points to the fact that the fate of world imperialism is sealed. The . . . republics are increasing daily and the Red Soviet troops are triumphing over the imperialistic executioners. . . . The revolutionary movement is also rapidly spreading in the East. . . ."

The Bolshevik Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Tchitcherin, admits the reliance that the Soviet Government places in its Red Army to back up its foreign policy. A signed article by him, printed in the Moscow "Izvestia" of February 23, 1919, says:

"Our glorious revolutionary Red Army is such a powerful factor in the foreign policy of Soviet Russia that even the loudest praises are not to be considered as exaggerated in defining its rôle in this respect. . . . Every military success won by us is immediately reflected in our foreign policy. . . . In the very foreground, at the front of the stage, as the leading force standing in the very center of the historical development of Soviet Russia, are the ranks of those who by their heroic acts and by death

on the field of battle, fight for the world fortunes of Soviet Russia, on whose valor and revolutionary consciousness has been built that force which in further developments will bring other countries, one by one, into the circle of the revolutionary world conflagration. In our foreign policy, that is, in the historic rôle of Soviet Russia in the world arena, one of the fundamental factors, one of the most powerful forces of its historic activity, is the flower and pride of Soviet Russia—our own heroic Red Army."

Open War on the World.—The masses of the Russian population are being constantly educated by the Soviet Government to believe in their mission, under its guidance and tutelage, and in strict military obedience, to bring about the victory of its Communistic doctrine throughout the world by force of arms, perhaps even as a new kind of militaristic imperialism. For example, the Petrograd Bolshevik newspaper, "Pravda," in its issue of so recent a date as November 5, 1919, reprinted the campaign slogans of the Petrograd committee of the Communist Party for the October celebrations in honor of the second anniversary of its accession to power. The seventh slogan was:

Victory for 1920 Predicted.—"In 1919 was born the Communist International—in 1920 it will triumph in the whole world."

And what will bring to pass this triumph, in which the ignorant but obedient masses of the Russian people are daily and hourly taught to believe? The armed force of the Soviet military power! The fifteenth slogan was:

"During two years we created the Red Army of several millions. Long live the Red Fighters!"

Their enemies at home have been crushed by the Red Terror and they are in a fair way to overcome the Russian anti-Bolshevist movements on the Russian territory around them. They look across the frontiers at Europe, struggling in the throes of manifold difficulties, and are of high hope. The leading editorial of the Communist organ "Pravda" in Moscow, in its issue of only a short time ago, November 19, 1919, says:

"Bourgeois Europe is freezing and starving. The powerful waves of the proletarian revolution roll higher and higher every day."

As late as February 3 insidious propaganda, designed to promote class antagonism, was circulated by wireless from Moscow.

In the messages sent broadcast by the Bolshevik authorities on that date the Estonian peace arrangement was characterized as being the opening wedge in the "diplomatic blockade" of the world's bourgeoisie against the Soviets.

A wireless message sent out from Moscow on December 6 gave the text of a speech by Lenin to the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets. In his speech Lenin said:

"We have played for an international revolution and have been successful. In spite of the fact that we are much weaker than the Entente we have succeeded in winning a great victory.

"In our fight against the Entente we have won three victories. Though the Entente has tried to crush us by its technical knowledge and by its

armies we have succeeded in making it impossible for its troops to fight against us. 'The germ of Bolshevism' has penetrated their army, which was formed of workmen and peasants.

"The second attempt of the Entente, the attempt to turn fourteen states against Soviet Russia, the attempt to force these small States, with their bourgeois governments, to fight against Soviet Russia, ended also in the failure of the Entente.

"Our third victory is that the small bourgeoisie and the intellectuals of the Entente are on our side. The Entente dares not declare war on us openly in its Parliaments."

The message containing Lenin's speech was followed on December 9 by another wireless, stating that a resolution was unanimously passed expressing the entire approval of the speech by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Soviet of People's Commissaries, and the Seventh Congress of Soviets.

That such propaganda will continue to be made and that the principle of bringing about world revolution is one of the fundamental doctrines of the Soviet State was clearly indicated in a signed article by A. Joffe, who represented the Soviet Government in a diplomatic capacity in Berlin after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace. The Joffe article appeared in the *Pravda*, the official organ of the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Communist Party, on November 7, 1919. In it Joffe said:

"The Russian revolution will conquer as an international revolution. Otherwise it will perish. From the very first day of the Socialist revolution in Russia this became its slogan, and this truth has determined the whole international policy of the Soviet authority."

In another paragraph the article stated:

"Under the new circumstances, the Russian revolution was obliged to go under ground. The open revolutionizing of the proletarian masses of Western Europe and America became impossible. This work had to be carried on illegally and conspiratively, and the only openly revolutionizing factor remained the fact itself of the existence of the only socialistic workmen's-peasants' republic in the world."

In the hearings before the United States Senate Committee, "Ambassador" Martens justified the revolutionary propaganda of Lenin in America. The Senate counsel, Mr. Ellis, produced a letter signed by Lenin, Soviet Premier, dated in January, 1919, urging American workingmen to establish a soviet government and "overthrow" reactionary labor leaders "like Gompers," and also overthrow "bourgeois parliaments."

Martens said the letter did not come through him, but added that "under certain circumstances such a letter might be justified." The letter was "war propaganda," he said, adding that "Russia was at war with all powers during the last two years."

But this American Soviet agitation was initiated in all countries within reach, absolutely independently of their state of war or peace with the Soviet Government.

The Soviet régime, in proportion to its strength and prestige, automatically propagates world revolution. If propagandists are not sent out then wireless messages are sent out. If propagandists are not exported, then propagandists are imported—and these pro-Bolshevist visitors return to their own countries as "expert" and "informed" as the Bolsheviks themselves. One of the

latest and most important examples is the ultra-radical British Socialist, George Lansbury, editor of the leading British labor organ, the Daily Herald, who wired from Russia (in March, 1920) :

"Lenine and his friends are convinced that the capitalist system can only be removed by violent revolution. The Russians ask just one thing: 'Do you want to establish Socialism? Is the aim and goal of your efforts the destruction of the capitalist power of exploitation?' They think their partisans in every country ought to work together for the realization of this object by every means possible."

World Disorder as the Preparation for World Revolt.—The Soviets now realize that the prospects for revolution are not yet good in America, England, and France. Hence they favor a steadily aggravated series of grave disorders as the best preparation. The evidences of this policy appear daily.

For example, in a message dated February 3, 1920, addressed to the central committee of the Federation of Postal, Telegraph, Telephone, and Wireless Employees in France, Germany, England, Italy, and Sweden, gratification is expressed at strike attacks at capitalism made in their countries. In this message, signed by the central committee of the All Russian Federation of Workmen and Employees connected with National Communication (viz., postal, telegraph, telephone, and wireless), it is stated that Russian workmen follow with anxiety the labor movement abroad, and it is added:

"These strikes can hardly modify in a capitalist society the painful lot of strikers, for complete emancipation from the economic and moral yoke of

the Bourgeoisie can only be obtained by a *general insurrection of workmen against their exploiters and by means of proletarian dictatorship*, but it remains none the less true that we are pleased at every one of these attacks which *gravely disorganize capitalism.*"

Sovietism in the Border States.—There is little question that world-revolution will remain the guiding principle of Bolshevik policy even through peace negotiations. There is not the slightest question that Lenine is counting on early revolutions in all the border states. For example, peace has already been made with one of these states. But in an address to the Workers' Council in Moscow Premier Lenine, alluding to this peace made with Estonia, is reported to have said:

"We left in the hands of Estonia districts populated by fully as many Russians as Estonians, not being ready to shed the blood of the workers and peasants for the sake of some strips of country which, anyway, are not definitely lost."

"Estonia is passing through the Kerensky period, but the dawn of Soviet rule is near. Then there will be quite other peace terms."

Bolshevist Revolutionism as Taught by Lenine's Latest Emissaries in Italy.—At first the Bolshevik-Socialists of Italy were disposed to apply immediately the identical methods of violence used in Russia. But Lenine's emissaries protested, chiefly, no doubt, because—as he said—immediate European revolutions would impede his efforts to secure peace, military supplies, and the most essential industrial equipment. The continued success of the Russian revolution, he urged, was indispensable for the success of the impending revolutions in

Italy and Europe. Therefore an immediate revolution in Italy would be "premature."

But Russian and Italian Bolsheviks are agreed that the Italian revolution must come very soon and that no moment is to be lost. They have also accepted Lenin's view that the conditions in the two countries are different and that other methods must be used; and, besides, Russian Bolshevism acknowledges mistakes. Bolshevism up to date and applied to western Europe, therefore, urges the following steps towards early revolt (we quote the Austrian radical Socialist organ, *Der Kampf*, whose summary is reprinted in the pro-Bolshevik French organ, *Le Populaire*) :

(1) The Italians must utilize their parliamentary force (150 Bolshevik Socialists out of 500 members) not for constructive legislation, but for revolutionary obstruction leading to the verge of revolution on the floor of the Chamber.

(2) "A sufficient political power must be developed (chiefly in municipalities) to prevent the bourgeoisie from being able to use the army."

(3) "Soviets must be organized in all the domains of production and of political and social activity. These Soviets will form the framework of the new society. They will be ready to be put to work the moment the bourgeois organism commences to crumble. In order to be able to take possession at once of all (public and industrial) services Ministers must be chosen now and must keep in touch with the labor organizations of each province."

So the violent revolution in Italy, to be carried out by a party which found itself in a minority in the elections only a few months ago, is to be postponed, but it is not to be long postponed—if the Russian emissaries continue

to rule their co-revolutionists. The French Bolshevik-Socialists also, in an almost identical numerical minority, regard this adaptation of Sovietism as excellent—according to their organ, *Le Populaire*.

Russian and German Sovietism.—On the 24th of February, 1920, an important emissary of the Soviets called a secret meeting in Berlin of Spartacists and Independent Socialists. Though his name was withheld the press was given an account of his speech—in which he assured the German revolutionists that the cause of the world revolution had not been shelved—even temporarily.

“The Russian State today,” said this apostle of Bolshevism, “is the most marvelous proof of successful proletarian rule. The Muscovite Government does not dream of making any concessions to the western countries nor to give up its determination to revolutionize the whole world after the Russian pattern, but Lenine and his associates, after several years’ experience, have become convinced that Bolshevism has other and more effective, while less costly, means to conquer than mere guns and armies. Not that the Soviet Government intends to do entirely without an army.

“Russia’s army now totals 2,500,000 men, excellently equipped, and officered and commanded by the best Generals of the old régime, many of whom have become convinced of Bolshevism.

“If Russia, despite this splendid army, is now seeking peace with the rest of the world, it is because a peaceful world would naturally open its doors to Russians who would carry the spirit of Bolshevism with them wherever they went, be they merchants, Government servants or laborers.

“Bolshevism will probably make a triumphant course through the old Galician province to Hun-

gary and Austria and into Germany and Italy. Once established there, it will be only a question of months when, *under the pressure of the military forces of an all-Bolshevik Europe*, the French bourgeois Republic and its Allies must capitulate, because its structures are already undermined by our friends to a degree that would astonish Millerand and Deschanel if they knew."

This undoubtedly referred to the revolutionary railway strike, which was then being planned, and broke out in France only two days later, instigated by French Sovietists (under Loriot).

The emissary of the Muscovite Government concluded by declaring that an early peace with the world would mean its speedy conquest by Bolshevism.

The speaker might have added that revolutionary preparations would be continued even while peace negotiations were in progress.

Bolshevist Imperialism.—What are the motives that explain the Bolshevik reaction from pacifism to imperialism? While they never preached pacifism they were in accord with the pacifists on most points. Then why this reversal? It must be remembered, first of all, that the overshadowing Bolshevik mental trait is an almost inconceivable sectarian megalomania. The sect is everything; outside of it the world, history, and humanity amount to little. Hence what appears to outsiders as a mental and moral somersault appears to them as a mere change of tactics in the struggle for power. But, in the course of this struggle, certain theories do appear and hold the field for a few months or years. Among these has been the theory that the war has destroyed all the foundations of society and so will introduce a

millennium—though the Bolsheviks were thoroughly anti-Utopian economists before the war. Now we read: “This imperialist war catastrophe has with one swoop swept away all the gains of parliamentary struggles,” etc., etc. (*Manifesto of the Communist International.*)

Then, connected with this theory of a bloody millennium ushered in with wars and dictatorships reminding one of the Mohammedans—to whom the Bolsheviks are making a special and successful appeal—there is the idea that it is the Bolsheviks and the “self-conscious proletarians” who follow them that are the chosen people with this Messianic mission to save the entire human race forthwith by the sword and propaganda. The *Manifesto of the Third International* (March, 1919), due largely to Lenine, throws light on the mental processes behind this theory—by which all the backward peoples, from Chinese and Hindus to American Negroes, are to be mobilized for Sovietism. Even at the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress of 1907, Lenine was playing with this thought—as the present writer can testify from having sat next to him and discussed the matter at length during the colonial debate. Even then he wanted all peoples to achieve immediate self-government without preparation. But it was only the new atmosphere of Soviet magic and world revolution caused by the war that led him to such an outré formula as this, that “the proletariat creates a new form of apparatus comprising the entire working class, irrespective of being ripe in an expert and political sense.” From this the transition is easy to Hottentot or any other Soviets and this direct appeal to all races to revolt: “Slaves of the colonies in Africa and Asia! The hour

of proletarian dictatorship in Europe will be the hour of your release!"'

Yet surely these slaves are not proletarians. For 90 per cent. of their social and economic system is precisely what it has been for centuries, and only a relatively small (if burdensome and inexcusable) amount of exploitation can be charged to foreign capital. Foreign capital may have held them back in this state, but that does not make them proletarians, i.e., persons exploited by capital—for this is Lenine's own use of the term, according to which he excludes an immense part even of the Russian peasantry from the proletariat!

It is not Bolshevik theories that lead to the Bolsheviks' faith that they are the chosen people destined to save humanity. It is the faith that they are the chosen people that leads to Bolshevik theories.

The Function of the Communist International.—The Bolsheviks have two immense international propaganda organizations, (1) the Ministry or Commissariat of Soviet Propaganda at Moscow, and (2) the Third or Communist Internationale, initiated by them and wholly under their control. Where revolutionary prospects are good, as in Germany, the two organizations are practically fused. Where prospects are not so good, as in America, they are kept separate so that the propaganda to secure "liberal" sympathy and support and openly to purchase the interest of traders and concessionaires may not be rendered futile by a simultaneous appeal to the revolutionists of the same countries. So while "Ambassador" Martens was doing business with American "radicals," "liberals," free traders, philanthropists, politicians, and certain newspapers and periodicals, the

Third Internationale was secretly busy with the various Communist organizations and with an effort to Sovietize the I. W. W. Though under orders from the Soviets and on intimate terms with the American Communists the connection of Martens with the revolutionary side of the propaganda seems impossible of proof—in America. But the connection of the two in Russia is complete, and the American Government publishes three dispatches (one dated January, 1920) from the Third Internationale and Soviet authorities that in themselves prove it—if proof were needed. One is a message captured from a Soviet courier by the Lettish Government and addressed to the American Communists by Zinoviev, the noted leader of the Soviets and President of the Executive Committee of the Third Internationale. The message *instructs* the American Communists (of the only two factions which had then joined the Soviet International—the American Socialist Party having joined later) as follows:

“The party must take into account the everyday incidents of the class war. The stage of verbal propaganda and agitation has been left behind. The time for decisive battles has arrived. The most important task confronting the American Communists at the present moment is to draw the wide proletarian masses into the path of revolutionary struggle. The party must have (for its object?) the dissolution of the American Federation of Labor and other unions associated with it and must strive to establish the closest connections with the I. W. W., the One Big Union, and the W. I. I. U. The party must support the foundation of the factory workers’ committees in factories, these serving as bases for the everyday struggle and for training the advance guard of labor in managing industry.”

The amalgamation of the *foreign speaking national federations* with the English-speaking party is insisted upon. Being better trained theoretically, the communication goes on to say, and more closely bound by the Russian revolutionary traditions, the members of the national federations may in the future have the guiding influence. *The employment of the referendum, it says, should be reduced to a minimum.*

"Referendums are considered undesirable during the period of disagreement," reads one of the conditions laid down in the plan of uniting the two American parties.

"Unless the workers of other countries rise against their own capitalists," runs the appeal to the American I. W. W.'s, "the Russian revolution cannot last."

Zinoviev states that the general strike, as advocated by the I. W. W., is insufficient to wrest power from the capitalist state. Armed insurrection, he says, must be employed.

The Bolsheviks' Communist International is so wholly occupied with international revolution that its meetings are concerned with nothing else.

The Dutch Communists published on March 20, 1920, a special edition of the Communist Tribune with a complete list of the resolutions adopted by the secret meeting of the Third Internationale held in February in Amsterdam.

Several of these resolutions include urgent appeals to Communists to support any movement furthering a world revolution, and declare "in order to further this action Communists in every country must use strike movements and mass demonstrations." Other resolutions call for stopping transportation, especially the transport of war materials.

"When in Germany or anywhere else a revolution breaks out," says one resolution, "the forces of the international proletariat, especially transport workers in England, America, Italy, France, Scandinavia and Holland, must prepare for a general strike at the moment the capitalist powers begin to intervene. Amsterdam must organize action as quickly as possible." (New York Times despatch, March 21, 1920.)

The Strength and Weakness of the World Revolt as the Basis of Sovietism.—In a speech at the last Soviet Congress (Moscow, January, 1920) Lenin at the very beginning of his address exposed the whole false foundation of Soviet reasoning. He declared, as reported by the friendly Lincoln Eyre:

"We have always said both before and after the October revolution that we regard ourselves merely as a detachment of the international army of the proletariat. It is only possible to count on a final victory of the Socialist revolution when the proletariat is victorious, at least in a number of advanced countries. This factor has created the chief difficulty that we have had to experience. This shouldn't surprise us, for it was easier to commence the Socialist revolution in a country like Russia than in more *advanced* countries."

Lenine regards Sovietism as being far on the road to victory, as the context and other declarations show. But a secure, permanent, and substantial victory depends upon revolts in advanced countries. In other words, he admits once more, as he has frequently admitted before, that Bolshevism cannot survive in a backward country like Russia, *where alone it has any strength.*

CHAPTER XVII

THE CAPTURE OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES BY BOLSHEVISM

A gross error prevails as to the attitude of the world's leading Socialist Parties towards Bolshevism. Most of these parties were dominated by advocates of democracy and peaceful parliamentary progress before the war and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Most of them are now dominated by advocates of violent revolution—"dictatorship of the proletariat."

There are still many prominent anti-Bolshevist Socialists in all countries, but they have been reduced to dwindling minorities on the entire Continent of Europe, with only a few exceptions—Belgium, Denmark, Sweden. About half of the leaders of the British Labor Party—if we regard that as a Socialist organization—are still anti-Bolshevist. The "American Socialist Party" is aligned with the Continent.

Whatever there is left of anti-Bolshevism was present at the two 1919 Congresses of the Second Socialist International, held at Berne in February and at Lucerne in August. But at these Congresses the anti-Bolsheviks (though in the majority) did not dare to take a vote either against Communism in general or against the Russian Bolsheviks.

They did show, however, that Bolshevism is opposed to traditional Socialism—not by a vote, but by the following expression of majority opinion:

"In full agreement with all previous Congresses of the International, the Berne Conference firmly adheres to the principles of Democracy. A reorganized society more and more permeated with Socialism, cannot be realised, much less permanently established, unless it rests upon triumphs of Democracy and is rooted in the principles of liberty."

"Since, in the opinion of the Conference, effective socialist development is only possible under democratic law, it is essential to eliminate at once any method of socialization which has no prospect of gaining the support of the majority of the people.

"A dictatorship of this character would be all the more dangerous if it were based upon the support of only one section of the working class. The inevitable consequence of such a régime would be the paralysis of working-class strength through fratricidal war. The inevitable end would be the dictatorship of reaction."

This demonstrates merely that the Socialist Parties of the world are getting more and more Bolshevik. For the most powerful Socialist Party in Europe outside of Russia, the Italian, with 160 members of parliament, has not only joined Lenine's Third International, but endorses Sovietism and communism, for Italy minority revolutions by violence for all countries, and the entire Lenine program.

The Socialists of Norway and several minor countries have followed. The Socialists of Switzerland and the United States, Spain, and several other countries, have decided they will belong to no International that does not contain the Bolsheviks of all countries. For them Russian Bolshevism is the greatest achievement of Socialism in history and—on the whole a model.

Sovietism and communism are under consideration

for adaptation to America, Switzerland, Spain, and these other countries—and they are doing everything in their power, concentrating a very large part of their energies to defending Sovietism, communism, and “the dictatorship of the proletariat” in Russia.

The Socialists of France, the Independent Socialists of Germany, etc., take the same ground. They are for an International with the Bolshevik parties, and they want to exclude all democratic Socialists. This was the ground they took at Berne and Lucerne—*voting against the resolution above quoted*.

Last Summer the American Socialist Party sent a member of its Executive Committee, James Oneal, to Europe to report on the International Socialist situation. Oneal’s report contains the following significant phrases favoring the Moscow International:

“The Moscow Congress certainly has in mind the ideals of Socialism, not the concept of communism of wealth, which has characterized many religious sects. Its membership is made up of all the elements of the Socialist movement that oppose war and militarism, relies upon the class struggle to chart the course of the movement, and keeps in mind the fact that the real struggle in the modern world is one between the workers of all countries as against the ruling classes of all countries.”

As a result of this report over one-third of the delegates of the present Socialist Party in their Chicago conference in September voted for immediate affiliation with Moscow. The other two-thirds were entirely in favor of affiliation, but desired to coöperate at the same time with German Independent Socialists and others already mentioned.

It is necessary to emphasize this tidal wave towards Sovietism, because the best known and greatest Socialists are anti-Bolsheviks, and their declarations have given the opposite impression.

Indeed no persons in the world are better qualified by intimate acquaintance with Lenin and Bolshevism and by their experience and knowledge to give a philosophic, statesmanlike and scientifically and practically accurate judgment. Kautsky and Bernstein in Germany, Henderson in England, Albert Thomas and Jules Guesde in France, Vandervelde in Switzerland, Branting in Sweden—the world has no higher authorities on such a question.

At the Lucerne Congress Vandervelde, now Belgian Minister of Justice and Chairman of the International until last Winter, declared that a socialism which did not recognize Parliaments and labor unions was no socialism. The Belgian delegates demanded the immediate and definite repudiation of the Soviets.

Edward Bernstein of the German Majority (the same who declared that nine out of every ten points of the Versailles Treaty were justified) pointed out that the Soviet idea of labor councils is reactionary when compared with the idea of labor unions. For the councils, being localized, scattered instead of concentrating the power of labor. All Bolshevism was in fact a reaction. "In spite of its revolutionary vocabulary it is pre-Marxian and Utopian. They had gone back for many of their ideas to Marx's anarchist antagonist, Bakunin. But they did not have the same excuse as Bakunin, for fifty years of history had followed to demonstrate his errors."

At the same Congress, J. R. MacDonald, long Chair-

man of the British Labor Party, declared that the Soviet régime was "destructive, not constructive, reactionary, not progressive" and that there was no alternative to democracy.

Arthur Henderson, leader of the British Labor Party, wrote:

"Socialism without democracy is nonsense. We know what the situation is in Russia. We are in a position to judge it. I was there during the revolution, and I could see that Bolshevism is oppression, violence, terror, and nothing else."

"We repudiate any policy of violence, whether it comes from above or below."

"For the reëstablishment of the Socialist International, we must necessarily put a line of demarcation between the purely destructive Bolshevism and constructive Socialism pure and simple."

Karl Kautsky, the best known Socialist authority alive, rejects utterly the Bolshevik propaganda for revolution in such democratic countries as France, England, and America.

The chief argument in favor of Sovietism, an argument used to me personally by Lenin in 1906—and to be found throughout all his writings and speeches—is that only when a temporary dictatorship can set up a model Socialist régime can the masses see whether they want it or not. They learn not from propaganda but from "the accomplished fact." True, but this accomplished fact, according to Kautsky, consists not in temporary dictatorships in economically and intellectually backward countries, but in the continued progress made by peaceful democratic means in the advanced democratic nations.

The world's highest Socialist authority does not mince his words in dealing with Bolshevism since he regards it as the antithesis of democratic Socialism. He says the Bolsheviks have conquered their enemies by "exploiting the lack of education and the lowest instincts of the workers."

"Bolshevism has replaced the Socialist struggle for the liberation of all mankind by passions of vengeance and outbursts of cruelty against all liberty loving citizens.

"Bolshevism has contributed nothing to the moral uplifting of the proletariat; on the contrary, Bolshevism has completely demoralized the working class."

Kautsky and Bernstein, both of whom have been deeply interested in the emancipation of Russia for half a century and understand Russian Socialism thoroughly, regard the entire Bolshevik movement as a reaction and a counter movement against the socialistic democracy established by Kerensky.

"The Bolsheviks are the real counter-revolutionists in Russia. They are the executioners of the Revolution."

Following the Spartacists, the German Independents have gone into the Bolshevik camp. This leaves only the Socialist minority which is now leading the German coalition government under Ebert and Bauer. Undoubtedly the Swiss will follow and probably also the French, as shown in the resolution proposed at their 1920 Congress (at Strassbourg) by the leader of the Party, Jean Longuet; its Secretary, Frossard, and a

group of 40 other pro-Bolsheviks. The resolution, which briefly sums up the entire International Socialist situation, is in part as follows:

"The efforts made by the French Socialist Party at Berne and Lucerne to re-align the Second International with the aid of the left wing of that organization are henceforth destined to complete failure and the regrouping of revolutionary Socialist forces, upon the traditional bases of international Socialism is an urgent duty.

"The Party declares that in view of its present membership the Second International no longer corresponds with the revolutionary situation of most countries—which demands a new International. Besides the Second International contains only a part of the Socialist workingmen of the world. It is now confronted by the Third International, formed at Moscow in March, 1919, which presents an uncompromising program of class struggle, as formulated by the communist manifesto (1847) and by the resolution of the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam (1904)—the fundamental chartas of all Socialist movements and activities. To that new International belong—besides a majority of the Russian Socialists—the Socialist parties of Italy, Norway, Serbia, and Roumania and factions in Sweden, Denmark, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, America, and England.

"Besides these, three important organizations have left the Second International: The Swiss Socialist Party, the Socialist Party of the United States, and the Independent Party of Germany. This last named organization has decided in its Congress of December, 1919, to negotiate with the revolutionary groups of western Europe and to present itself at the Congress of the

Third International with the combination thus formed. If it does not succeed in this grouping it has decided to join the Third International anyway.

"The French Socialist Party endorses with all its power the suggestion of the German Independents and will work for the world unity of Socialism by the fusion of all elements of the Second International which have remained faithful to the class-struggle with the groups that compose the Third International.

"Because of the capitalist governments of the Entente it is impossible to know the details of the Russian revolution or to judge in a complete way all its work and its actions. But the French Socialist Party, in agreement in any case with all proletarian emancipation movements, considers that none of the fundamental declarations of the Moscow International is in contradiction with the essential principles of Socialism, that the dictatorship of the proletariat—destined to assure the passage of capitalist society into a Socialist régime—is the basis of every concept of revolution, and that the institution of workingmen's councils is evidently one of the most effective means of accomplishing that transfer of power."

The Strassbourg Congress, after a bitter struggle, refused to join the Communist Internationale at once—on Lenine's terms. But it adopted the Longuet resolution!

In a national referendum, completed in January, 1920, the membership of the American Socialist Party, which constitutes its highest authority, voted to join the Third International (the Communists). The report was adopted by a vote of 3475, against 1444 for the "majority" report.

The minority report, which the party membership

adopted, was signed by J. Louis Engdahl and William F. Kruse. Engdahl at the time was official Socialist editor and Kruse had been secretary of the Young People's Socialist League. Both of them, together with Victor Berger, were convicted in the Chicago Socialist trial of violation of the Espionage Act, and sentenced. The case is now on appeal.

The manifesto unanimously adopted by the Socialist convention in September, 1919, offered support to the Soviets, but the resolutions adopted by the party membership more specifically came out for the Third International.

The manifesto declared:

“We, the organized Socialists of America, pledge our support to the revolutionary workers of Russia in the maintenance of their Soviet Government.”

The resolution on international relations now adopted says:

“We consider that the second international ceased to function as an international Socialist body on the outbreak of the world war.

“Any international, to be effective in this crisis, must contain only those elements who take their stand unreservedly upon the basis of the class struggle, and who by their deeds demonstrate that their adherence to this principle is not mere lip loyalty.

“The second international is dead. We consider that a new international which contains those groups which contributed to the downfall of our former organization must be so weak in its Socialist policy as to be useless.

“The Socialist Party of the United States, in principle and in its past history, has always stood with those elements of other countries that re-

mained true to their principles. The manifestoes adopted in national convention at St. Louis (1917) and Chicago (1919) as well as referendum (D) 1919, unequivocally affirm this stand. These parties, the majority parties of Russia, Italy, Switzerland, Norway, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and growing minorities in every land, are uniting on the basis of the preliminary convocation at Moscow of the third international. As in the past, so in this extreme crisis, we must take our stand with them."

The American Socialists Join the Communist International.—Following the adoption of the minority resolution by the party membership, official application was made on March 18 for membership in Lenine's Communist International by Otto Branstetter, national executive secretary of the party.

Thus the American party has gone the way of the Italians—not even stopping at the half-way house of the French Socialists. So nearly all of the leading Socialist Parties of the world—assuming that the British and Australian Labor Parties, as their names imply, are not altogether Socialist—have either joined with the Bolsheviks, who have repudiated the very name Socialist, or indicated their intention to do so in the immediate future.

And these are the leading popular parties in most of the countries of Continental Europe! Nor is the pro-Bolshevist tendency of a large section of the powerful British Labor Party any less marked!

The Soviet Government and the Communist Internationale.—The identity of the control of the Soviet Government and the Communist Internationale is shown by the original printed documents issued by these organ-

izations and their leaders, and by the Russian Communist Party which binds them together. The United States Government issued (on April 11th, 1920) a large collection of these, upon which it reaches the conclusion that "while the Soviet institutions, as such, may agree to abstain from subversive propaganda abroad, neither the Russian Communist Party nor the Third International would be bound thereby."

The State Department summarizes this mass of evidence as follows:

"The program of the Russian Communist Party is one of world revolution, and the Communist International is avowedly the directing and coördinating center of an international revolutionary movement to establish the 'world Soviet republic.' It is impossible to differentiate as to world policy between the Russian Communist Party, the Third or Communist International, and the official Soviet administration because of the system of interlocking directorates common to all three.

"The most authoritative statements with respect to the official relations of the three organizations are utterances of these leaders who occupy directing positions in all three—not as individuals, but as members of the Communist Party. It is this interlocking directorate created by the common personnel which establishes that the Communist Party, the Soviets and the Third International constitute a single movement backed by all the administrative machinery and resources of Soviet Russia, directed to the instigation of revolutions in other countries to establish the proposed 'world Soviet republic.'

"The Communist Party of Russia, the Russian Soviets and the Third Internationale are so closely interrelated as to constitute actually if not technically one working organization.

"The call for the first congress of the Communist Internationale, later called the Third International, was signed by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Lenine, Trotzky, Zineviev, Stalin, Bukharin, Tchitcherin, Obolensky (Osinsky) and Vorovsky), four of whom hold the highest official positions in the Soviet Hierarchy.

"The eighth All-Russian Congress of the Communist Party, meeting a few weeks later, passed a formal resolution adhering to the platform of the Third International in its entirety. In an introductory speech at the opening session of the Congress, Lenine emphasized the importance of funding the Third International and, in a speech summarizing the work of the Congress said: 'We approved the creation of the Third Communist International.' At a special session the Communist Party *in conjunction with official Soviet institutions* passed a resolution supporting the Communist or Third International.

"The Third International has an executive committee, the chairman of which is Zineviev, as shown in a typical 'appeal to the proletarians of all countries' issued in the name of the Third International, published in *Izvestia*, Nov. 2, 1919. Documents quoted show that Zineviev is also chairman or president of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, and a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In addition, he is chairman of the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Communist Party and constantly makes reports at conferences and meetings of that party.

"Bukharin is the Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Third International. He is also a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and of the Presidential body of the Third Congress of Soviets of National Economy. Bukharin is also editor of the Moscow *Pravda*, which is an official organ of the Russian Communist Party.

"The Executive Committee of the Third International has its headquarters at Smolny Institute. Smolny Institute is also the headquarters of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

"The Executive Committee of the Communist International has an official organ called the Communist International, the first issue of which appeared March 1, 1919 (in the files of the department in Russian, French and German editions, published simultaneously). The editorial office of this publication is indicated on its title page as 'Petrograd, Smolny, office of G. Zineviev' and on the cover the 'Kremlin, Moscow,' the headquarters of the Central Soviet institutions precedes the indication 'Petrograd, Smolny.' A wireless dated Petrograd, Jan. 16, 1920, gives the contents of the seventh number of this publication, stating that 'it is published at Petrograd under the direction of Zineviev, in Russian, English, French and German.'

"This particular number contains articles by Lenin, Trotzky, Sadoul and Zineviev. There is also an article entitled 'American and Russian Revolution' by S. Rutgers, and one on 'The Revolutionary Movement in America' by Reed.

"The Communist International, as such, gives not only encouragement but direction and even orders to Communist parties of other countries.

"The wireless stations in Russia are under strict official Soviet control. They are used for administrative purposes and also to distribute news through the official telegraph agency, the Rosta. The appeals issued by the Executive Committee of the Communist Internationale are sent out by wireless. Messages to representatives of Communist groups of other countries are similarly sent out by the official wireless as, for example, the one sent out by Buk-

harin to representatives of the Austrian Communist Party.

"Soviet officials, in addressing Soviet institutions, constantly refer to the Third International. Thus Zineviev, as President of the Petrograd Soviet, addressing a special session of that body, said: 'Long live the future ruler of the world, the great Communist International.' Later, in opening the session of the newly elected Petrograd Soviet, Zineviev refers to Petrograd as 'the key of the Third International,' and speaks of the Petrograd Soviet as 'the guardian and keeper of the key.'

"In an order to the Red Army, issued by the Petrograd Military Circuit, the Third Communist International is mentioned as the 'Great Uniter of the Proletarians.'

"A leading article in the Krasnaya Gazeta, an official organ of the Petrograd Soviet, speaks of the English working class as entering 'into direct relations with us,' and interprets this as 'the first step of our English brothers on the road to the Third International.' Thus the general attitude of all the Bolshevik leaders with respect to the Third International is that it represents one of their most important activities."

One of the documents quoted shows in a few lines the purely sectarian nature of the movement and the unprincipled means by which it maintains its hold over its half-educated and in practical matters inexperienced following:

"*In the party press,*" one of the reports submitted to the Communist Congress declared, "*every line should express the principles of communism.*" The simplest news item should pass through a kind of prism and be accordingly reflected in the press. In the heading of any communication and in the

headline of any telegram, in a word, everywhere there must be this touch. Formerly papers were for the most part commercial enterprises. With us it is a governmental communist apparatus, created to serve the proletariat. *The paper must be the lash which people fear.*"

Newspapers which are not unprincipled propaganda sheets, but commercial enterprises can keep their circulation in competition with other newspapers only by making a very broad appeal to many kinds of readers and to a wide variety of human interests. It is only where there is a governmental control of printing presses and paper, together with the prohibition or rigid control of all opposition opinion that any such sectarian policy can be followed. It is the very foundation of the momentary "success" of Sovietism.



APPENDICES

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I—*Sovietism and Religion*

Without an important exception the Communist leaders are militant and "ostentatious" atheists, and regard anti-religious propaganda as one of the foundations of their movement. One of their American branches (the Federation of Russian Workers) even places the propaganda against religion before the propaganda for communism—a manifesto declaring, "We hate religion. . . . And we declare war upon all gods and religious fables. We are atheists," and coming to communism only in the next paragraph.

The attitude is not that of the mere non-believer of the type of Voltaire, Tom Paine, Herbert Spencer or the modern scientific and humane writers on the psychology or history of religion. Religion is regarded not as an intellectual error of the race, nor as a means of oppression in some of its manifestations, but as being *solely* a means of class rule and the maintenance of the existing social system. They are anti-religious fanatics as violent in their beliefs as any of the superstitious religious fanatics of past centuries.

When they first obtained power the Bolsheviks attempted almost spontaneously to put this theory into practice by every conceivable form of persecution. Many of their leaders declared that religion and God were to be "**abolished**," and some of the early decrees went far

in this direction, as that forbidding religious instruction even in private schools. Priests were killed and churches plundered on a large scale. But the Bolsheviks had not yet worked out their anti-religious policies, and some of their leaders, like Lenin, had always pointed out the impossibility of the sudden and forcible conversion of the peasant 90 per cent.

A policy has now been formulated. It consists in the cessation of all public and systematic persecution and the use of the entire machinery of the Soviets, schools, monopolized press, and other official propaganda, for one vast campaign against religion. As Bukharin declares, "Religion is a private affair; this does not mean that we (i.e., the Soviets) must not oppose religion by all persuasive means." We have noted the Bolshevik methods of persuasion! As the leading Roman Catholic dignitary of Russia, Archbishop Ropp, declares,

"Bolshevism, despite its ostentatious atheism, does not prevent Christian work in churches, but there is a constant effort to demoralize the youth of the country. Their theory is that a child does not belong to the parents, but to the state."

The Soviets are now moderating their anti-religious campaign somewhat *in order to make it more effective*. But there is not the slightest modification in spirit. Anti-religious propaganda is the twin sister of Communist propaganda, and both are still functions (indeed, the chief functions) of government!

The Communist organization and the Soviet organization are absolutely one—but two phases of a single movement, as the Bolsheviks never grow weary of declaring—though, of course, they also deny the conne-

tion whenever more convenient. The present Soviet policy on religion was formulated at the 18th Communist Congress (March 11-23, 1919) as follows:

"With respect to religion the Russian Communist Party is not satisfied to stop with the separation of Church from state and school from church, already effected by (Soviet) decrees, that is, measures which bourgeois democracies put forward in their programs, but have never carried out to the logical conclusion because of the many strong ties between capital and religious propaganda.

"The Russian Communist Party is guided by the firm conviction that only the realization of initiative and consciousness on the part of the masses in all social and economic activities, will bring about the complete eradication of religious prejudices. The Party strives to destroy completely the connection between the exploited classes and the organization of religious propaganda, thus assisting the actual liberation of the toiling masses from religious prejudices and *organizing the broadest possible scientific-educational and anti-religious propaganda*. In this connection one must carefully avoid giving any offense to the feelings of religiously inclined persons, which would only lead to the strengthening of religious fanaticism."

It may be doubted if the peasants and their natural religious leaders will be deceived by the new manner of this propaganda. They will know that their confiscated property is being used in large part to teach their children what they do not believe and to fill the press with a propaganda directed against some of the ideals and principles they hold most dear.

After Lenin, Bukharin, editor of the *Pravda*, is the great Communist theorist and he is the leading authority

on religion as well as a high official in the Soviets and the Communist International. This is what Buckharin says (in his book "The A B C of Communism," published in Moscow last October) about the attitude of his party and government toward religion:

"There are some soft-headed Communists who say that their religion does not prevent them from being Communists. They say that 'they believe both in God and in Communism!' Such a view is fundamentally wrong: religion and communism do not go together either in theory or in practice. Between the precepts of communism and those of the Christian religion, there is an impassable barrier."

Buckharin has written a pamphlet especially for the guidance of Soviet educators entitled "Church and School in the Soviet Republic" (republished by the Russian Socialist Federation of New York, in 1919). Here are some striking paragraphs:

"One of the means for casting darkness into the popular mind is the belief in God and the Devil, in evil and good spirits (angels and saints)—*religion*. The mass of the people has become accustomed to believe in all this, and meanwhile, if we examine the matter thoroughly and understand whence religion has arisen as well as why religion is so strongly upheld by the ruling class (bourgeoisie), it will become comprehensible what the present significance of religion is, that it is a poison with which they have been and still are poisoning the people. It will also then become understandable why the Communist party is the decided opponent of religion.

"The word God (Bog) comes from the word rich (bogaty).

"It is an interesting fact that all names of God

testify to this origin of religion. What does the word 'God' mean? Whence does it come? God (Bog) means strong, powerful, rich (bogaty). How still in contradistinction to the slave. In the prayers they say: We are the slaves."

This play upon the word for God in Russian is an especially unprincipled deception of the illiterate Russian peasant, the suggestion being that it is the same in other languages. Bukharin continues:

"Thus the belief in God is the casting away of filthy earthly connections, it is a belief in slavery, not only on earth but throughout the universe.

"War breaks out, people perish by the millions, and oceans of blood is spilled. An explanation must be found for this. Those who do not believe in God look at the how, the what, and the wherefore: they see that the war was schemed by the czars, emperors and the presidents, by the fat bourgeoisie and the landlords: they see that it is waged for the sake of rapacious and filthy ends. And therefore they say to the laborers of all countries: 'Take up arms against your oppressors, cast capital from its thrones!' A religious man is an entirely different matter. He reasons thus (and at the same time groans like an old woman): 'The Lord has punished us for our sins. O father, emperor of heaven, thou hast rightly chastized us sinners.' And if he is very religious and at the same time orthodox, then he begins to zealously chew one kind of food instead of another on certain days (this is called 'doing reverence'), and does a thousand other stupid things. Just such stupid things are performed by the religious Jew, the Mohammedan Tartar, the Buddhistic Chinese, and in a word by all believers in God. Hence it is apparent that those who really are believers are incapable of any struggle. Religion thus

not only leaves the people in barbarism but contributes toward keeping them in slavery. The religious man is rather inclined to the belief that everything must be borne without resistance (because everything, he says, 'is from God'), and that it is necessary to submit to the authorities and suffer, (for 'in the other world you will be rewarded 100-fold'). It is therefore no wonder that the reigning capitalistic classes deem religion a very useful weapon for keeping the people stupid."

Here we see the highly educated Bukharin deliberately hiding from the Russian peasant that there are in the world any religious people, Christian, Jewish or other, except the grossly superstitious with which they are familiar.

He next proceeds to spread the idea that almost all religions are engines of autocratic governments, like the State Churches of the Kaisers and the Czars:

"We have seen that the bourgeoisie maintains itself not only with bayonets but also by stupefying the minds of its slaves. We have seen on the other hand that the bourgeoisie poisons the minds of its subjects in an organized and planned manner. This purpose is served by a special organization, viz, the church, the ecclesiastical organization of the government. The church in almost all capitalistic countries is as much of a government organization as the police, and the priest is as much of a government official as the sheriff, gendarme or detective. He receives a government salary for the poison which he spreads among the popular masses."

Surely these quotations are enough to show the utterly unprincipled and crude nature of the official Soviet anti-religious propaganda—and the thoroughly dishonest character of their propaganda generally.

I can safely leave to the reader's imagination the inevitable "working out" of such a policy in such hands.

II—The Soviets as a Military Menace; the "Labor Army" a Cloak for Large and Permanent Professional Army

"We shall call our troops a labor army," said Zinoviev in a recent speech in Petrograd (quoted in "Soviet Russia" April 3rd, 1920).

Trotzky developed this thought at great length at the Third All-Russian Congress of the "National Economic Congress" in January, declaring that the military forces must be kept both mobilized and under arms. He said:

"If we have learned anything in the civil war it is certainly circumspection. While keeping the army under arms, we may use it for economic purposes, with the possibility of sending it to the front in case of need." (The Bolshevik official organ, Izvestia, January 29th, 1920.)

The use of this army to inaugurate compulsory labor and to function economically does not therefore interfere in any way with its military function. The military force has not been disbanded and converted into an economic force. On the contrary the two functions have been fused. It is just as much a military as an economic policy. We can see this from the language of Trotzky's entire speech. He continued:

"This experiment is of the most vital moral and material importance. We cannot mobilize the peasants by means of trade unions, and the trade

unions themselves do not possess any means of laying hold of millions of peasants. *They can best be mobilized on a military footing.* Their labor formations will have to be organized on a military model—labor platoons, labor companies, labor battalions, disciplined as required, for *we shall have to deal with masses which have not passed through trade union trading.* This is a matter of the near future.

"We shall be compelled to create new military organizations such as exist already in the form of our armies. It is therefore urgent to utilize them by adapting them to economic requirements.

"That is exactly what we are doing now."

At the Convention of the Communist Party on March 27th the critical international diplomatic situation of the Soviets and their difficulties in securing recognition led Trotzky to say less about the purely military motives which lay at the bottom of his scheme. But no fundamental change was made in the Red "Labor" Army to make it any less a military organization than it was before. On the contrary it was always military discipline that was emphasized.

At this Congress Trotzky was brutally frank in his outline of the "civil war" use of the Red Army—under its new title. It was to be employed to coerce, not so much the unskilled workers, who have for the most part long ago submitted to the Soviets, but such skilled workers as those of the railroads and that 90 per cent. of the population, the peasantry. In reading the following quotation from Trotzky's speech it will be evident that this coercion has just as much value for the purposes of preventing any possible insurrections, rebellions or revolts, as it has for the purpose of securing new labor power. At this Congress Trotzky said:

"Mobilization is more necessary now than it was formerly," he declared, "because we have to deal with the peasant population and the masses of unskilled labor which cannot be utilized to the fullest extent by any other means than military discipline."

Trotzky declared the working army, which is built on the principle of compulsory work, is no less productive than was the old system of competition, and came out in favor of personal rather than collective administration (dictatorship). He asserted that "political" administration of railroads was unsatisfactory and temporary, adding, however, that it was necessary, because railroad workers are more *conservative* in tendency than men engaged in other branches of labor.

(As quoted by the Official Soviet wireless.)

If, in connection with this permanent Red Army, we recall the Soviets' boast that their propaganda has so permeated the armies of western Europe that none will fight against them, we can see that here is a military menace of the first magnitude—an immense, well organized army led by aggressive and unprincipled fanatics with world conquest—by arms, revolution, or propaganda—as the first point of their program!

Even if the Soviets are mistaken about the strength of the pro-Bolshevist sentiment in Europe and America, even if there are circumstances under which western armies might fight—in their own defense or in the defense of the smaller nations—nevertheless, the success of the Soviet armies (however inconsiderable the resistance they had to meet) has convinced the Bolsheviks that they are invincible. This *idea* in itself makes future aggression almost certain.

But the Soviets have fairly good grounds for this

belief in their military superiority. For propaganda is a recognized means of warfare. As the Soviet radiogram quoted on page 81 declares, it is often more effective than artillery fire. By every imaginable falsehood against other governments, by every conceivable false statement that could appeal to the average man, the Bolsheviks have developed by far the most effective military weapon yet known. With this weapon they have had an almost uninterrupted success. It is by this weapon—largely—that they hope to conquer.

III—The Communist Party's Official Functions in the Soviet Government

Besides a rigid control over the Red Army, the bureaucracy, the Soviets, the schools and the press, the Russian Communist Party has endowed itself with many specific government functions. A memorandum of the United States Government describes some of these as follows, giving the original printed documents in the Appendices referred to ((see "Memorandum on the Bolshevik or Communist Party in Russia and its Relations to the Third or Communist International and the Russian Soviets")):

The Communist Party, as such, has assumed definite administrative functions. This took place first in connection with the organization of the Extraordinary Commissions to Combat Counter-Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation in the first months of 1918. At first these commissions were simply local party organizations, though later they became attached to the local Soviets and to the Central Executive Committee. (For discussion of this point see "Memorandum on Certain Aspects

of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia," p. 9, in which statements are taken from the official Weekly of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, of October 27, 1918.)

In connection with the mobilization in 1918, instructions were sent out by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in which it is stated that the—

Provincial Committee of the Party is responsible for carrying out the cantonal mobilization which was set by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, and by the Soviet of Defense on April 25, 1919.

In these same instructions members of the Party were ordered to perform the definite functions of verifying, in collaboration with the Provincial Military Commissaries, the lists of former officers in civil positions. (For text of these instructions, see Appendix XI.) The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party sent instructions not only to Provincial Committees of the Party but also to the above mentioned Provincial Military Commissaries (announcement appearing in the Petrograd "Pravda" of May 1, 1919, Appendix XII).

In connection with the organization of a "Workmen's-Peasants' University" which was to be a kind of normal school attached to the official People's Commissariat of the Interior, students had to be supplied not only with a certificate of the local Executive Committee, but also with a recommendation of a Communist organization. The program of this university included among the subjects taught "The Russian Communist Party and its History." (Appendix XIII.) Also, in connection with the development of general educational work in the vil-

laces, an extract from the resolution of the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, held in March, 1919 (Appendix XIV) shows that "*departments of public education, in provinces and districts, with the assistance and under the control of local party organizations, organize colleges of propaganda. . . .*"

Committees of the Russian Communist Party sit in joint session with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as well as with other official Soviet institutions. Such an instance is described in the Severnaya Kommuna of March 7, 1919 (Appendix XV), at which resolutions were passed "in the name of Soviet Russia."

In announcing the reëlection of People's Judges in Petrograd, a news item in the Krasnaya Gazeta of December 20, 1919, states that "the reëlection of judges and the confirmation of the new judges will take place in the ward committees of the party." (Appendix XVI.)


Attached to each unit of the Red Army is a so-called Political Section, which receives instructions from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. (See Appendix XXII.)¹

In a widely published letter by Lenin, addressed to workmen and peasants on the occasion of the victory over Kolchak, one finds it stated that—

"The dictatorship of the working class is carried out by the Party of Bolsheviks, which, as early as 1905, and earlier, became one with the revolutionary proletariat."

¹ This Political Section has supreme power, except over technical military matters. It freely distributes penalties, including capital punishment.







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